

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES

**Final Evaluation Report**  
**TÜRKIYE EARTHQUAKE**  
**RESPONSE EMERGENCY APPEAL**

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b><i>Acknowledgments</i></b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b><i>Disclaimer</i></b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b><i>Evaluation Management Team (EMT) and Focal Points</i></b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b><i>Acronyms</i></b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b><i>List Of Figures and Tables</i></b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b><i>Executive Summary</i></b> .....	<b>8</b>
<b>1. Background</b> .....	<b>8</b>
<b>2. Purpose of the Evaluation</b> .....	<b>8</b>
<b>3. Methodology</b> .....	<b>8</b>
<b>4. Limitations</b> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>5. Analysis and Key Findings</b> .....	<b>9</b>
5.1. Enabling Factors and Outcomes: Overarching Findings from the Türkiye Response .....	9
5.2. Identifying and Selecting the Population Reached .....	10
5.3. CVA Modality & Management .....	11
5.4. Information Management (IM) & Accountability Towards Stakeholders.....	12
5.5. Registration and Data Management.....	12
<b>6. Selected Lessons Learned</b> .....	<b>13</b>
6.1. Identifying and Selecting the Population Reached .....	13
6.2. CVA Modality & Management .....	14
6.3. Information Management & Accountability Towards Stakeholders .....	14
6.4. Registration and Data Management.....	14
<b>7. Priority Recommendations</b> .....	<b>14</b>
7.1. Identifying and Selecting the Population Reached .....	14
7.2. CVA Modality & Management .....	15
7.3. Information Management & Accountability Towards Stakeholders .....	15
7.4. Registration and Data Management.....	15
7.5. One Additional Recommendation .....	15
<b>8. Conclusion</b> .....	<b>15</b>
<b>1. Introduction</b> .....	<b>17</b>
<b>1.1. Context</b> .....	<b>17</b>
<b>1.2. Response</b> .....	<b>17</b>
<b>2. Purpose Of The Evaluation</b> .....	<b>18</b>
<b>3. Methodology</b> .....	<b>19</b>
3.1 Evaluation Design.....	19
3.1.2 Data collection methods .....	20
Observation.....	22

3.1.3	Methods used for quantitative and qualitative data analysis and triangulation .....	22
3.1.4	Sampling techniques .....	23
	<b>Evaluation Questions.....</b>	<b>24</b>
	<b>Limitations.....</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>4.</b>	<b><i>Analysis &amp; Key Findings</i>.....</b>	<b>25</b>
4.1.	<b>Enabling Factors and Outcomes: Overarching Findings from the Türkiye Response .....</b>	<b>25</b>
4.2.	<b>Identifying and Selecting the Population Reached .....</b>	<b>28</b>
4.2.1.	Targeting Approach and Implementation .....	28
4.2.2.	Prioritization of Vulnerable Populations .....	29
4.2.3.	Coordination and Data Management.....	30
4.2.4.	Support to Refugees and Host Communities .....	31
4.2.5.	Adaptation of the Response .....	32
4.2.6.	Delays or Gaps in the Response .....	35
4.2.7.	Inclusion and Exclusion in Beneficiary Selection .....	36
4.2.8.	Core Operational Components for Scalability .....	37
4.3.	<b>CVA Modality &amp; Management .....</b>	<b>38</b>
4.3.1.	Programmes Analysis and Findings .....	39
4.3.2.	Delivery Mechanisms .....	43
4.3.3.	Transition of Modalities .....	50
4.3.4.	Modality Effectiveness .....	50
4.4.	<b>Information Management &amp; Accountability Towards Stakeholders.....</b>	<b>52</b>
4.4.1.	Innovative Information Management Practices .....	53
4.4.2.	Best Practices in Community Engagement and Accountability.....	54
4.4.3.	Areas to improve in Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA).....	59
4.5.	<b>Registration and Data Management .....</b>	<b>60</b>
4.5.1.	Registration Process: Methods and Sources .....	60
4.5.2.	Data Management: Systems and Integration.....	61
4.5.3.	Role of Partnerships .....	62
4.5.4.	Innovations and Lessons .....	63
<b>5.</b>	<b><i>Lessons Learned</i> .....</b>	<b>65</b>
5.1.	<b>Identifying and Selecting the Population Reached .....</b>	<b>65</b>
5.2.	<b>CVA Modality &amp; Management .....</b>	<b>65</b>
5.3.	<b>Information Management &amp; Accountability Towards Stakeholders.....</b>	<b>66</b>
5.4.	<b>Registration and Data Management .....</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>6.</b>	<b><i>Conclusion And Recommendations</i> .....</b>	<b>67</b>
6.1.	<b>Identifying and Selecting the Population Reached .....</b>	<b>67</b>
6.2.	<b>CVA Modality &amp; Management .....</b>	<b>69</b>
6.3.	<b>Information Management &amp; Accountability Towards Stakeholders.....</b>	<b>70</b>
6.4.	<b>Registration and Data Management .....</b>	<b>71</b>

6.5. One Additional Conclusion and Recommendation .....	72
<b>7. Conclusions .....</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>Annex.....</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Annex I. List of Literature Review.....</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Annex II. List Of Key Informant Interviews and Participants In The Focus Group Discussion .....</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>Annex III. Field Trip Agenda .....</b>	<b>80</b>
<b>Annex IV. Survey Questionnaires .....</b>	<b>83</b>
Online Survey Questionnaire PNS.....	83
Online Survey Questionnaire TRC.....	87
Online Survey Questionnaire People Reached .....	95
<b>Annex V. Focus Groups and Key Informant Interviews Questions.....</b>	<b>100</b>
Community Focus Groups Questions.....	100
Key Informant Interviews Questions (IFRC & TRC) .....	101
Key Informant Interviews Questions - Stakeholders .....	104
<b>Annex VI. Term of Reference .....</b>	<b>106</b>
<b>Annex VII. Evaluation Matrix .....</b>	<b>113</b>
<b>Annex VIII. Conclusion and Recommendation Matrix .....</b>	<b>118</b>

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## DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this Final Evaluation are solely those of the consultant team and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the IFRC, Partner National Societies (PNS), or the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC).

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## ACRONYMS

Acronym	Description
<b>Appeal</b>	Emergency Appeal MDRHT004
<b>AFAD</b>	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (from its Turkish acronym)
<b>BRC</b>	British Red Cross
<b>CC</b>	Community Centers
<b>CEA</b>	Community Engagement and Accountability
<b>CHF</b>	Swiss francs (currency)
<b>CSC</b>	Community Service Centres
<b>CSOs</b>	Civil Societies Organizations
<b>CM</b>	Case Management
<b>CVA</b>	Cash and Voucher Assistance
<b>DTT</b>	Data Triangulation Tracking Table
<b>DRC</b>	Danish Red Cross
<b>DREF</b>	Disaster Response Emergency Fund
<b>DRR</b>	Disaster Risk Reduction
<b>ERP</b>	Enterprise Resource Planning
<b>ESSN</b>	Emergency Social Service Net
<b>FGDs</b>	Focus Group Discussions
<b>GRC</b>	German Red Cross
<b>HD</b>	Humanitarian Diplomacy
<b>HR</b>	Human Resources
<b>HNS</b>	Host National Society
<b>HR</b>	Human Resources
<b>HSP</b>	Humanitarian Service Points
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IDPs</b>	Internally Displaced Persons
<b>IFRC</b>	The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
<b>IHL</b>	International Humanitarian Law
<b>IM</b>	Information Management
<b>INGOs</b>	International Non-Governmental Organizations
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>KII</b>	Key Informant Interviews
<b>MHPPS</b>	Mental Health and Psychosocial Support
<b>MPCA</b>	Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-Governmental Organizations
<b>MIRA</b>	Multi-Cluster/Sectoral Initial Rapid Assessment
<b>NS</b>	National Society
<b>OCAC</b>	Organization Capacity Assessment and Certification
<b>OIM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>PER</b>	Preparedness for Effective Response
<b>PFA</b>	Psychological First Aid
<b>PGI</b>	Protection, Gender, and Inclusion
<b>PMER</b>	Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Unit
<b>PNS</b>	Partner National Society
<b>PSEAH</b>	Protection Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment
<b>ROE</b>	Regional Office for Europe
<b>RCRC</b>	Red Cross and Red Crescent
<b>SEAH</b>	Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment
<b>SPRM</b>	Strategic Partnerships and Resource Mobilization Unit

Acronym	Description
TRC	Turkish Red Crecent
ToR	Terms of Reference
TRY	Turkish Lira
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugee

## LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure	Description
Figure 1	<a href="#">Map of Consultancy Field Visit Locations</a>
Figures 2, 3 and 4	<a href="#">Photos: Mobile dormitory</a>
Figure 5	<a href="#">Effectiveness of the Prioritization Process in Reaching the Most Vulnerable</a>
Figure 6	<a href="#">Assessment and Response to Displaced, Host, and Refugee Communities by TRC</a>
Figure 7	<a href="#">Provision of Timely Support</a>
Figure 8	<a href="#">Photo: ESEN card</a>
Figure 9	<a href="#">Preferred Methods for CVA</a>
Table 1	<a href="#">CVA Modalities</a>
Figure 10	<a href="#">Providing Information to the Community</a>
Figure 11	<a href="#">TRC Contact Posters</a>
Figure 12	<a href="#">Data Management: Systems and Integration</a>
Figure 13	<a href="#">Beneficiary Satisfaction</a>

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### 1. BACKGROUND

In February 2023, devastating earthquakes struck southeastern Türkiye, killing over 53,000 people, injuring 107,000, and displacing 3 million. Some 15.7 million people were affected, including 1.8 million Syrian refugees, with massive damage to housing and services compounding pre-existing vulnerabilities and USD 6.4 billion in agricultural losses. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) launched a CHF 750 million Emergency Appeal on behalf of the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC), raising CHF 500 million for shelter, health, food security, livelihoods, protection, WASH, and psychosocial support. TRC mobilized its nationwide network to deliver assistance to 1.34 million people, while IFRC coordinated the Federation-wide response, led the shelter cluster, and provided technical and surge support. More than 20 assessments informed the shift to recovery, with Community Service Centres central to ongoing resilience and capacity-building efforts.

### 2. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The Final Evaluation of the Türkiye Earthquake Response covers activities funded through the Emergency Appeal (February 7, 2023 – February 28, 2025), focusing on six provinces with TRC coordination offices. It assesses performance and outcomes in terms of relevance, coverage, and effectiveness; identifies best practices and areas for improvement; and supports accountability to Movement standards. The evaluation highlights cash-based interventions, multi-purpose cash, cash for protection, and cash for livelihoods, emphasizing scalability, replicability, and innovation. It complements the Operational Review and lessons learned workshop to ensure consistency and avoid duplication.

### 3. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation used an evidence-based methodology combining the Data Triangulation Tracking Table (DTTT) with qualitative analysis to integrate data and align with the Terms of Reference.

- **Secondary Data Review:** Internal and external documents, including Emergency Appeals, TRC and IFRC plans, government strategies, PNS response plans, and prior reviews.
- **Key Informant Interviews (KIIs):** 47 semi-structured interviews with TRC, IFRC, government, and UN/INGO stakeholders.
- **Focus Group Discussions (FGDs):** 12 FGDs with staff and communities on protection, health, cash, and livelihoods (75 participants).
- **Online Surveys:** Three surveys targeting TRC staff, PNS, and people reached, with responses from 33 TRC staff, 3 PNS, and 816 community members.
- **Field Visits:** Observations and validation in Hatay, Adiyaman, and Kahramanmaraş, including container cities.

## 4. LIMITATIONS

The evaluation faced several limitations, though most were mitigated with TRC's active involvement, particularly through its call centre:

**Evaluation fatigue:** Prior assessments in the same regions posed a risk, but TRC's engagement helped secure survey participation.

**Scheduling:** Summer leave created challenges, though most KIs and field visits were completed beforehand.

**Survey response bias:** Some participants may have given overly positive feedback due to trust in TRC or fear of losing assistance.

**Recall bias:** Some respondents may have struggled to accurately recall details of support received.

**Geographical coverage:** Field visits could not fully capture variations across all provinces.

## 5. ANALYSIS AND KEY FINDINGS

The report presents five main findings, regrouping the ToR questions into thematic clusters. This reorganization improves readability and provides a more integrated understanding.

### 5.1. *Enabling Factors and Outcomes: Overarching Findings from the Türkiye Response*

The response is widely recognized as a success, with strong performance, coordination, and impact. Achievements included 416 million hot meals, shelter for over 1.2 million people, and cash assistance to 1.7 million through multipurpose, protection, and livelihoods programmes.

#### 5.1.1. Key Success Factors

- **Effective CVA programming:** Flexible, well-adapted to evolving needs, and integrated with Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) and Information Management (IM), ensuring relevance, accountability, and evidence-based decision-making.
- **Strong TRC-IFRC partnership:** Characterized by trust, shared leadership, and strategic alignment. IFRC showed flexibility in adapting the Appeal to TRC recommendations, and TRC's recognized auxiliary role enabled ownership and alignment with government priorities.
- **Enabling conditions:** A capable TRC and strong IFRC country office; surge staff with cultural understanding; effective use of operational systems (ESSN database, IM platforms); and strong donor and stakeholder engagement.

#### 5.1.2. Challenges and Gaps

- Centralized management limited local branch and volunteer involvement. Staff well-being was insufficiently supported despite positive steps like mobile dormitories.

#### 5.1.3. Impact and Institutional Learning

The response enhanced TRC's recognition and showed how strong partnerships, contextual understanding, and adaptive programming can maximize the reach and sustainability of humanitarian assistance.

## **5.2. Identifying and Selecting the Population Reached**

### **5.2.1. Targeting and Prioritization**

Targeting was largely effective, prioritizing vulnerable groups through government data, assessments, and referrals. Staff and community feedback confirmed this, though outdated lists, inclusion of better-off individuals, and access barriers remained challenges.

### **5.2.2. Coordination and Data Management**

TRC's collaboration with AFAD, UN, and NGOs enabled rapid action, with co-leadership of the Shelter Cluster and CVA Technical Working Group. Strains arose from outdated data, silos, and transparency gaps, but IFRC advocacy for TRC field data led to stronger SOPs.

### **5.2.3. Support to Refugees and Host Communities**

TRC and IFRC assisted both Turkish and refugee populations, mainly through cash and protection programmes. Community Service Centres built trust, but nearly half of staff felt refugee needs were only partly met, and refugees were excluded from livelihoods support.

### **5.2.4. Adaptation and Responsiveness**

The response was agile, shifting from relief to recovery while maintaining flexibility. TRC mobilized within 20 minutes of the quake, and community feedback via call centres, advisory committees, and CSCs informed adjustments. Most respondents found support timely, though assessments lacked analytical depth and exit strategies for housing and recovery were unclear.

### **5.2.5. Delays and Gaps**

The scale of the disaster caused unavoidable delays in food, shelter, and cash assistance. Coordination challenges, government restrictions on CVA, and internal silos created further slowdowns. Refugees and migrants faced political barriers to inclusion. Communities also reported insufficient communication about container camp phase-outs, creating uncertainty and anxiety.

### **5.2.6. Inclusion and Exclusion**

Home visits, feedback mechanisms, CEA systems, and post-payment audits were implemented to reduce errors. However, outdated data impacted implementation, some better-off groups were included, and literacy barriers hindered equitable access.

### **5.2.7. Scalability**

The operation showed strong scalability through TRC's logistics, digital tools (SMS payments, displacement tracking), partnerships with banks and supermarkets, and pre-positioned stocks. Centralized funding and coordination avoided fragmentation, while public fundraising provided flexibility. Expanded call centre capacity, IM systems, and the Collective Kindness programme leveraging ESN systems enabled scale, demonstrating the value of supporting rather than substituting the National Society.

Strong logistics, digital tools, partnerships, and pre-positioned stocks supported large-scale delivery. Centralized funding and public fundraising added flexibility, while expanded IM and call centre systems, along with the Collective Kindness programme, demonstrated the value of planning, preparedness and building upon existing structure and expertise.

### 5.3. CVA Modality & Management

CVA was the cornerstone of the Türkiye Earthquake Response and proved highly successful due to the existing Kızılaykart/ESSN infrastructure, which enabled rapid and secure scaling up. It was delivered through context-adapted modalities, including Multipurpose Cash (MPCA) for basic needs, livelihoods support to restart businesses, and cash for protection to address urgent risks. While evolving in line with market functionality and recipient preferences, the approach transitioned from electronic vouchers (fast but less flexible) to ESEN cards and ultimately to ID-linked transfers (rapid, traceable, and scalable). Integrated with CEA mechanisms (notably the 168 Call Center) and guided by market assessments, post-distribution monitoring, and community feedback, the CVA portfolio ensured speed, dignity, and accountability, while providing clear lessons for strengthening inclusion, coordination, and administrative simplicity in future responses.

#### 5.3.1. Programmes & Reach

- **MPCA:** 1,058,080 people received unconditional cash for essentials, using MEB benchmarks co-developed by TRC, IFRC and World Food Program (WFP).
- **Livelihoods Recovery:** 860 farmers and 600 SMEs supported to restart income; Phase 2 refined targeting (formal application, outreach) and raised transfer values to reflect inflation.
- **Cash for Protection:** 3,757 highly vulnerable people supported; 99% found the aid helpful, 97% reported no access barriers.

#### 5.3.2. Delivery Mechanisms (what, why, when)

- **Electronic vouchers (early phase):** Rapid shift from in-kind to market purchases via A101 chain; good visibility and speed but less flexible, heavy reconciliation, and limited monitoring.
- **ESEN prepaid card:** Dignified, flexible spending; launched as banking systems recovered. Challenges: early rollout amid instability, co-branding confusion, POS dependence, financial literacy, and stigmatization concerns.
- **ID-linked transfers (final/optimal):** Fast, scalable, traceable, with strong SMS and call centre communication and near real-time oversight; require ID, ATM access, connectivity, and basic digital skills.

Evidence-led shifts from vouchers → cards → ID transfers based on market assessments, PDM and community feedback, improving speed, oversight, and user experience over time.

Pre-existing bank/retailer agreements and TRC's platform enabled rapid scale-up. Beneficiaries indicate the chosen methods were appropriate; many would opt for the same modality again.

#### 5.3.3. Notable strengths

- **High satisfaction and dignity**, especially for MPCA.
- **Strong CEA integration** (168 Call Centre) for two-way communication, targeting support, and real-time issue resolution.

- **Livelihoods cash** proved timely and feasible; Phase 2 design improvements were valued by recipients.

#### 5.3.4. Key challenges

- **Hotline and referral underuse** occurred early on; however, it improved after PDM-driven outreach.
- **Internal coordination** and external list access delays decreased early; improved with experienced CVA staffing.
- **Livelihoods gaps:** informal workers and refugees were excluded. Administrative burdens (invoice submission), restrictive eligible costs, transfer sizes and the duration are sometimes insufficient.
- **Modality-specific risks:** monitoring burden (vouchers), stigma/brand confusion (ESEN), and access barriers for ID transfers (ID/ATM/queues, mobility, connectivity, digital literacy).

#### 5.4. *Information Management (IM) & Accountability Towards Stakeholders*

Information Management (IM) was a key element of the Türkiye Earthquake Response, enhancing transparency, accountability, and evidence-based decisions. A dedicated IM team, integrated for the first time, worked with PMER and field staff to deliver real-time dashboards, logistics tracking, displacement analytics, and ID-linked payment monitoring. Digital tools such as Power BI, SMS-based monitoring, ClickUp, and call centre systems improved donor reporting and accountability to affected communities.

Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) also evolved into a central component of the operation. TRC formalized practices like container city committees, advisory groups, weekly community meetings, and home visits, supported by multilingual staff and inclusive communication. Call centres, rumour tracking, and digital feedback tools strengthened responsiveness and trust.

However, some Key gaps persisted: outreach lacked clarity and accessibility, feedback and safeguarding mechanisms were underused, and many were unaware of safe channels to report concerns. Participation in programme design was limited, staff had uneven access to monitoring results, and the absence of a centralized public information platform reduced transparency.

The integration of IM and CEA marked a major step forward in building agile, transparent, and community-responsive systems, though institutionalizing safeguarding, strengthening feedback use, and improving inclusive communication remain priorities for future large-scale operations.

#### 5.5. *Registration and Data Management*

The TRC established registration and data management systems that leveraged government databases, UN partnerships, and digital tools to scale assistance rapidly, though accuracy and inclusion challenges persisted.

##### 5.5.1. Registration Process

Data from AFAD lists, TRC systems, CSC referrals, household assessments, and Chamber of Commerce records enabled quick targeting of pre-registered groups. SMS and ATM registration,

ID verification, and field assessments supported broad coverage. Reliance on outdated lists limited the inclusion of some newly affected groups and sometimes led to ineligible payments, while rural poor, refugees, informal workers, and illiterate farmers faced barriers linked to ID, literacy, language, and digital access. Still, 88% of beneficiaries surveyed reported registration was smooth and accessible.

### 5.5.2. Data Management

Partnerships with UNHCR, IOM, WFP, and national ministries strengthened validation and reduced duplication, while call centres recorded complaints and referrals. Dashboards such as Power BI and the GO Platform, along with digital tracking and anonymized datasets, improved transparency and donor reporting. Efficiency was somewhat hindered by TRC departmental fragmentation, delays in IFRC–TRC data sharing, and reliance on paper forms in rural areas.

### 5.5.3. Role of Partnerships

Collaboration with government ministries and provincial directorates facilitated verified beneficiary lists and rural inclusion; however, the need for alignment with AFAD’s data-sharing protocols temporarily slowed progress. The UN and international agencies (WFP, UNHCR, IOM) supported rapid scaling through ESSN/Collective Kindness.

### 5.5.4. Innovations

Selected key innovations were:

- Digital innovations (ID-linked transfers, SMS, rumour tracking, multilingual call centres, Power BI dashboards) improved scalability, accountability, and inclusion.
- Community committees and accessibility pilots (Braille, simplified formats, sign language) supported participation, though not systematized.

The registration and data management were efficient, innovative, and partnership-driven, but equity was undermined by over-reliance on static pre-crisis data, coordination delays, and barriers for hard-to-reach populations.

## 6. SELECTED LESSONS LEARNED

### 6.1. *Identifying and Selecting the Population Reached*

1. **Multi-source, accurate data improves targeting** – Combining government data, community referrals, and field verification, supported by up-to-date systems, ensures inclusion of vulnerable groups and reduces duplication or exclusion errors.
2. **Early, integrated coordination strengthens responsiveness** – Avoiding silos, speeding deployment, and conducting timely reviews supports adaptive management.
3. **Accessible feedback and complaint systems are critical** – Removing awareness and literacy barriers ensures targeting errors are detected and corrected quickly.
4. **Preparedness and scalable systems enable rapid response** – Digital tools, logistics models, pre-positioned stocks, and established partnerships reduce delays and support large-scale delivery.

5. **Shared platforms and IM capacity maximize efficiency** – Common systems, strong information management, and inter-agency collaboration reduce duplication and improve targeting.

#### 6.2. **CVA Modality & Management**

1. **Leveraging prior CVA experience** – TRC’s work with the Kızılaykart platform and ESSN, plus pre-established agreements with banks, retailers, and financial service providers, enabled rapid, large-scale cash distribution after the earthquake.
2. **Flexible modality selection** – Transitioning from vouchers to prepaid cards, and later to ID-linked transfers, based on market assessments and community feedback, improved accessibility, efficiency, and satisfaction.
3. **Strong local partnerships** – Collaboration with entities such as the Chambers of Tradesmen and the Ministry of Agriculture fosters local ownership, credibility, robust monitoring, and coordinated assistance while reinforcing TRC’s visibility.

#### 6.3. **Information Management & Accountability Towards Stakeholders**

1. **Embedded IM capacity with digital tools** – A dedicated IM team and tools like Power BI dashboards, SMS-based monitoring, and feedback systems improved real-time coordination, decision-making, transparency, and adaptive response.
2. **Structured community engagement** – Formal committees, advisory groups, and regular meetings enabled two-way communication, empowering affected populations, especially underrepresented groups, to influence decisions and strengthen ownership.
3. **Responsive and accessible feedback systems** – Tools such as the 168 Kızılay Call Center enhance accountability, but awareness, especially for sensitive complaints, must be improved.

#### 6.4. **Registration and Data Management**

1. **Simple registration fosters equity and participation** – Accessible processes, especially in livelihoods programming, reduce barriers for those with limited digital literacy, documentation, or mobility, building trust and participation.
2. **Integrated data management improves accountability** – Eliminating departmental silos, ensuring timely data sharing, and moving away from paper-based systems strengthens coordination, monitoring, and decision-making.

### 7. **PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS**

The following are abbreviated recommendations that the consulting team considers priorities, including to which partner the recommendation is directed (in brackets). Please refer to the expanded list and related conclusions.

#### 7.1. **Identifying and Selecting the Population Reached**

**Recommendation: Promote Adaptive and Decentralized Leadership:** Encourage leadership that is flexible and responsive to emerging challenges by authorizing leaders to make quick decisions in high-pressure situations. (TRC, ongoing assessment by IFRC)

**Recommendation: Promote Cross-Sectoral Integration and Internal Coordination:** Create and institutionalize internal communication, coordination and collaboration mechanisms (structured meeting/planning) between sectors such as cash, protection, and livelihoods to create integrated and efficient programs that better meet the holistic needs of affected populations. (TRC)

**Recommendation: Enhance Staff Well-Being and Capacity:** Invest in wellness programs and rest protocols for staff and volunteers, especially those directly affected by the disaster. (TRC)

### **7.2. CVA Modality & Management**

**Recommendation: Prioritize the use of ID-based cash transfer mechanisms** in future programmes, as they offer scalability, cost-efficiency, and operational effectiveness. (TRC)

**Recommendation: Community Consultation.** Before initiating cash distributions, conduct community consultations as part of the needs assessment to identify preferred transfer modalities and communication channels. (TRC and IFRC)

### **7.3. Information Management & Accountability Towards Stakeholders**

**Recommendation: Reinforce safeguarding awareness and reporting sensitive complaints.** Expand awareness of safeguarding policies and confidential complaint mechanisms by embedding safeguarding messages across all communication channels. (TRC)

**Recommendation: Institutionalize Community Participation Structures.** Establish Community Groups in all programmes and response operations to strengthen participation in programme design, targeting, and implementation. (TRC)

**Recommendation: Develop a Centralized Public Information Platform.** Establish a centralized, user-friendly digital platform in Türkiye that provides up-to-date information on the activities conducted by TRC. (TRC)

### **7.4. Registration and Data Management**

**Recommendation: Establish Pre-Crisis Data-Sharing Protocols.** Formalize agreements with government (AFAD, ministries) and UN agencies to enable real-time access to updated databases. (TRC)

**Recommendation: Harmonize Internal Data Systems:** Integrate TRC departmental platforms to eliminate duplication, standardize tools (e.g., tablets), and enable real-time reporting. (TRC)

### **7.5. One Additional Recommendation**

**Recommendation: Document the Türkiye experience** as evidence of how a National Society, led model, with TRC in a clear leadership role supported by federation-wide solidarity, can deliver effective results. Ensure that this approach, reflecting the **Agenda for Renewal**, is applied in whole or in part in future operations, adapted to the varying capacities of different National Societies. (IFRC)

## **8. CONCLUSION**

The Türkiye Earthquake Response stands out as a clear success, delivering large-scale, multisectoral impact across food security, shelter, livelihoods, protection, and cash assistance. Over 416 million meals were provided, 1.2 million people received shelter support, and 1.05 million were reached with

multipurpose cash, protection, and livelihoods programmes. Beneficiary satisfaction was high at 91%, and both national and international stakeholders recognized the quality and effectiveness of the operation. A key factor was the proactive role of the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC), which assumed a central position in the response, reflecting its strong auxiliary role and domestic capacity, while the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) provided critical technical support without assuming decision-making power. This model ensured relevance, ownership, and responsiveness throughout the operation. Despite areas for improvement in data management, feedback systems, and communication, the overall performance was widely acknowledged as highly effective.

The success of this partnership was enabled by trust, shared leadership, and strong operational systems. Flexibility in adapting the Appeal to TRC's recommendations, effective surge support, and skilled donor negotiations, such as reallocating ESSN funds, further strengthened delivery. Information Management (IM) and Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) played a central role in ensuring accountability and evidence-based decision-making, while coordination across UN, government, and Movement partners reduced duplication and increased efficiency. Taken together, these conditions demonstrate how a strong National Society, complemented by targeted IFRC support through a skilled country office, can lead and deliver an effective large-scale response.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. CONTEXT

On 6 February 2023, two powerful earthquakes (with magnitudes of 7.7 and 7.6) struck southeastern Türkiye, followed by more than 80 aftershocks. A subsequent 6.4 magnitude earthquake on 20 February further compounded the destruction. These events rank among the deadliest and most devastating disasters in Türkiye's modern history, directly affecting approximately 15.7 million people across 17 provinces, including an estimated 1.7 to 1.8 million Syrian refugees residing in the region.

The earthquakes resulted in over 53,000 deaths and more than 107,000 injuries, alongside massive infrastructural damage. More than 300,000 buildings were impacted, with 262,000 either severely damaged or destroyed, leaving millions without shelter amid harsh winter conditions. Critical public services, including health, education, and municipal infrastructure, were severely disrupted, heightening risks for women, children, and other vulnerable groups. More than 3 million individuals were displaced.

The earthquakes further eroded the region's already fragile socio-economic landscape, characterized by low labour force participation and high unemployment. According to the Shaken to the Core II report by the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 95% of households in the affected provinces lacked savings, 72% were in debt, and many relied on informal or seasonal employment. The cumulative impacts of the earthquakes, the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis, and adverse climatic conditions have placed extraordinary strain on community resilience and recovery. Agricultural losses were estimated at USD 6.4 billion, and approximately 83% of affected individuals reported worsening financial conditions, deepening the region's socio-economic vulnerabilities.<sup>1</sup>

### 1.2. RESPONSE<sup>2</sup>

In response to the earthquakes, the IFRC, on behalf of the TRC, launched a Federation-wide Emergency Appeal (Appeal) of CHF 120 million on 7 February 2023. This included an initial CHF 2 million allocation from IFRC's Disaster Response Emergency Fund (DREF), aiming to assist 300,000 people. As the scale of the disaster became clearer, the Appeal was revised twice, ultimately raising the funding target to CHF 750 million to support mid- to long-term recovery efforts for 1.25 million people. The Federation-wide Appeal, with CHF 500 million raised, enabled TRC and its partners to implement large-scale programming across key sectors, including shelter, mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), food security, livelihoods, protection, Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), and health.

TRC, as the sole Movement actor on the ground, led the response by leveraging its auxiliary status, nationwide reach, and long-standing institutional capacity. During the response, TRC delivered mass feeding services under the National Disaster Response Plan and contributed to health services, psychological support, relief item distribution, and shelter assistance. Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA) was also used to address urgent needs. In the first six months, TRC provided 416 million meals, clean water, hygiene items, and health services. Additionally, 1.34

<sup>1</sup> Operational Update #7 on the earthquake response operation and other relevant reports and documents related to the Emergency Appeal, available at: IFRC GO - Emergency

<sup>2</sup> Operational Update #7

million individuals received cash assistance to cover basic needs. These achievements were made possible by TRC's extensive network of 13,000 staff, 300,000 volunteers, and its 520 branches across the country. TRC drew on its experience from previous earthquakes and leveraged existing cash-based programmes, such as the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), to scale up operations. Its well-equipped headquarters and operational Emergency Operations Centre enabled swift assessment and response to ground-level needs.

The IFRC coordinated the Federation-wide response, including leading Shelter Sector Coordination until December 2023 and engaging in inter-agency coordination with United Nations (UN) agencies and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). Multiple assessments, such as Shaken to the Core, Beyond the Faultline, and market and community consultations, guided the operational strategy and the transition to early recovery.

TRC also led recovery efforts through its Community Service Centres (CSCs) in the six most affected provinces, offering services in MHPSS, cash assistance, livelihoods recovery, and protection. The IFRC, through its Türkiye Country Delegation and Regional Office for Europe (ROE), seconded technical staff in areas such as Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting (PMER), finance, information management (IM), and communications. Forty-three delegates were deployed through the Rapid Response Mechanism, including HEOPs and operational leadership functions. Coordination with National Societies (NS) has been strong, with six embedded IFRC staff supporting membership engagement. Over 23 field visits with external partners were conducted, alongside regular partner briefings.

The IFRC and TRC further aligned their efforts under the Federation-wide approach, fostering data-driven decision-making, minimizing duplication, and integrating lessons learned into long-term planning. More than 20 assessments have been conducted, informing priorities for 2025 and beyond. Remaining appeal funds are dedicated to supporting long-term community resilience activities, NS capacity strengthening, and the transition into the IFRC Unified Plan 2025–2027.

## 2. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

This Final Evaluation of the Türkiye Earthquake Response aims to:

- Assess the overall performance, outcomes, and quality of the support provided to affected populations under the Emergency Appeal, examining the response in terms of relevance, coverage, and effectiveness.
- Provide a robust evidence base to inform strategic planning and decision-making for current and future disaster response and preparedness initiatives.
- Identify replicable good practices and critical areas for improvement to contribute to institutional learning and the ongoing refinement of programmatic approaches.
- Support accountability efforts by assessing the extent to which the operation achieves its objectives and adheres to the Fundamental Principles and established standards of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

The scope of the evaluation is limited to activities funded through the Emergency Appeal and does not encompass the overall earthquake response.

This evaluation covers activities implemented under the Appeal from 7 February 2023 to 28 February 2025, with a focus on the six provinces where TRC coordination offices operate. It prioritizes the assessment of cash-based interventions, including multi-purpose cash assistance, cash for protection, and cash for livelihoods, with an emphasis on scalability, replicability, and innovative approaches.

It complements the Operational Review and the outcomes of the February lessons learned workshop, ensuring that findings and insights from these exercises are integrated and duplication is avoided.

While this report concentrates on the Turkish Red Crescent's response under the Türkiye Earthquake Response Emergency Appeal (MDRTR004), TRC's earthquake-related efforts extended well beyond this framework. Through national and international partnerships and by leveraging structures such as community centers, TRC continued to support affected populations, including migrants and refugees. In addition to the Appeal and contributions from National Societies, approximately 300 million CHF in cash and in-kind assistance was mobilized specifically for the Pazarcık earthquake, enabling a wide range of activities. Many programmes with established UN partners and other humanitarian actors were maintained, adapted, or expanded in response to the earthquake, ensuring that critical assistance reached those most in need. This report, therefore, highlights the contributions and outcomes achieved under the Emergency Appeal, while recognizing that TRC's overall earthquake response encompassed a broader set of activities and collaborations.

### 3. METHODOLOGY

#### ***3.1 Evaluation Design***

The evaluation was designed as a summative assessment, conducted toward the end of the Türkiye Earthquake Appeal operation, to determine the extent to which the operation achieved its stated objectives and to assess the overall relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and coherence of the response. As a summative evaluation, it aimed to consolidate evidence on key achievements, identify gaps and challenges, and capture lessons learned to inform future emergency operations and strategic planning across the IFRC network.

A mixed-methods approach was applied, combining quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis to ensure a comprehensive understanding of results. Quantitative data were primarily derived from secondary sources, including operational reports, monitoring systems, and beneficiary data provided by the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) and IFRC. These were complemented by qualitative evidence gathered through key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and document review. This approach enabled the evaluation to explore not only *what* results were achieved, but also *how* and *why* they were attained, considering contextual factors and implementation dynamics.

To ensure the credibility and reliability of findings, the evaluation employed systematic triangulation across data sources, methods, and stakeholder perspectives. Evidence gathered through KIIs, FGDs, and surveys was cross-validated against monitoring data and documentary sources, including operational updates, situation reports, and external evaluations. This multi-layered verification process minimized bias and strengthened the validity of conclusions,

ensuring that findings reflected a balanced and comprehensive understanding of the operation's performance.

The consulting team applied a cohesive and empirically validated methodology for data analysis and verification, combining the Data Triangulation Tracking Table (DTTT) with qualitative thematic analysis. This approach facilitated the systematic integration of quantitative and qualitative evidence, providing a robust triangulation mechanism to support evidence-based findings and recommendations. The use of the DTTT enabled comparative assessment aligned with the Terms of Reference (ToR) and the key evaluation questions, ensuring analytical consistency throughout the evaluation process.

### **3.1.2 Data collection methods**

To gather comprehensive and reliable data, the consulting team will employ a range of interrelated methods and tools, including:

#### **Secondary Data Review**

Existing internal and external information will be analyzed. IFRC will be requested to provide the consultant team with the most relevant documents which include

- Emergency Appeals Documents, including the operations updates, including those not available on the Go Platform.
- Community/people reached assessments, surveys and consultations.
- Relevant TRC documents - Strategic Plan, Sector Plans (CVA, Livelihood, Health...), Unified Plan, organigram, etc.
- IFRC Country Plan for Türkiye, IFRC delegation organigram.
- Relevant government strategies for this emergency, and MoU with IFRC and TRC.
- PNS bilateral response plans.
- Lesson Learned – Mid-Term Review and the Operational Review.
- Other relevant documents

List of documents reviewed or Documents Consulted for Literature Review are provided in [Annex I](#).

#### **Key Informant Interviews (KII)**

The evaluation team conducted 47 in-person and online semi-structured interviews representing a diverse sample of key stakeholders, including:

- IFRC staff at the regional, country cluster, country, and operating branch offices, including present staff as well as delegates involved in earlier stages of the response.
- TRC Staff senior leadership and management staff, technical staff, and branch staff
- External Stakeholders, including government representatives, as well as UN Agencies and other organizations directly involved in the operation at the national and local levels

The list on the people interviewed are provided in [Annex II](#), and the complete questionnaires in [Annex V](#).

### Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).

The evaluation team facilitated 12 FGDs to explore relevant topics and gather qualitative insights:

- TRC Community Service Centre Staff: 3 protection teams/ 1 health team - total of 22 persons
- Communities Focus Groups:
  - **Cash for Protection** ((women only/migrant women/men only/mixes men and women): 4 groups, total of 21 persons
  - **Multi-Purpose Cash (women/men mixed/)**: 2 groups, total of 13 persons.
  - **Cash for Livelihoods** (women only/mixed men and women) 2 groups, total of 19 persons

The number of FGDs was determined according to the agenda and logistical capacities, while ensuring a sufficient minimum to capture all required information.

For the People reached FGS, efforts were made to form diverse and inclusive groups, including women, men, older adults, and individuals with disabilities. Participants were also chosen to represent beneficiaries from the three main areas of the Appeal's work. This approach allowed for gathering a wide range of perspectives and provided a more complete understanding of the project's impact. Details regarding locations and target groups are provided in [Annex II](#), while the questionnaires are found in [Annex V](#).

### Online Surveys

Three online questionnaires targeted TRC staff, Partner National Societies (PNSs), and community members to gather quantitative data:

1. **TRC Staff:** HQ and field-based managers, coordinators, and implementers were consulted to gather insights on operational effectiveness, coordination, and perceived impact. A total of 33 TRC staff members responded, representing both headquarters and various field locations. Their contributions offered valuable perspectives on internal processes, challenges faced during implementation, and recommendations for enhancing programme quality and efficiency in future operations.
2. **PNSs:** Key representatives assessed partnership dynamics, resource contributions, and perceptions of impact. Three PNS have responded to the consultation: the Japanese Red Cross, the Canadian Red Cross, and the British Red Cross. Their feedback has provided critical insights into the effectiveness of coordination, the relevance of their contributions, and the overall added value of the Movement's collective response. This input helps to strengthen partnership practices and inform future collaboration strategies.
3. **Community Members:** Beneficiaries of the Appeal shared feedback on their experience, satisfaction, and the quality of assistance they received. A total of 816 surveys were conducted in collaboration with the Kızılay 168 Call Center to gather feedback from people reached through the operation. Given the total number of people reached (1,751,234), this sample size provides a 99% confidence level with a margin of error of approximately  $\pm 4,5\%$ . This indicates that the results are statistically representative of the

broader population reached and can reliably inform program learning and decision-making.

The survey questionnaires are provided in [Annex IV](#).

### Field Visits

The evaluation team conducted extensive field visits to key implementation areas in coordination with TRC field staff. These visits aimed to directly observe programme implementation, interact with affected communities, and gather insights from local actors. The team visited a diverse range of locations across different provinces to capture geographic variation and operational differences. These visits strengthened the contextual understanding of the response and helped validate findings from other data sources.

Details of the agenda are provided in [Annex III](#).



Figure 1: Map of Consultancy Field Visit Locations

### Observation

During the field visit, the Advisory Group meetings were observed. Additionally, the consulting team visited the container cities in Hatay, Adiyaman, and Kahramanmaraş, gaining direct insight into the living conditions of the population.

#### 3.1.3 Methods used for quantitative and qualitative data analysis and triangulation

The evaluation applied a mixed-methods analytical framework integrating both quantitative and qualitative data to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the Türkiye Earthquake Appeal operation's performance and outcomes.

Quantitative data analysis focused on secondary data and surveys. Quantitative data were systematically organized and cross-checked using the Data Triangulation Tracking Table (DTTT) to validate consistency between multiple data sources and reporting periods.

Qualitative data analysis was conducted through thematic coding of evidence gathered from key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and document reviews. The consulting team applied an inductive and deductive approach to identify recurring themes, patterns, and explanatory factors related to relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and coherence. The qualitative evidence was then cross-referenced with quantitative findings to ensure contextual interpretation and depth of analysis.

Both data streams were integrated through triangulation, combining perspectives from different stakeholder groups (e.g., TRC, IFRC, partners, and affected communities) and multiple sources of evidence. This iterative process ensured the internal validity of the findings, allowing the evaluation to produce balanced, evidence-based conclusions and actionable recommendations.

### **3.1.4 Sampling techniques**

The consultancy team identified a sample of TRC branches for onsite visits and remote assessments, in consultation with the Evaluation Management Team (EMT). The selection was guided by criteria such as the scale of the operation, staff availability, accessibility of Community Service Centers (CSCs), engagement with external stakeholders, and logistical feasibility.

#### **HQ Staff**

The selection of interviewees at the TRC Headquarters was based on their level of involvement in the Türkiye Earthquake Appeal. All available staff members who had directly contributed to the planning, coordination, or implementation of the operation were included in the sample. However, it is important to note that several key personnel who had been involved during the initial phases of the response were no longer employed by TRC at the time of the evaluation. As a result, some institutional memory gaps were identified, particularly regarding early decision-making and coordination processes.

#### **On-site Visit**

Field visits were conducted by two consultants following a purposive sampling strategy designed to ensure balanced geographic and programmatic representation. The selection of field locations was based on operational criteria and recommendations from TRC and IFRC, with provinces chosen to reflect diverse contexts, levels of impact, and programmatic coverage within the Türkiye Earthquake Appeal. The branches selected for field visits included Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, and Adiyaman.

During the visits, data were collected using multiple qualitative methods, including interviews with TRC and local authorities; focus group discussions (FGDs) with staff, volunteers, and affected populations reached through Multipurpose Cash, Cash for Livelihoods, and Cash for Protection programmes; and direct observation at selected Community Service Centers.

FGDs were structured to capture diverse perspectives and ensure inclusivity, engaging displaced people, Turkish host community members, and refugees, with separate groups organized for women, men, and, where applicable, persons with disabilities.

#### **Remote Assessments**

To complement our fieldwork and broaden our geographic coverage, we conducted a survey with TRC staff and beneficiaries in our Osmaniye, Gaziantep, and Malatya branches. The survey aims to gather additional data from these regions.

## EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Criteria	Question
Relevance & Appropriateness	Were there mechanisms in place for ongoing needs assessment and program adjustments during the implementation of the emergency appeal that can be replicated in future operations? (see <a href="#">section 4.2.5</a> )
	To what extent was the choice of modality (e.g., cash, voucher, ATM cards, or digitised payment systems) appropriate to the context, scale of emergency, recipient preferences, and local market infrastructure? (see <a href="#">section 4.3</a> )
	What was the role of Information Management in ensuring accountability towards key stakeholders (affected population, donors, government institutions)? (see <a href="#">section 4.2.3</a> and <a href="#">section 4.4</a> )
Effectiveness	How effective was the targeting system in identifying and selecting populations in need, and to what extent were the targeting mechanisms aligned with programme objectives and needs assessment findings? (see <a href="#">section 4.2.1</a> )
	How well did the TRC adapt its response to emerging needs over time, ensuring continued timeliness of service delivery and its continuity in the recovery phase? (see <a href="#">section 4.2.5</a> )
	Were there any delays or gaps in the overall response, and what lessons can be learned to ensure quicker responses in future emergencies? (see <a href="#">section 4.2.6</a> )
	What are some core operational components of the earthquake response that have a potential for high scalability, and how can these components be optimized to facilitate cost-effective scaling in future emergencies? (see <a href="#">section 4.2.8</a> )
	What were any innovative information management practices, such as the use of digital tools or mobile technologies, that enhanced the operation's effectiveness and can be replicated in future operations? (see <a href="#">section 4.2.3</a> and <a href="#">section 4.4.1</a> )
	What emerging best practices in Community Engagement and Accountability can be identified how can these practices be institutionalized for future operations? (see <a href="#">section 4.4.2</a> )
Coverage	How well did the TRC assess and respond to the needs of displaced populations, host and refugee communities? (see <a href="#">section 4.2.4</a> )
	How well did the prioritisation process ensure that the most vulnerable individuals were prioritised for assistance, particularly in contexts with resource constraints? (see <a href="#">section 4.2.2</a> )
	How successfully were inclusion and exclusion errors minimised during the targeting design and implementation, and what measures were in

Criteria	Question
	place to address such errors in practice? (see <a href="#">section 4.2.7</a> )
	How effectively did the registration process capture and manage accurate and comprehensive data for targeted populations, including through partnerships with external entities such as government/ UNHCR/IOM/WFP amongst others? (see <a href="#">section 4.2.3</a> and <a href="#">section 4.5</a> )

## LIMITATIONS

As with any evaluation exercise, there were certain relevant limitations/risks to consider. However, most were effectively mitigated through TRC's proactive involvement, especially in the case of the community online survey.

- Evaluation fatigue was a concern due to prior reviews carried out in the same regions. However, strong engagement by TRC, particularly via their call centre, ensured participation in the community surveys.
- Summer scheduling risks were also managed effectively. Despite vacation periods, the majority of targeted KIIs were completed, and TRC and IFRC successfully organized field visits ahead of staff leave.
- Potential survey response bias: Respondents may have provided more positive answers due to trust in TRC or concerns about losing present assistance or future assistance, as the survey was conducted by the TRC Call Center.
- Recall bias: Some respondents may not accurately remember the timing, type, or quality of assistance received, which could affect the reliability of survey data.
- Geographical coverage: While field visits covered several provinces, local variations in experiences and challenges may not have been fully captured.

## 4. ANALYSIS & KEY FINDINGS

The report is organized into four main findings areas, each representing a consolidated grouping of the questions outlined in the ToR. While these groupings do not strictly follow the sequence or structure of the questions as originally presented in the ToR, the evaluation team determined that reorganizing them in this way would better align similar and complementary findings. This approach enhances readability and provides a more integrated and comprehensive understanding of each thematic area.

### 4.1. ENABLING FACTORS AND OUTCOMES: OVERARCHING FINDINGS FROM THE TÜRKIYE RESPONSE

The following are general but pivotal findings drawn from the Türkiye Earthquake Response during this final evaluation. While they span diverse aspects of the operation, from leadership and coordination to staff well-being and community needs, they reflect systemic issues and strengths that had a profound impact on the quality, coherence, and sustainability of the

response. Addressing these overarching themes is essential for institutional learning, continuous improvement, and preparedness for future large-scale emergencies.

The Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA) program implemented by IFRC and the Turkish Red Crescent was delivered effectively, demonstrating both operational flexibility and strong contextual adaptation. The gradual shift in transfer modalities in response to the evolving needs of affected populations ensured that assistance remained relevant and timely throughout the operation, and CVA could be offered on a large scale. A key success factor was the integration of CVA with Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) and Information Management (IM), which strengthened two-way communication, enhanced targeting, and supported evidence-based decision-making. This combined approach not only improved the efficiency of delivery but also reinforced the accountability and responsiveness of the intervention.

By any standard evaluation criteria, this operation stands out as a clear and demonstrable success. This was not incidental, but rather the result of a convergence of key enabling factors that offer important lessons for future large-scale humanitarian responses. When these factors align, they substantially enhance the reach, relevance, and effectiveness of Red Cross Red Crescent assistance in emergency contexts where lives, livelihoods, and dignity are at risk.

The scale of direct impact reflects this: the mass feeding programme alone provided over 416 million hot meals and nutritional supplements; more than 1.2 million people benefited from shelter support; and approximately 1.7 million were reached through three major cash programmes, Multipurpose Cash, Cash for Protection, and Cash for Livelihoods.

The response was grounded in a strong contextual understanding of the country and of the capacity of TRC, including not only the support they needed but also what was not needed. TRC is a large and professional organization, and the IFRC has a strong and skilled country office. TRC's placement as the operational lead, right from the onset, reflected a meaningful recognition of National Society ownership of the response, strengthening its auxiliary role with the government and signalling maturity in domestic capacity. This was perhaps the key strategic decision and operational decision that led to a successful operation.

The collaboration between TRC and IFRC was widely recognized as effective and sustained across all phases of the emergency. Clear coordination mechanisms among Movement partners, combined with well-structured partner briefings and surge support, allowed the operation to prioritize service delivery over internal administrative challenges. It is important to note that significant effort has been invested in reallocating approximately CHF 50 million from the ESSN programme to the operation, a process marked by extensive revisions and protracted approval procedures.

This cooperation model demonstrates how impactful partnerships can be when working with a strong, capable National Society. The TRC–IFRC partnership was characterized by trust, shared leadership, and strategic alignment, factors that cannot be assumed in all contexts. Also, a key factor in this success was the flexibility demonstrated by the IFRC in adapting the Appeal based on the recommendations and feedback from TRC, ensuring that the response remained context-appropriate and responsive to evolving needs.

These conditions are not universally replicable; such an approach is only viable when the National Society possesses the capacity, leadership, and systems necessary to take on a central operational role. Key enablers included:

- A well-established IFRC Country Office with a strong support function
- Clear, defined and recognized auxiliary role of the National Society.
- High-level surge human resources with prior cultural understanding of the country context and dynamics that complemented the existing skills in the Country office, and hence freed field teams to focus on delivery
- Streamlined operational systems that supported real-time decision-making, such as TRC, leveraging tools like the ESSN database and information management platforms from the outset.

Effective membership coordination and external stakeholder/donor communication. The ability to negotiate with large funders such as DG ECHO to allow funds to be used for addressing the needs of both the Turkish and Refugee/Migrant population shows skill and a strong knowledge base.

Disaster operations were managed centrally from TRC headquarters, with branches playing a limited role in the overall response. While branch volunteers supported the implementation of certain activities, most notably meal distribution, the branches themselves were not engaged in planning and had only limited involvement in broader operations. Key components such as multipurpose cash assistance, psychosocial support, and livelihoods were led by the specialized operational team recruited for the Appeal. This centralized model ensured technical delivery but reduced opportunities for deeper branch engagement and limited skill transfer at the local level. The restricted role of branches was consistently noted in all three branches visited. Expanding the role of branches and volunteers would strengthen community trust and ownership, while also enhancing the sustainability and resilience of future responses by building greater local capacity across the TRC network.

Staff well-being is another area requiring improvement. The lack of protocols to support personnel under extreme working conditions, such as sleeping in cars or camps, highlighted the need for more robust systems to safeguard staff mental health and physical safety, particularly for those engaged in protection-related work and acknowledging that many staff and volunteers were themselves impacted by the earthquake. On the other hand, the procurement of the mobile dormitory under the appeal aimed to strengthen the duty of care towards staff and volunteers in future emergencies.



Figures 123 and 4: Mobile Dormitory

Despite these challenges, TRC's operational performance significantly elevated its public standing. Counting on a previous strong recognition as a central actor in the country, TRC is even more recognized as a central humanitarian actor in Türkiye. This reputational growth was especially evident in the communities reached through the various TRC services and programmes.

## 4.2. IDENTIFYING AND SELECTING THE POPULATION REACHED

### 4.2.1. Targeting Approach and Implementation

This section covers the following evaluation question:

***How effective was the targeting system in identifying and selecting populations in need, and to what extent were the targeting mechanisms aligned with programme objectives and needs assessment findings?***

Targeting approaches were aligned with program objectives, prioritizing vulnerable populations and adapting to evolving needs. The strategy used government data, community networks, and field assessments, focusing particularly on cash, protection, and livelihoods. The following highlights both key elements of success as well as challenges:

- **Targeting focused on vulnerable groups**, drawing on government data, local knowledge, and coordination with UN and other NGOs to ensure effective aid distribution; for Multipurpose Cash (CVA), TRC and IFRC initially relied on government lists but followed up with door-to-door assessments to identify and include newly vulnerable individuals.
- **Clear vulnerability criteria** guided targeting across all programmes, with TRC Social Services conducting household assessments using consistent criteria such as elderly status, disability, and single-headed households.
- **Targeting for the Livelihoods programme** was supported by the Ministry of Family and Social Services, the Chamber of Tradesmen and Craftsmen, and the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and Forestry, who provided beneficiary lists and coordinated through shared platforms. A scoring system prioritized formal registration, workplace damage, household size, and disabilities, with a formal application process introduced

in Phase 2 (2024). The programme focused on supporting existing businesses with cash injections.

- The survey results from TRC and PNS staff indicate that over 80% of respondents considered the targeting system for identifying populations in need to be effective or very effective, reflecting a strong level of confidence among operational staff in the system's ability to accurately identify and reach those most in need of assistance.

#### 4.2.2. Prioritization of Vulnerable Populations

This section covers the following evaluation question

***How well did the prioritization process ensure that the most vulnerable individuals were prioritized for assistance, particularly in contexts with resource constraints?***

The Türkiye Earthquake response aimed to prioritize the most at-risk populations through a multi-layered strategy involving door-to-door vulnerability assessments, government data, and community referrals. While generally effective, challenges such as reliance on pre-existing institutional lists and access barriers impacted equity in targeting. Over time, the approach evolved to better include underserved groups and refine prioritization.

Vulnerable populations, including elderly people, people with disabilities, people with chronic illnesses, families who lost members, women, children, and single-parent households, were identified through a combination of government data, internal systems, beneficiary lists, and proactive door-to-door assessments and community-level referrals. This approach ensured the inclusion of both host communities and those in non-container areas.

The TRC staff survey results show that 90% of staff believe the prioritization of vulnerable populations was carried out well or very well, as illustrated in the following chart.




Figure 5: Effectiveness of the Prioritization Process in Reaching the Most Vulnerable

During the FGD with the People Reached, respondents consistently stated that the most vulnerable individuals were continually prioritized for support. Participants explained how they had been identified and described the steps taken by TRC staff to verify their vulnerability before

providing assistance. This was also confirmed by representatives of the Turkish Government who were interviewed.

#### **4.2.3. Coordination and Data Management**

This area addresses several of the evaluation questions:

- ***How effectively did the registration process capture and manage accurate and comprehensive data for targeted populations, including through partnerships with external entities such as the government/ UNHCR/IOM/WFP, amongst others?***
- ***What was the role of Information Management in ensuring accountability towards key stakeholders (affected population, donors, government institutions)?***
- ***What were any innovative information management practices, such as the use of digital tools or mobile technologies, that enhanced the operation's effectiveness and can be replicated in future operations?***

Effective coordination with government and humanitarian actors was an important strength of the response, though not without challenges, most notably data-sharing constraints and internal fragmentation that at times limited accountability and efficiency. These concerns had already been raised in the earlier lessons learned workshop, and at the time of the evaluation, TRC was actively working to address them by introducing more consistent practices, encouraging greater collaboration across departments, and reinforcing coordination mechanisms. This reflects both recognition of the issue and progress toward institutional improvement.

Although some challenges were identified, the following points highlight TRC's coordination strengths and effective practices, with certain limitations noted where relevant:

- TRC's strong relationships with AFAD, UN agencies, and local authorities enabled rapid deployment and regular coordination meetings, providing a strong foundation for the response. However, their effectiveness still depended on timely and reliable information sharing.
- Early collaboration with AFAD took place in a context of strong public expectations for broad inclusion, which at times added complexity. Complementing AFAD's data, IFRC emphasized TRC's field-verified information, and together these efforts supported the development of Standard Operating Procedures for targeting and validation.
- TRC's use of technical working groups to cross-check beneficiary lists helped reduce duplication, though their effectiveness was weakened by internal communication challenges across departments.
- TRC co-led the Cash-Based Interventions Technical Working Group to coordinate cash and voucher assistance (CVA) across disaster-affected areas. The platform was key for harmonizing approaches and reducing overlap but was sometimes constrained by inconsistent data inputs and inclusion pressures.
- Inter-agency platforms in Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA), Protection, and Information Management (IM), initiated and co-led by TRC and IFRC, strengthened collective standards and fostered harmonized approaches. While valuable, the overall

impact of these platforms depended on sustained engagement and follow-through from participating agencies.

- TRC’s leadership in national coordination structures, combined with its operational autonomy in the field, created a hybrid model: central participation in government-led mechanisms alongside independent field-based data verification. This dual role positioned TRC to both support and challenge government systems when accuracy was at stake, though balancing the two required careful negotiation of relationships.

**“We work with 13 NGOs, TRC was by far the biggest and most professional.”**  
(AFAD Container City Manager)

#### **4.2.4. Support to Refugees and Host Communities**

This section covers the following evaluation question:

***How well did the TRC assess and respond to the needs of displaced populations, host and refugee communities?***

The Türkiye Earthquake Response was carried out in a sensitive political and social context, particularly in relation to refugee and migrant populations. From the outset, both TRC and IFRC aimed to ensure that assistance reached all those affected, including Turkish nationals and refugees. While certain operational and contextual factors initially posed challenges to achieving full equity and timeliness of support, continuous dialogue with stakeholders and adaptive approaches progressively strengthened the inclusiveness of service delivery. This ensured that, over time, the response became more responsive to the diverse needs of affected communities.

- Approximately 50% of refugees were in the earthquake-affected zone<sup>3</sup>. TRC supported refugees through the multi-purpose cash and Cash for Protection programmes, using mainly, but not exclusively, refugee-specific funding such as that provided by ECHO. Notably, through effective negotiation, ECHO refugee-designated funds were also used to support Turkish communities, freeing Appeal funds to aid refugees.
- Refugees were referred to services through Community Service Centres (CSCs) in a conflict-sensitive manner to minimize social tensions. TRC’s established presence in refugee-hosting areas, with locally recruited staff, supported responsive and trusted service delivery to both Turkish and refugee populations. This was evident during field visits through direct discussions with refugees, visits to CSCs and discussions with staff.
- Refugees were not included in the livelihoods programme but as previously mentioned, supported through migration-specific funding channels. TRC was not able, nor had the capacity to fully meet refugee needs, though the provision of services to refugees improved over time. It’s essential to note that the TRC’s primary role is not to meet all the needs of refugees; rather, it is to support the government of Turkey in its auxiliary role. The TRC Staff survey results and the interviews highlight a gap in addressing refugee needs, as shown in the chart below: 46% of respondents stated that these needs were only partially identified and addressed, while just 27% felt that they had been mostly or

<sup>3</sup> UNHCR. (2024, February 2). *Year after Türkiye, Syria quakes, UNHCR warns of rising humanitarian needs*. UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/briefing-notes/year-after-tuerkiye-syria-quakes-unhcr-warns-rising-humanitarian-needs>

fully met. This data reflects perception rather than based in actual numbers supported by programming.




Figure 6: Assessment and Response to Displaced, Host, and Refugee Communities by TRC

#### 4.2.5. Adaptation of the Response

This section covers the following evaluation questions:

- ***How well did the TRC adapt its response to emerging needs over time, ensuring continued timeliness of service delivery and its continuity in the recovery phase?***
- ***Were there mechanisms in place for ongoing needs assessment and program adjustments during the implementation of the emergency appeal that can be replicated in future operations?***

The Türkiye Earthquake Response demonstrated noteworthy agility and flexibility, with the ability to rapidly adjust to changing needs across various sectors. Both TRC and IFRC collaborated closely with government and UN partners, ensuring timely deployment and adaptation to new challenges as the response evolved from emergency relief to recovery efforts.

The TRC staff survey results show unanimous agreement among respondents that the Appeal adapted either excellently, very well, or well. This demonstrates a strong and consistent perception of the operation's ability to adjust and respond effectively to evolving needs.

##### **Timely Response and Flexibility**

The Türkiye Earthquake Response demonstrated strong agility and adaptability, with early action and sustained programmatic flexibility. Pre-existing systems and close coordination with government and UN partners enabled timely deployment, and both TRC and IFRC navigated donor restrictions to maintain responsiveness.

- TRC's early response capacity was notable, with actions launched within 20 minutes of the earthquake.

- Timely deployment of shelter, food, and cash assistance was enabled by pre-existing systems.
- TRC adapted quickly to emerging needs through collaboration with government and UN partners.

**“The transition from emergency to recovery occurred smoothly, allowing for continual responsiveness.”**  
(IFRC Staff member)

- The livelihoods programme scaled from a small pilot of cash grants to broader coverage across urban and rural areas.
- Community survey results show that 91 % of participants felt the assistance arrived when they most needed it.




Figure 7: Provision of Timely Support

It is noteworthy that 45% of all the respondents reported waiting more than two weeks to receive any form of support after the earthquake. This indicates that communities were aware not only of the scale of the disaster but also of the challenges faced in mounting the response.

***Feedback and Local Adaptation*** Community feedback mechanisms and local engagement were critical in shaping and adapting the response. Advisory committees, door-to-door outreach, and strengthened call centres ensured real-time responsiveness, though challenges in sustaining engagement and decentralized decision-making were noted (see more information in sections [4.4.2](#) and [4.4.3](#)).

**“In some cases, headquarters-level approval was required for field-driven prioritization decisions, which occasionally delayed responsiveness and created tension.”**

(TRC Field Staff Hatay)

- In the branches visited, respondents highlighted how Community Service Centres (CSCs) and volunteers played a central role in adjusting frontline services and identifying emerging needs.
- Those interviewed in the Kahramanmaraş Branch cited strong collaboration between CSCs and TRC branches ensured operational continuity throughout the response.

***Assessments and Learning*** Assessments played a crucial role in shaping the response. Early multisectoral assessments set priorities, while later exercises helped refine the transition from emergency relief to recovery programming. Important to mention the IFRC Recovery Conference (25-26 April 2023) in GVA IFRC HQ with participation of both TRC and SRC leadership, international donors, briefings with Permanent missions, etc. Continuous learning was supported through internal reviews and coordination with external actors, although some gaps in deeper analysis and inclusivity were noted.

- Early assessments, including the Multi-Cluster/Sectoral Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA), Refugee Brief, and others, were instrumental for initial planning but were limited in analytical depth.

**“The MIRA assessment helped us understand the general picture, but after that, the next steps were more focused on responding to needs, not analyzing them further.”**  
(IFRC Staff Member)

- While it is true that TRC may have relied on existing field knowledge and UN cluster coordination, it should also be noted that the Kızılaykart program has continuously conducted Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) studies, and the Directorate of Social Services carried out a comprehensive needs assessment in the field in April 2023. In addition, TRC was also a partner in the Multi-Cluster/Sectoral Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA)

**We didn’t do a thorough needs assessment later, because the needs were obvious... coordination with UN clusters helped us refine our response.”**  
(IFRC Staff Member)

### ***Preparedness and Planning for Transition***

The Türkiye Earthquake Operation demonstrated significant advancements in preparedness and exit planning, although performance varied across sectors. TRC’s financial reserves and pre-positioned assets enabled rapid mobilization and strategic foresight, but some sectors lacked strong exit planning.

**“The needs were so obvious... the question was more about coordination.”**  
(TRC Staff Member)

- TRC reserved TRY 250 million (approx. CHF 5 million) for future phases of the response, allowing for greater flexibility and forward-looking planning.
- Overall, TRC maintained a relatively strong exit strategy, with flexibility to adapt in the later stages of the operation. Although ensuring long-term housing solutions is not the direct responsibility of TRC, several focus group discussion (FGD) participants expressed concern that, once required to leave the containers, they would not have the financial

means to secure alternative housing and felt uncertain about their future. Communities clearly stated that TRC could play an important supporting role by developing clearer exit strategies to facilitate a smooth transition to municipal or government-led schemes, such as Dermankart.

- In the People Reached Survey, 66.4% of respondents said the support they received no longer contributed to their ongoing recovery. While this aligns with the project's focus on immediate emergency relief, it also underscores unmet needs and the importance of integrating longer-term recovery strategies, including a clear exit or transition plan that addresses both short- and medium-term needs.

### **Staff and Volunteer Well-being**

The well-being of staff and volunteers was a critical operational consideration. Many responders were directly impacted by the disaster, creating emotional and logistical challenges. Staff and volunteers in Kahramanmaraş, for example, were personally affected, leading to capacity constraints and overwork, highlighting the need for better wellness and rest planning. Despite this, TRC demonstrated a strong commitment to volunteer and staff care, though the experience highlighted the need for better wellness and rest protocols in future emergencies.

#### **4.2.6. Delays or Gaps in the Response**

This section covers the following evaluation question:

***Were there any delays or gaps in the overall response, and what lessons can be learned to ensure quicker responses in future emergencies?***

Despite TRC and IFRC's extensive efforts, delays and gaps emerged due to the scale of needs, logistical challenges, coordination issues, and internal challenges. These highlight areas for improvement in coordination, partnerships, and equitable access for all affected groups.

### **Delays and Coordination Issues**

The scale of the disaster exceeded the capacity of any single actor, causing delays, particularly in food distribution and shelter setup.

- The overwhelming scale led to significant delays, especially in food and shelter distribution. In Adiyaman, for example, FGD participants stated that they were unable to eat for the first three days due to blocked roads.
- Internal silos between TRC's departments led to delays in service integration.
- In Adiyaman, focus group respondents stated that the Livelihood project ended abruptly without proper communication, leaving beneficiaries with insufficient time to use allocated funds.
- In Hatay, cash assistance was delayed in some instances though staff noted the system became more efficient as procedures and experience increased.

### **Inclusion Barriers**

- Several of those interviewed noted that the assistance (those under the Emergency Appeal) did not specifically include refugee and migrant populations. However, it should be underlined that the Turkish Red Crescent continued to provide support to these

groups through its ongoing national and international programmes outside the scope of the Appeal, ensuring that earthquake-affected migrants and refugees received assistance through existing structures. During the early stages of the operation, limited access to certain data from AFAD created challenges for coordination and required reliance on preliminary assumptions about needs. As the operation progressed, information sharing with AFAD improved significantly, enhancing the accuracy of planning and decision-making. Almost all FGD participants expressed uncertainty about the duration and amount of support. In Hatay, there is an expectation from participants to receive clearer information about the process following the closure of the container camps. The absence of timely and detailed communication created uncertainty and anxiety among affected households, limiting their ability to prepare for transition and make informed decisions about alternative housing and livelihoods. This highlighted the importance of consistent, transparent communication strategies to support community resilience during phase-out processes.

#### **4.2.7. Inclusion and Exclusion in Beneficiary Selection**

This section covers the following evaluation question:

***How successfully were inclusion and exclusion errors minimized during the targeting design and implementation, and what measures were in place to address such errors in practice?***

While the Türkiye Earthquake Response included multiple safeguards to minimize inclusion and exclusion errors, these systems had mixed success. TRC employed various verification and feedback mechanisms, including direct household visits, government data, and coordination with UN agencies. Referral systems, often supported by ministries, also helped flag overlooked cases. However, outdated data, reliance on institutional lists in early phases, and limited awareness of complaint mechanisms created gaps. While trust in TRC staff was generally high, beneficiaries were not always aware of formal complaint and appeal systems, limiting the correction of errors post-selection. A range of verification measures were used, including vulnerability assessments, cross-checking with government data such as AFAD lists, and coordination with UN agencies like UNHCR and IOM. Local knowledge and home visits, particularly within the Protection programme, strengthened targeting and reduced reliance on self-registration, while feedback mechanisms, call centres, referral pathways, and post-payment audits provided additional layers of oversight. These systems supported early error detection and verification of appropriate fund use, as illustrated by audits of shopkeepers in the livelihoods programme. Nevertheless, weaknesses persisted. Early reliance on institutional lists, such as Chambers of Commerce records, risked exclusion and manipulation. Outdated data and literacy barriers in rural areas further contributed to gaps, while limited awareness of complaint and appeal channels constrained the ability of beneficiaries to challenge errors after selection. Additionally, tensions arose from data-sharing arrangements with government that affected equity between refugees and Turkish citizens, and the initial exclusion of men and male caregivers from the Cash for Protection programme underscored the need for continuous adaptation. Overall, while safeguards reduced errors in many cases, structural limitations and contextual barriers prevented the system from achieving full equity.

#### **4.2.8. Core Operational Components for Scalability**

***What are some core operational components of the earthquake response that have a potential for high scalability, and how can these components be optimized to facilitate cost-effective scaling in future emergencies?***

The Türkiye Earthquake Response demonstrated several scalable operational components, enabled by digital infrastructure, centralized funding, and institutional preparedness. TRC's effective use of internal systems, government partnerships, and private sector relationships facilitated rapid expansion of services. Key enablers of scale included logistics, digital tools, and social enterprise models, which are ideal for cost-effective scaling in future emergencies.

- TRC's cash assistance and beneficiary targeting systems were highly scalable, supported by strong logistics, professional staff, and national infrastructure, including high literacy rates and digital access. However, there was still a need to scale up much quicker. For example, although TRC demonstrated agility by rapidly providing A101 vouchers to affected families in the first days after the earthquake, scaling up cash assistance to meet the scale of the disaster was delayed by nearly two months, largely due to internal coordination challenges. This observation supports what was presented in the IFRC Operational Review.
- Digital tools, such as SMS payments and displacement tracking via Facebook, allowed rapid, data-driven scale-up.
- As identified in the Operational Review, the ESSN system, while technically advanced, was designed for refugees and not for a nationwide disaster affecting both refugees and Turkish citizens. Following the earthquake, aligning selection criteria and eligibility across multiple parallel programmes took weeks, delaying the establishment of a common operational model. Future cash response planning should build in adaptable mechanisms that can be rapidly expanded beyond specific constituencies to cover all targeted populations.
- TRC's social enterprise model for logistics contributed to a professional, scalable emergency response, supported by local stockpiles that sped up the initial response.
- Centralized funding via the Appeal streamlined large-scale coordination and avoided fragmentation, and was complemented by other Membership Coordination mechanisms to align bilateral contributions (for example, the integration of the Korean Red Cross)
- TRC raised TRY 250 million (Approx CHF 5 million) in public funds, enhancing long-term operational flexibility and scalability.
- Partnerships with banks, supermarkets, and government entities facilitated rapid deployment without requiring major new infrastructure.
- The call centre, an essential component of the CEA system, was significantly scaled to support targeting decisions, surveys, M&E tools, and feedback management.
- The Collective Kindness programme scaled successfully by leveraging existing ESSN infrastructure, reaching 115,000 households.

- Participation in coordination platforms, including the WFP-led Emergency and Response Group, demonstrated a scalable inter-agency model.
- Household visits and local coordination enabled a flexible, context-specific approach, supporting scalability across diverse settings.
- Turkey’s substantive pre-existing stocks (tents, hygiene kits, etc.) minimized delays and reduced dependency on international hubs. Reinforces the importance of local preparedness and logistics agility.
- Success was rooted in the IFRC’s ability to support, not replace, the National Society, enabling local leadership and ownership and to be physically working day by day in the same space.
- The IM team played a critical role in supporting decision-making across all sectors during implementation. Many interviewees emphasized the scale and strength of the IM team in the operation, describing it as “impressive” and essential to effective coordination.
- Strong multi-agency coordination with a common CVA platform to pool resources and reduce duplication.

#### 4.3. CVA MODALITY & MANAGEMENT

This section covers the following evaluation question:

***To what extent was the choice of modality (e.g., cash, voucher, ATM cards, or digitized payment systems) appropriate to the context, scale of emergency, recipient preferences, and local market infrastructure?***

Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA) has played a pivotal role in the earthquake response and is widely recognized as a major achievement by all interviewed stakeholders. CVA activities were delivered in various forms, including multipurpose cash transfers and tailored interventions targeting protection and livelihoods.

The TRC centred its response around CVA, based on a decade of experience with the Kızılaykart platform<sup>4</sup>. This included the pre-existing Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) programme<sup>5</sup>, which provided monthly debit-card cash assistance to over 1.5 million refugees. As highlighted by the Cash Hub<sup>6</sup>, TRC was uniquely positioned to scale digital cash transfers rapidly, thanks to its established infrastructure and operational expertise.

The people reached have been supported by several key CVA initiatives:

- **Multipurpose Cash Assistance (MPCA):** Approximately 1.058.080 people received<sup>7</sup> unconditional cash grants to meet essential needs such as rent, utilities, food, and medicine. This support was based on the Minimum Expenditure Basket methodology<sup>8</sup>, which is used in humanitarian work to determine the minimum amount of goods and services a household needs to survive or maintain a basic standard of living and helps

<sup>4</sup> See <https://platform.kizilaykart.org/en/>

<sup>5</sup> See <https://www.ifrc.org/our-work/disasters-climate-and-crises/cash-and-voucher-assistance/emergency-social-safety-net-essn>

<sup>6</sup> See <https://cash-hub.org/resources/cash-in-turkiye/>

<sup>7</sup> See Lesson Learned Workshop Report

<sup>8</sup> See [Calculating the Minimum Expenditure Basket: A Guide to Best Practice - The CALP Network](#)

define poverty thresholds, humanitarian assistance needs, and social safety nets.), jointly developed by TRC, IFRC, and World Food Program (WFP), ensuring a needs-based and evidence-driven approach.

- **Livelihood Recovery Programme:** Focused on supporting small businesses, farmers, and Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) to replace assets for restarting income-generating activities and promote economic recovery. Within the scope of this programme, 860 Farmers and 600 SMEs were supported.
- **Cash for Protection Programme:** Launched in late 2023, this initiative provided protection-sensitive cash assistance to vulnerable individuals, aiming to prevent harmful coping mechanisms and address legal and psychosocial needs. The programme has supported a total of 3,757 beneficiaries, addressing various protection-related needs.

Post-distribution monitoring and transaction data, published through platforms such as Cash Hub, provide evidence of the effectiveness of the Kızılaykart delivery mechanism, which is explained below. Beneficiaries consistently reported high levels of satisfaction, emphasizing the autonomy and dignity afforded by this form of assistance.

#### ***4.3.1. Programmes Analysis and Findings***

The following is a detailed analysis of the three main programmatic areas where CVA was implemented: Basic Needs, Livelihoods, and Cash for Protection, each illustrating how the modality was adapted to meet distinct humanitarian objectives and the evolving needs of crisis-affected populations.

##### ***Basic Needs Cash Support Programme***

**Objective:** To provide immediate cash assistance for essential needs such as shelter, food, hygiene items, utilities, and medicine following the February 2023 earthquakes.

**Target population:** Vulnerable households in earthquake-affected areas, with a focus on women, children, persons with disabilities, and those with damaged housing.

**Selection criteria:** Beneficiaries were selected based on socio-economic vulnerability and damage assessments provided by the Turkish authorities (AFAD and the Ministry of Family and Social Services), as we can read in more detail in the target section(link)

**Delivery mechanism:** Assistance was provided through the three different delivery mechanisms (e-voucher, Esen cards, ID transfer)

##### ***General Findings***

- The MPCA modality empowered households to prioritize and address their diverse needs, as confirmed by both staff and beneficiaries during interviews and focus group discussions.
- The cash assistance programme's effectiveness was strengthened by a strong Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) strategy. Tools like the 168 Kızılay Call Centre helped close communication gaps, provided tailored support, and enabled real-time adaptation to beneficiary needs and preferences.

### Challenges

- **Underutilized Hotline and Referral Systems:** These mechanisms were initially underused, mainly in the second and third quarters of 2023, due to limited awareness, weak communication, and specific conditions in the field. This gap was identified and reported through Post-Distribution Monitoring studies, which enabled TRC to implement targeted improvements. As a result, outreach and information-sharing were strengthened over time, though further efforts are still needed to consolidate Accountability to Affected Populations.
- **Internal Coordination Delays:** Several of those interviewed observed that early response was hindered by delays in mobilizing cash teams and accessing beneficiary lists from AFAD. Over time, TRC improved internal coordination and prioritized deploying experienced CVA staff, which increased efficiency and responsiveness.

### Livelihoods Recovery Programme

**Objective:** To support the economic recovery of earthquake-affected individuals by preserving and strengthening existing income-generating activities, with a focus on small and micro enterprises (SMEs) and rural livelihoods in agriculture and livestock.

**Target population:** Earthquake-affected individuals who owned or operated existing businesses or engaged in farming/livestock activities, both in urban and rural areas.

**Selection criteria:** Beneficiaries were selected through a scoring system based on multiple factors, including the degree of business or livelihood damage, household size, and the presence of vulnerable individuals (e.g., persons with disabilities, female-headed households). Selection was further informed by local partners such as the Chambers of Commerce and the Ministry of Agriculture.

**Delivery mechanism:** Conditional cash grants were transferred to verified business bank accounts via ID-based transfers. The support was disbursed in two instalments: 80% upfront and the remaining 20% following positive verification through field visits, ensuring funds were used appropriately.

### General Findings

- Cash for Livelihoods proved to be a relevant and timely response modality, effectively supporting the rapid recovery of small businesses and stimulating local economic revitalization. By enabling beneficiaries to quickly resume income-generating activities, it offered a more flexible and efficient alternative to other forms of assistance, such as in-kind support.

**“The support I received from TRC to restart my business wasn’t a lot of money, but it gave me hope that I could get my life back to where it was before”**  
(Livelihood Programme Beneficiary)

- Conditional cash grants proved feasible and well-suited to the post-earthquake context.
- Collaboration with local professional chambers and the Ministry of Agriculture was seen as essential to the legitimacy and sustainability of the intervention.

- Post-distribution data indicated that 90–96% of recipients experienced improvements in their income-generating activities (IFRC, 2024; Cash Hub, 2024).
- Cash for Livelihoods programme was enhanced in its second phase by incorporating lessons learned from Phase 1, particularly in relation to targeting strategies (e.g. formal application process for beneficiary selection. Public awareness campaigns to inform the population and encourage submission) and transfer design. Notably, the programme shifted from fixed transfer amounts in Phase 1 to increased values in Phase 2 to better account for inflation and evolving beneficiary needs, which was later highly valued by the people who received the assistance.
- This programme supporting small businesses proved to be a promising intervention model, offering a solid foundation for future, longer-term programming. This phased approach allowed for gradual scale-up and adaptive learning. Future projects could expand beyond reinforcing existing businesses to promoting livelihood diversification. This would include facilitating and supporting the creation of new income-generating activities.

### Challenges

- **Insufficient Staffing to Meet Operational Demands:** Initial staffing levels were inadequate to manage the scale and complexity of the operation, particularly in view of planned programme expansions. TRC responded by scaling up its human resources, deploying additional technical staff, and leveraging surge capacity. The experience highlighted the importance of sustained investment in staffing for future responses. Additionally, the IFRC surge system can play a crucial role in filling existing gaps / complementing the NS structure.
- **Exclusion of Informal Economy Workers:** The programme's eligibility criteria did not adequately cover individuals active in the informal economy, such as day labourers or unregistered small business owners, leaving significant gaps. In addition, some affected individuals without formal identification, particularly those living in informal settlements, were excluded from assistance. This limitation underscored the need for more inclusive targeting mechanisms, which TRC began to consider through broader stakeholder engagement and adapted approaches.
- **Restrictions on Eligible Expenditures:** Constraints on what beneficiaries could purchase with grant funds, such as the exclusion of non-traditional items like office desks, were perceived as overly limiting. In response, TRC initiated a review of allowable expenses to better align with the practical needs of diverse livelihood activities.
- **Bureaucratic Barriers to Expense Justification:** Beneficiaries expressed frustration with the centralized, time-consuming reimbursement process, which required long travel and waiting times to submit invoices in person. The absence of online or decentralized options was especially burdensome for those in remote areas, underscoring the need to streamline procedures. Similar issues were noted in the Operational Review, which found that multiple cash streams within TRC and the lack of formal SOPs delayed disbursements and created inconsistencies in messaging and roles.

- **Inadequate Transfer Values and Duration of Support:** Beneficiaries reported that the level and duration of cash support were insufficient to cover essential equipment and operational costs. While acknowledging these concerns, TRC made some adjustments in later phases and emphasized the temporary nature of the support to avoid fostering dependency.
- **Exclusion of Refugee Populations:** The programme's eligibility criteria excluded refugee populations, reducing its inclusivity and impact, especially in areas where refugees were economically active. Although constrained by policy and donor frameworks, TRC recognized this gap and advocated for more inclusive approaches in future programming.
- **Limited exit planning:** The absence of a clearly communicated closure rationale shared with participants affected the overall transparency of the programme's conclusion. The cessation of activities in December 2024 led to handover challenges, with second payments managed under constrained oversight. These factors may have weakened follow-up and accountability processes.

### **Cash for Protection Programme**

**Objective:** To provide short-term, targeted financial assistance to individuals facing acute protection risks, while facilitating access to essential services such as legal aid, psychosocial support, and healthcare.

**Target population:** Highly vulnerable individuals affected by the 2023 Türkiye earthquakes, including people at risk due to disability, child protection concerns, lack of legal documentation, or exposure to gender-based violence.

**Selection criteria:** Beneficiaries were identified individually through in-depth protection risk assessments conducted by trained TRC social workers. Eligibility was reviewed and validated by technical committees at both the field and headquarters levels to ensure consistency and quality.

**Delivery mechanism:** Unconditional cash assistance was provided in up to three instalments, with follow-up assessments after each to determine the need for continued support. Payments were aligned with the specific protection risks identified. The programme integrated accountability mechanisms such as call centres and in-person feedback to monitor and adapt support as needed.

### **General Findings**

- **Protection Cash was a critical enabler for vulnerable individuals,** particularly those receiving mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), helping to reduce emotional distress and support recovery.
- **Inclusion of Refugee Populations.** The programme included refugee populations, ensuring that all the vulnerable people were included.
- Based on the findings of the Cash for Protection learning study conducted jointly by the IFRC and TRC teams, 99% of recipients indicated that the assistance provided was helpful or very helpful. Furthermore, 97% of respondents reported encountering no barriers in accessing the support.

### Challenges

- **Limited Consultation on Modality Preferences:** Beneficiaries noted a lack of consultation regarding their preferences for how assistance was delivered, revealing a gap in participatory programme design and community engagement. This highlighted the need to strengthen feedback mechanisms and involve affected populations more meaningfully in the design phase.
- **Need for Improved Localization and Delivery Diversification:** While cash assistance proved effective in addressing specific protection outcomes, its impact could be significantly strengthened by increasing localization and expanding the range of delivery methods. Tailoring approaches to better reach marginalized and hard-to-access groups, such as people with disabilities, undocumented individuals, or those in remote areas, would ensure more equitable access and improve overall program effectiveness.
- **Language Barriers in Initial Communication:** Early communication efforts, including SMS messages and hotline services, were provided only in Turkish, creating barriers for non-Turkish-speaking beneficiaries. This emphasized the need for multilingual communication strategies to ensure accessibility for all affected populations.

#### **4.3.2. Delivery Mechanisms**

The delivery mechanisms refer to the operational channels and systems through which financial assistance is transferred to beneficiaries. These mechanisms are critical to ensuring that support reaches recipients in a timely, safe, and dignified manner, while also aligning with local infrastructure, levels of financial inclusion, and protection considerations.

In the context of the Türkiye earthquake response, delivery mechanisms played a central role in the implementation of CVA. TRC adopted a phased, multi-modal delivery strategy, carefully adapted to the evolving operational environment and the diverse needs of affected individuals and families.

Depending on the context and population profile, the delivery mechanisms used included prepaid debit cards, electronic vouchers, and direct bank deposits. Each modality was selected based on its suitability to the local context and its ability to ensure efficient, secure, and dignified delivery of assistance.

The following provides a detailed overview of the key delivery mechanisms implemented during the operation, highlighting their design, implementation, and impact.

#### **Electronic Vouchers**

The e-voucher mechanism, implemented by TRC with support from IFRC, utilized the Kızılaykart platform to distribute pre-loaded electronic vouchers to eligible households. These vouchers enabled recipients to purchase essential goods, such as food, hygiene items, clothing, and health products, from pre-screened local vendors, with usage restricted to specific types of establishments.

For the electronic voucher modality, TRC selected A1019, one of Türkiye's largest retail chains, as the principal vendor due to its extensive national footprint, particularly across all 11

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<sup>9</sup> See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A101\\_\(company\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A101_(company))

earthquake-affected provinces. Its strong urban presence ensured reliable and practical access for beneficiaries in areas where market systems remained functional or were rapidly restored. The selection of A101 was based on a Joint Market Assessment conducted by TRC, IFRC, and WFP from 22 to 24 February 2023 and from 24 to 28 March 2023, which confirmed that urban markets were sufficiently functional to support voucher-based assistance. While rural areas faced challenges, urban centres showed strong capacity for implementation.

#### Strengths:

- **Facilitates a rapid transition from in-kind to market-based assistance:** As markets in the affected areas began to recover, beneficiaries were able to use e-vouchers to access essential products through partner stores. The e-voucher modality used in Intervention 101 enabled a rapid transition from in-kind distributions to market-based assistance.
- **Ensure immediate access to essential goods:** Electronic vouchers ensured timely and fair access to goods already available in the local market, helping to meet the population's urgent needs in the first few weeks and strengthening local supply chains.
- **Useful when direct cash is impractical due to the lack of infrastructure:** In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake in Turkey, many areas experienced banking service disruptions, limited ATM access, and damaged financial infrastructure, hampering the safe and efficient implementation of direct cash transfers. The e-voucher approach offered a practical alternative by allowing assistance to be delivered through a controlled digital system independent of banking networks and cash liquidity.
- **Rapid implementation based on pre-established agreements:** By leveraging the Turkish Red Crescent's pre-existing digital payment infrastructure and network of providers, developed through previous cash and voucher programs such as ESSN and Kızılaykart, the response could be activated quickly without the need to build new delivery systems from scratch.
- **Good institutional visibility (TRC branding):** The e-voucher intervention provides strong institutional visibility in the early stages of the operation, reinforcing the trust of affected communities and also the organization's accountability and recognition among government stakeholders and humanitarian partners. This high visibility helps demonstrate leadership in the cash response, while strengthening its role in coordinating large-scale emergency assistance.
- **Enables greater security:** The e-voucher system significantly enhanced security for both aid providers and beneficiaries. By eliminating the need to distribute large sums of physical cash, the program reduced risks related to theft, fraud, and mismanagement during transportation and distribution. Beneficiaries received digital vouchers (often in physical printed form with secure codes), which they could redeem only at authorized vendors, minimizing the chance of misuse.

#### Challenges

- **Complex Financial Reconciliation** The voucher system was complex to reconcile, requiring detailed verification of transactions between multiple stakeholders, including

vendors, financial service providers, and program implementers. This increased administrative workload and slowed down financial closure processes.

- **Need for Strong Coordination with Retailers.** Effective implementation of voucher assistance required robust coordination with contracted retailers to ensure a consistent supply of goods, adherence to quality standards, and timely reporting. In contexts with limited market capacity, this coordination proved logistically challenging.
- **Reduced Flexibility for Beneficiaries.** Unlike unrestricted cash assistance, vouchers limited beneficiaries' purchasing options to pre-approved items and specific vendors. This reduced their autonomy in meeting diverse and context-specific needs.
- **Limited Monitoring and Risk of Duplication.** TRC faced constraints in monitoring voucher use at the individual level, making it difficult to track whether items were used as intended or if beneficiaries received overlapping support through other actors.
- **Limited Suitability for Multipurpose Cash Objectives.** Vouchers were less appropriate for multipurpose cash programming, as spending was confined to goods available at participating vendors. This restricted the potential to address broader household needs beyond food or hygiene items.
- **High Planning and Administrative Burden.** Voucher-based assistance required significant upfront planning, vendor contracting, logistical arrangements, and administrative resources to launch and maintain, which could delay a timely response.
- **Disadvantage to Non-Participating Traders.** Local traders who were not included in the voucher scheme were excluded from the economic opportunities it generated, occasionally leading to community tensions and disrupting local market dynamics.

#### ***DEBIT CARD (ESEN Card)***

The TRC ESEN Card is a prepaid debit card developed by TRC as a cash delivery mechanism. Personalized with the beneficiary's Turkish ID number (TCKN), the card was designed to provide rapid, secure access to cash for individuals lacking traditional banking services. Unlike standard bank cards, it is not linked to a personal account and cannot be used for online purchases or fund transfers. Instead, recipients can withdraw cash from VakıfBank<sup>10</sup> ATMs or make purchases at affiliated merchants.

The ESEN Card is protected with passwords sent via SMS and includes safeguards such as restrictions on contactless payments. Also, the card has some purchase limitations, such as purchases of alcohol, tobacco, or gambling products. The ESEN card was developed based on Türkiye's extensive experience in humanitarian cash assistance, particularly the ESSN programme. From 2020 to 2023, TRC and IFRC, with EU funding, delivered monthly cash aid to over 1.5 million refugees through ESSN, the world's largest humanitarian cash programme.

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<sup>10</sup> See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VakifBank>



Figure 8: ESEN Card

### Strengths:

- Scalable response with strong traceability:** It enabled rapid assistance to be provided to newly affected Turkish citizens in vulnerable situations following the earthquake. Furthermore, the card's electronic system facilitated real-time transaction tracking and traceability, improving transparency and accountability in fund management. This scalability and control were crucial to efficiently manage the growing number of cases while ensuring the safe and targeted delivery of humanitarian aid.
- Effective during early emergency banking disruptions:** The ESEN Card proved highly effective in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, when conventional banking services were partially or completely disrupted. By using a pre-established digital payment system, independent of traditional bank branches or ATMs, the card ensured that vulnerable populations could access financial assistance without delay. This capability was crucial for providing timely support in a chaotic environment where physical banking infrastructure was damaged or inaccessible, thus maintaining the continuity of humanitarian aid delivery.
- Rapid implementation through pre-established partnerships and existing platforms:** The ESEN Card program not only leveraged pre-established agreements between the Turkish Red Crescent, financial institutions, and local providers, but also relied on an already operational digital payment platform and the experience of the ESSN program for refugees. This combination enabled extremely rapid implementation immediately after the earthquake. Since the infrastructure, provider networks, and technical systems were already in place and tested, humanitarian actors were able to avoid the usual delays in establishing new payment mechanisms.
- Flexible for recipients:** Its flexible design allowed beneficiaries to access a wide range of essential goods and services from numerous suppliers or withdraw cash from ATMs, adapting to the diverse needs of the affected population. The cash can be spent wherever and however desired. Not only to purchase items, but also to pay rent, utilities, and debts, for example.

### Challenges

- Deployed too early in unstable conditions because markets/beneficiaries were not ready.** The cash assistance program was rolled out before local markets and

beneficiaries were adequately prepared to absorb and utilize the support. In some areas, the economic infrastructure, such as functioning markets, supply chains, and vendor networks, had not yet stabilized after the crisis. As a result, beneficiaries faced difficulties in accessing goods and services, which reduced the effectiveness and timeliness of the assistance.

- **Branding Confusion with ESEN Cards.** Confusion arose when AFAD distributed ESEN cards co-branded with TRC’s logo, despite TRC not managing the funds or communication for those cards. Beneficiaries continued to contact TRC with questions that TRC was no longer able to address.

“I do not like the ESEN Card because everybody knows that I received support from TRC.”

Protection Programme beneficiary

- **Delayed Reporting by Financial Service Provider.** Timely monitoring was hindered by delays in reporting from the financial service provider. The lack of real-time data limited the program’s ability to promptly track disbursements, address issues as they emerged, and ensure effective oversight of cash distributions.
- **Point of Sale (POS) Infrastructure in Local Businesses:** The reliance on POS systems inadvertently excludes small or informal local businesses that lack this infrastructure, limiting their ability to participate in the program and reducing potential positive spillover effects on the local economy.
- **Financial literacy.** Limited financial literacy among some members of the affected population posed a significant barrier to fully benefiting from cash-based assistance. This lack of understanding not only reduced the effectiveness of the assistance but also increased stress and confusion, especially among older adults, women with limited education, and those with no prior experience with formal financial services. Addressing financial literacy is essential to ensure equitable access and to empower recipients to make informed decisions about the use of their financial resources.
- **Stigmatization Risk from Branded Assistance Cards.** The use of assistance cards that carry visible logos or branding identifying them as humanitarian aid tools can inadvertently expose recipients to social stigma or discrimination. When individuals use these cards in public, such as at ATMs, shops, or service providers, they may be recognized as aid beneficiaries. This can lead to feelings of shame, embarrassment, or social exclusion, particularly in communities where receiving aid is associated with vulnerability, poverty, or marginalization.

### **ID Transfer**

TRC used the ID Transfer mechanism to reach affected individuals who lacked access to physical Kızılaykart debit cards, bank accounts, or had lost their identification documents. Beneficiaries were registered using their mobile phone numbers linked to their Turkish national ID numbers (TCKN), allowing the creation of temporary digital wallets without issuing physical cards.

Cash assistance was transferred via Halkbank<sup>11</sup> to recipients' ID, and they could only withdraw money from Halbank ATMs by entering their ID number and the SMS code that had been sent to them. Halkbank was selected following a market analysis to ensure the most suitable and accessible financial service provider<sup>12</sup>. Notifications were sent via SMS by TRC's call centre, ensuring secure and accessible delivery of aid.

**Strengths:**

- **Flexible and inclusive rapid outreach without physical cards:** The ID transfer mechanism used in the response offered a flexible and inclusive way to deliver assistance quickly to affected populations. By linking transfers directly to beneficiaries' national ID numbers, the system bypassed the need for traditional banking infrastructure or physical card issuance, which can be slow and logistically complex in emergency contexts. This approach enabled timely access to funds through existing financial service providers, ensuring that vulnerable groups could receive support rapidly and with minimal barriers, regardless of their location or access to physical cards.
- **Fast and secure disbursement:** The identity transfer model enabled the rapid and secure delivery of financial assistance to beneficiaries. By using verified identity systems linked to national identification numbers, funds were disbursed directly and securely, minimizing the risk of fraud or misallocation. This method also reduced administrative burdens and eliminated the need to handle cash or physical cards, improving the security of both beneficiaries and implementing agencies during the emergency response.
- **Scalable and suitable for emergencies:** The ID transfer mechanism proved highly scalable, allowing rapid expansion to cover large numbers of beneficiaries as the emergency evolved. Its reliance on national ID systems and digital financial networks made it well-suited for crisis contexts where speed and adaptability are essential. This approach facilitated quick onboarding of new recipients without the need for physical infrastructure, making it an effective solution to meet urgent humanitarian needs at scale.
- **Facilitated real-time monitoring and accountability:** This system provided the TRC with detailed reports twice a week from the banking partner, enabling real-time monitoring of withdrawals and potential issues. This transparency facilitates proactive program management, rapid identification of difficulties, and ensures that assistance reaches beneficiaries as intended. This monitoring improves accountability, enhances the reimbursement rate, and contributes to the continuous improvement of emergency response.
- **Strong communication and accountability processes:** The ID transfer model incorporated a robust communication strategy to keep beneficiaries informed and engaged throughout the assistance process. Recipients received SMS notifications before, during, and after transfers, ensuring transparency and clarity about the timing and amount of funds. Additionally, follow-up reminders and support were provided through a dedicated call centre, allowing beneficiaries to raise concerns or seek

<sup>11</sup> See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halkbank>

<sup>12</sup> See Uneven Market Speeds: Exploring the Potential for Cash Programming after the Earthquake – Market Assessment Report" (April 2023)

assistance. This comprehensive communication approach enhanced trust, accountability, and overall satisfaction with the program.

- **Financial inclusion without physical cards:** The ID transfer system promoted financial inclusion by requiring only a national ID number and a reference code, eliminating the need for physical cards. This streamlined process made it easier for vulnerable populations, especially those without access to bank accounts or physical documentation, to receive aid promptly. By reducing barriers related to card distribution and banking infrastructure, the program ensured broader reach and accessibility in the emergency context.

### Challenges

- **Identification and Banking Infrastructure Requirements.** The program required recipients to have a valid ID and access to banking infrastructure, such as functioning ATMs. This created barriers for individuals lacking official documentation or living in areas with limited financial services.
- **ATM Access and Availability Issues.** Beneficiaries faced several practical challenges when trying to withdraw cash, including:
  - Overcrowding at ATMs and bank branches
  - Long waiting times in queues
  - ATMs running out of cash
  - Technical failures or non-functioning machines
- **Mobility Constraints.** Reaching ATMs or bank branches was particularly difficult for vulnerable individuals, such as the elderly, persons with disabilities, or those living in remote areas, limiting their ability to access assistance independently.

“When we were informed that we could withdraw the money, as there were several beneficiaries in my village, we all hired a car to go together to get the money, as it was far away from our village”

Livelihood Programme Beneficiary

- **Connectivity and Digital Literacy Requirements.** The system relied on recipients having mobile connectivity and basic digital skills to receive and interpret SMS notifications or access digital banking tools. This was especially problematic for:
  - Individuals with low literacy
  - Older adults unfamiliar with digital tools
  - Cases of undelivered codes or inactive reference numbers.

“My nephew helped me through the whole process as it was very complicated for me to understand. I don't know how to use telephones and ATMs well”

Protection Programme Beneficiary

### 4.3.3. *Transition of Modalities*

TRC and IFRC adopted a progressive and adaptive approach to selecting cash assistance delivery mechanisms, guided by operational conditions, market functionality, and the needs of affected populations.

- **Initial Phase:** Electronic vouchers redeemable at contracted supermarkets were deployed to facilitate a rapid transition from hot meal distribution to a market-based solution. However, due to limited traceability and monitoring, along with heavy human requirements, this modality was phased out.
- **Transition Phase:** As infrastructure improved, the ESEN prepaid card (Kızılaykart system) was introduced, drawing on TRC's experience with the ESSN programme. While it offered greater autonomy, early distribution led to confusion and stigmatization, as beneficiaries associated the card with government welfare due to its design and co-branding with AFAD.
- **Final Phase:** The ID-linked cash transfer mechanism was adopted as the most effective solution, allowing beneficiaries to access funds using their national ID and a code sent via SMS, which offered speed, traceability, and a reduced logistical burden. This modality was beneficial in areas with disrupted financial infrastructure or among mobile and undocumented populations.

The selection and transition between modalities were decided by market assessments, post-distribution monitoring, and community feedback, ensuring a flexible, people-centred strategy that adapted to evolving needs and conditions on the ground.

### 4.3.4. *Modality Effectiveness*

- Pre-established agreements with banks and retailers, and the existing delivery cash platform from TRC ensured a rapid and smooth scale-up of cash distribution.
- In response to evolving programmatic priorities and operational realities, TRC progressively adapted its cash delivery mechanisms, shifting from vouchers to ATM cards, and eventually to direct bank transfers linked to national ID numbers, thereby improving both operational efficiency and accessibility for beneficiaries.
- According to surveys conducted among the population regarding potential future emergencies, the preferred delivery mechanism is:




Figure 9: Preferred methods for CVA

Based on these results, we can conclude that TRC selected the delivery method appropriately, as reflected by the high percentage of beneficiaries who indicated they would prefer the same method if assistance were provided again. These findings confirm that the cash-based modalities were accessible and effective, allowing recipients to address their own priorities with minimal restrictions or logistical challenges.

The following table consolidates the different modalities over the course of the operation:

Modality	Advantages	Disadvantages	Reason for change	Time of use	Program use
<b>Electronic Voucher (Shopping Card)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supports local market engagement</li> <li>• Ensure immediate access to essential goods.</li> <li>• Useful when direct cash is impractical</li> <li>• Rapid implementation based on pre-established agreements.</li> <li>• Good institutional visibility (TRC branding).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Complex to reconcile</li> <li>• Needs strong coordination with retailers</li> <li>• Less flexible for beneficiaries</li> <li>• TRC lacked capacity to monitor usage and prevent duplication.</li> <li>• Not suitable for cover all basic needs as cash as spending is limited to items available at contracted vendors</li> </ul>	<p>Limited monitoring and control capacity.</p> <p>Too much workload to be scalable.</p> <p>Established card delivery service providers.</p>	Immediately after the earthquake	Basic needs

<b>ESEN Card (Prepaid Debit Card)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables dignified shopping at stores.</li> <li>• Rapid implementation based on pre-established agreements.</li> <li>• Election flexibility in what to use the cash</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Markets/beneficiaries were not ready</li> <li>• Confusion due to co-branding with AFAD</li> <li>• Financial literacy is required</li> <li>• Stigmatization Risk from Branded Assistance Cards.</li> </ul>	Operational issues, access barriers, cobranding confusion	3 weeks after the earthquake	Basic needs
<b>ID Transfer (ID-Linked Direct Transfers)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fast and secure disbursement</li> <li>• Scalable and suitable for emergencies</li> <li>• Enabled real-time monitoring</li> <li>• Strong communication and accountability mechanisms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requires access to ID and ATM infrastructure</li> <li>• Requires traveling to ATMs, which may be difficult for vulnerable individuals.</li> </ul>	Efficiency, scalability, robust oversight	Since mid-2023	Basic Needs Livelihoods Cash protection for

Table 1: CVA Modalities

#### 4.4. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTABILITY TOWARDS STAKEHOLDERS

This section covers the following evaluation question:

***What was the role of Information Management in ensuring accountability towards key stakeholders (affected population, donors, government institutions)?***

The IFRC and TRC made notable strides in institutionalizing information management (IM) and strengthening accountability to affected communities, both of which emerged as key pillars of the Türkiye earthquake response and the Appeal. IM played a central role in supporting transparency, coordination, and data-informed decision-making across all response levels.

The operation marked a significant milestone in IM by fully embedding a dedicated IM team within the operational structure for the first time. This team worked closely with field staff and cross-functional units such as Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting (PMER), enabling real-time coordination, evidence-based decision-making, and dynamic program adjustments.

IM supported multiple sectors by leveraging and adapting platforms from established programs, such as the ESSN programme. This integration demonstrated both scalability and institutional continuity. The team also produced high-quality dashboards and infographics, which enhanced internal planning, donor transparency, and the communication of key achievements and gaps.

Accountability and verification mechanisms were established, including the processing of anonymized beneficiary data, quality control, and random eligibility checks in collaboration with call centres, strengthening the integrity of targeting and delivery.

Daily coordination with technical teams ensured validated, real-time data flows to donors, AFAD, and institutional partners. Finally, IM outputs were instrumental in evidence-based advocacy, supporting the inclusion of vulnerable groups and defending the use of cash modalities over in-kind assistance.

These practices collectively reflect the institutional approach to IM and accountability, positioning both IFRC and TRC for more agile, transparent, and community-responsive operations in future emergencies.

#### **4.4.1. Innovative Information Management Practices**

This section covers the following evaluation question:

***What were any innovative information management practices, such as the use of digital tools or mobile technologies, that enhanced the operation's effectiveness and can be replicated in future operations?***

The Türkiye earthquake response introduced a range of innovative, tech-enabled IM practices that significantly enhanced the efficiency, targeting, and adaptability of operations. Many of these tools were a legacy of the ESSN, which the Planning Quality and Accountability and IM teams rapidly repurposed to meet the specific demands of the earthquake response. This transfer of resources and expertise, facilitated by the ESSN's gradual phase-out, ultimately fueled the effectiveness of the intervention. These approaches not only accelerated delivery but also improved precision, inclusiveness, and accountability, offering scalable models for future emergencies.

According to the TRC staff survey, most respondents rated the use of digital tools and mobile technologies in the Appeal positively, with 39.4% rating them "very well" and 36.4% "well." Only 12.1% were neutral, and 3.0% rated them poorly, indicating strong overall confidence in their effectiveness for operational efficiency.

#### **Key Innovations to Sustain and Expand:**

- **Social Media Analytics for Displacement Tracking.** IM teams used geolocation data from Facebook to monitor population movement patterns before and after the earthquake. By overlaying this with damage and vulnerability data, targeting and coverage decisions were made with greater accuracy.
- **ClickUp for Internal IM Coordination.** A digital platform (ClickUp) was employed to manage sector-wide information requests, improving traceability, response time, and cross-sectoral collaboration.
- **Digital Feedback Management Systems.** A dedicated tool was developed to systematically capture and analyze community feedback. Integrated with CEA channels, it enabled escalations to ethics and investigation teams and produced regular feedback reports for decision-makers.

- **Power BI Dashboards for Real-Time Decision Support.** Pre-developed Power BI dashboards synthesized complex data into visual insights, facilitating timely, evidence-based decision-making across operational teams.
- **Call Center System.** The TRC 168 Call Center was significantly strengthened through the implementation of a new web-based system. This upgrade introduced several key improvements that enhanced efficiency and accountability, including:
  - **Real-time beneficiary reporting,** allowing instant access to updated data for more responsive support.
  - **Integrated communication tools** enable direct coordination between the call centre and field teams to address cases more efficiently.
  - **Enhanced case tracking,** ensuring better follow-up and resolution of queries, complaints, and feedback.
- **Real-Time Logistics Monitoring.** Material flow from logistics hubs was digitally tracked in real time, improving transparency and planning for procurement and distribution.
- **SMS-Based Monitoring in Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA).** SMS notifications were used throughout all stages of the CVA process, before, during, and after cash transfers, providing a fast and effective mechanism to inform the targeted population. This approach strengthened transparency, ensured beneficiaries were aware of the assistance process, and reinforced overall accountability to community members.
- **National ID-Linked Payment Systems.** Leveraging national ID infrastructure enabled secure, traceable bank transfers with automated weekly reports from banks on fund withdrawals and anomalies.

These innovations collectively represent a shift toward more integrated, digital, and data-driven humanitarian response models. Sustaining and scaling these systems, particularly those involving cross-platform integration, real-time data flows, and digital feedback, will be crucial for increasing the speed, inclusiveness, and accountability of future large-scale operations.

It is essential to highlight that several of these innovations have significantly strengthened CEA. For example:

- The TRC 168 Call Center became a key tool for CEA. The call center not only allowed communities to automatically receive information but also offered a trusted channel to share their concerns, feedback and suggestions.
- The Digital Feedback Management Systems represented an important step forward in CEA. This dedicated tool systematically captured and analyzed community feedback, ensuring that feedback were not only collected but also acted upon.

These improvements created a more transparent, responsive, and accountable system, ensuring that community voices were reflected in both operational adjustments and strategic decision-making.

#### **4.4.2. Best Practices in Community Engagement and Accountability**

This section covers the following evaluation question:

***What emerging best practices in Community Engagement and Accountability can be identified how can these practices be institutionalized for future operations?***

During the Türkiye earthquake response, CEA evolved from a supportive function to a core pillar of the operation. The IFRC and TRC demonstrated how integrating CEA throughout the program cycle enhances responsiveness, inclusivity, and trust. The following best practices illustrate this institutional shift:

***Community-Based Structures and Participation***

The operation demonstrated how structured, community-based participation mechanisms can foster accountability, improve program relevance, and build trust between responders and affected populations. TRC invested in various platforms to ensure that community voices, especially those of marginalized groups, were not only heard but also directly influenced decision-making.

- **Container City Committees:** Each container city established formal community committees as two-way communication channels between residents and TRC teams. Meeting regularly, they gathered concerns, provided recommendations, and co-developed solutions. Their input influenced shelter layout, basic services (e.g., water, hygiene, electricity), and psychosocial support design and timing. These committees also reinforced community ownership and transparency.
- **Advisory Groups:** TRC established dedicated advisory groups to ensure the participation of underrepresented populations. These included child advisory committees and targeted consultations with women, persons with disabilities, and minority communities. The groups provided guidance on protection, accessibility, safety, and cultural relevance, helping tailor services to diverse needs and reinforcing a rights-based, inclusive approach.
- **Weekly Community Meetings and Home Visits:** TRC field teams held weekly meetings open to all community members encouraging dialogue, sharing updates, and gather community feedback. To reach those unable to attend, especially vulnerable or low-mobility households, home visits were conducted, enabling inclusion, early issue identification, and real-time feedback to inform programming.

**“Thanks to meetings with the committees, we were able to identify the real needs within the container cities and tailor our activities to those needs”**  
TRC Staff

***Diversity, Inclusion, and Trust-Building***

A cornerstone of the Türkiye earthquake response was ensuring equitable access to services for all individuals, regardless of language, ability, or background, while fostering a sense of being heard and respected. TRC and IFRC integrated inclusive practices into field operations and communication strategies, strengthening both participation and community trust.

- **Multilingual Field Teams and Sign Language Capacity:** Diversity and inclusion were prioritized through field teams fluent in Arabic, Turkish, and sign language, improving access for vulnerable groups. TRC’s consistent presence strengthened trust and accountability, with many community members viewing TRC as the most responsive

actor. However, SMS notifications were only sent in Turkish, limiting understanding among non-Turkish speakers. Future responses should ensure linguistic accessibility in both in-person and digital communication.

- **Consistent Community Presence and Engagement:** From the outset, TRC maintained a regular and visible presence in affected areas. Teams returned to the same sites, built relationships with residents, and responded to feedback with visible changes.

*“TRC was the only organization that truly listens to us”*

Protection Programme Beneficiary

### ***Providing Information to the Community***

IFRC and TRC prioritized informing communities about the assistance process, achieving positive results in many areas, but with some gaps. Over 64% of respondents clearly understood when, where, and what support they would receive, but only about 40% understood the selection criteria. Moreover, 15–30% reported receiving no information, underscoring the need for a more systematic approach to ensure all beneficiaries have access to essential details.




Figure 10: Providing Information to the Community

During project implementation, communication with beneficiaries was limited. Only 27.33% of respondents reported receiving clear and timely updates, while 64.83% received none, 0.49% stated that updates were late or unclear, and 5.88% were unsure. Survey data further illustrate this gap: while the majority of respondents clearly understood the type of support received (69%), the amount (60%), and the timing of assistance (61%), understanding of the selection criteria was much lower, with only 41% reporting full clarity. Strikingly, 30% of respondents indicated that no one had explained the selection criteria to them at all. These results highlight that, although operational details of the assistance were generally communicated, transparency around eligibility criteria was weak, limiting communities' ability to fully understand and engage with the response.

Regarding preferred ways to receive information and provide feedback:

- The call center was the most preferred channel (38%).
- In-person interaction with TRC staff followed closely (33%).
- SMS was far less favored for feedback purposes (13%).

This suggests that while SMS is effective for rapid, large-scale delivery, participants preferred two-way communication through the call center or face-to-face engagement.

### **Effective Tools and Feedback Systems**

Effective communication and accountability mechanisms were key components of the TRC's response strategy. TRC, co-leading the Accountability to Affected Populations Task Team, reinforces the key role played by the NS. Various digital and in-person tools were employed to facilitate community feedback, monitor beneficiary satisfaction, and address concerns promptly. These mechanisms aimed to enhance transparency, ensure responsiveness, and adapt interventions based on community input. The following highlights key aspects of these systems and their impact on the overall response.

**Feedback and Complaint Mechanism.** A centralized, multi-channel platform enabled communities to submit feedback and complaints easily. Sensitive cases triggered confidential protocols via the TRC ethics unit, ensuring an appropriate response and escalation. However, as explained in the next section, community members were not always aware of this procedure or the protocols for raising sensitive complaints. TRC did not fully ensure that communities had access to safe and responsive mechanisms for handling complaints, adapted to the local context. In particular, many community members were unaware of how to confidentially report sensitive issues such as sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment (SEAH), or of the survivor-centred approaches designed to protect them. This limited awareness suggests that, while systems may have existed on paper, they were not consistently communicated or made sufficiently accessible. Such gaps weaken accountability and undermine trust, highlighting the need to strengthen and institutionalize complaints mechanisms in line with CHS Commitment 5<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) Alliance. *The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS)*. Available at: <https://www.corehumanitarianstandard.org/languages>



Figure 11: TRC Contact Posters

- **Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM):** Digital and in-person PDM tools assessed beneficiary satisfaction and intervention relevance, informing adjustments to cash assistance. These tools provided valuable evidence that informed adjustments to assistance modalities, including changes in the value or delivery mechanism of cash assistance. However, some field staff state that the results were not consistently shared with them, limiting operational learning.
- **Enhanced Call Center Services (168 Hotline):** The hotline expanded to handle information requests, complaints, and referrals, serving as a key channel for community concerns.
- **Rumor Tracking and Perception Surveys:** A structured mechanism was used to track and counter misinformation, while perception surveys captured views on response effectiveness, fairness, and clarity.

#### **Institutionalization and Cultural Change**

- **CEA Embedded Across the Programme Cycle.** CEA was fully integrated into all operational phases, from needs assessment and design to implementation and exit strategies. This approach fostered greater community ownership and improved program relevance.
- **Internal Change and Strategic Advocacy.** The response acted as a catalyst for organizational change within TRC, encouraging a shift toward participatory programming. While CEA is increasingly viewed as a strategic priority, some departments still lack permanent staffing or budget lines for its full implementation.

- **Regular Strategic Reviews.** CEA inputs were systematically incorporated into internal operational reviews every 3–6 months, enabling real-time adjustments based on community feedback and improving overall flexibility and responsiveness.

#### **4.4.3. Areas to improve in Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA)**

While the CEA approach demonstrated strengths, such as multilingual teams, feedback channels, and community engagement, several areas for improvement were identified.

The following areas highlight the main gaps in the operation:

1. **Communication and Outreach.** Despite the presence of multilingual staff and sign language capacity, several communication gaps persisted, such as:
  - SMS notifications were not consistently sent in all relevant languages:
  - Communications materials were not always adapted for people with low literacy levels or disabilities.
  - Lack of visual information about the Code of Conduct of TRC, how the TRC’s staff should behave, or how to raise sensitive complaints.
  - Community members also reported low visibility of TRC offices and a lack of clear, regular updates, particularly concerning feedback mechanisms, available services, and exit strategies.
2. **Feedback Mechanisms.** TRC quickly activated multiple feedback channels to engage with affected communities. The vast scale of the disaster and competing operational priorities hindered systematic efforts to close the feedback loop, leaving feedback mechanisms with clear scope for improvement. More than half of survey participants (51.72%) were unsure who to contact for feedback, complaints, or suggestions. Only 38.73% knew the correct contact point and process, 5.76% reported they were never informed, and the remainder either had difficulty reaching the relevant contact or could not recall the information.
3. **Safeguarding and Sensitive Complaints.** Safeguarding systems for reporting abuse, misconduct, or protection concerns were not well-known or easily accessible. Many community members were unaware of their right to report such issues or how to do so safely and confidentially. Low awareness of safeguarding policies and reporting mechanisms limits access to protection and undermines accountability.
4. **Community participation.** Community members were rarely consulted on selection criteria or program design, which limited the relevance, ownership, and sustainability of the program. The survey results indicate that community involvement in the initial needs assessment was relatively low, with only 30% of respondents reporting that they had been asked about their needs before receiving assistance.
5. **Access to Monitoring Data and PDM Results.** Field staff had limited access to key monitoring data, particularly PDM findings. This hindered their ability to understand community feedback, identify challenges, and apply lessons in real-time. Without regular sharing of results, frontline teams are less equipped to make evidence-based decisions or adapt programming effectively.

6. **Access to Appeal Information for the Turkish Population.** Despite communication efforts, there is no centralized, publicly accessible platform in Türkiye where communities can access up-to-date information on the appeal and its activities, unlike the IFRC's GO platform<sup>14</sup>. This limits transparency and makes it harder for affected populations to stay informed about services, selection criteria, timelines, feedback channels, and exit strategies.

#### 4.5. REGISTRATION AND DATA MANAGEMENT

This section covers the following evaluation question:

***How effectively did the registration process capture and manage accurate and comprehensive data for targeted populations, including through partnerships with external entities such as government/ UNHCR/IOM/WFP amongst others?***

The TRC set up registration and data management systems that showed strong use of institutional partnerships, digital tools, and multi-source data. However, the approach faced key limitations in data accuracy, inclusion of newly vulnerable populations, and internal coherence. This chapter synthesizes findings to assess how well the registration process captured and managed accurate and comprehensive data for targeted populations, particularly through collaboration with government bodies and UN agencies.

##### 4.5.1. Registration Process: Methods and Sources

The registration process showed both strengths and systemic gaps. Multi-source data and strategic partnerships enabled rapid targeting of pre-registered groups and large-scale SMS/ATM registration. However, reliance on outdated pre-earthquake lists led to exclusion errors and missed newly vulnerable groups. Digital tools streamlined workflows (see [Information Management section](#)), and field verification prioritized vulnerability, but accessibility challenges underscored the need for more inclusive, adaptive systems.

- **The registration process integrated data from AFAD's social protection lists**, TRC's systems, door-to-door assessments (TRC Social Services), and Community Service Centre (CSC) referrals. This enabled swift targeting of pre-registered groups but risked excluding those newly vulnerable. TRC directly registered ~47,000 people in the hardest-hit areas through ID verification, internal data, and CSC referrals. TRC also partnered with the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and Forestry to register illiterate farmers and worked with Chambers of Commerce/Tradesmen to ensure urban business lists were accurate.
- **TRC used national databases via agreements with AFAD and the Ministry of Family and Social Services to target vulnerable Turkish citizens.** It combined earthquake damage data with refugee information from the ESSN program. Through the Collective Kindness initiative (TRC, IFRC, WFP), TRC scaled assistance, registering 135,759 households via SMS/ATM using ESSN infrastructure.
- **Field teams conducted household-level assessments in hard-hit provinces** (e.g. Adiyaman, Hatay), using criteria like disability, elderly, or female-headed households.

<sup>14</sup> See <https://go.ifrc.org/countries/174/ongoing-activities/emergencies>

For protection programming, household visits helped verify eligibility and reduce targeting errors. In livelihoods, for example, post-payment checks randomly sampled 40% of beneficiaries. While no shared platform existed with actors like the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation, data coordination often occurred informally.

- **Digital tools**, clickUp (tracking), SAP (logistics), and Power BI (visualization), improved registration. SMS payments and ID-linked systems enhanced efficiency but presented barriers like remote ATMs and literacy issues. TRC’s migration department reused an online application/scoring tool for livelihoods, though it lacked emergency integration. (more information in the [Information Management section](#)).
- **Reliance on outdated pre-earthquake government lists** created accuracy problems, leading to payments to deceased or no longer vulnerable individuals. The use of these lists also led to exclusion, as they did not identify new vulnerabilities arising from the earthquake, such as acquired disabilities.
- **Rural populations, refugees, and informal settlers faced added challenges:** limited digital literacy, lack of ID, and SMS messages exclusively in Turkish.
- **The registration process was widely regarded by the people who participated in the survey**, with 88% of respondents reporting a smooth, straightforward experience. Most found it accessible, user-friendly, and free of significant barriers, reflecting an efficient and well-designed system that facilitated participation.

#### **4.5.2. Data Management: Systems and Integration**

Data management was a critical pillar of the response. While the system showed strong performance through strategic partnerships and internal accountability mechanisms, internal fragmentation and coordination gaps weakened its effectiveness. These issues underscored the need for integrated systems and clearer inter-agency protocols.

- **TRC’s partnerships with AFAD, Turkish ministries, UNHCR, IOM, and WFP enabled cross-validation of beneficiary lists**, reducing duplication and improving targeting accuracy. In addition, TRC’s internal registration systems featured built-in systems for random eligibility checks, appeals, and community feedback through call centres and CSC referrals, which helped correct errors. The 168 Call Center logged complaints and referred issues to protection teams, enhancing accountability.
- **Data management strengths also included a real-time coordination with UN agencies** such as UNHCR, IOM, and WFP, which enabled cross-validation of beneficiary lists to minimize duplication. According to the surveyed TRC staff, coordination has been rated as effective or highly effective, as the following chart shows:




Figure 12: Data Management: Systems and Integration

- **A data-sharing protocol with the Ministry of Family** ensured compliance with data protection laws, while anonymized datasets enabled call-centre verification before monthly cash distributions.
- **Centralized dashboards**, particularly the IFRC GO Platform, integrated MIRA and shelter cluster analytics for real-time reporting. For example, Facebook displacement tracking and layered data (damage, population, vulnerability) improved targeting precision.
- Despite strengths, fragmentation between TRC departments (e.g., Disaster Management and Migration) led to duplication and operational gaps.
- TRC-IFRC delays in sharing financial and operational data resulted, in some instances, in inconsistent reporting and donor communication. Paper-based forms in rural areas posed risks of data loss, and recommended tablet-based collection was not widely adopted.

#### 4.5.3. Role of Partnerships

Partnerships were essential for scaling registration and targeting but faced coordination and political challenges. Government collaborations with AFAD, provincial directorates, and Chambers of Tradesmen enabled verified beneficiary lists for livelihoods and cash programs, while ministries provided critical databases for Turkish citizens and refugees. While ministries enhanced sectoral inclusivity (e.g., Agriculture's support for illiterate farmers), lengthy negotiations for data access, partial fund reallocations and coordination between earthquake/Syria-response systems created coordination complexities.

- **Collaboration with Government agencies**, such as AFAD, provincial directorates (e.g., Agriculture), and the Chambers of Tradesmen, provides verified lists for livelihoods and multipurpose cash programs. However, some challenges emerged due to AFAD's limited prior experience with cash interventions and the need to establish new field data-sharing mechanisms.

- **TRC accessed Ministry of Family databases** for Turkish citizen registrations, complying with data protection laws to target beneficiaries based on post-earthquake damage assessments, though lengthy negotiations were required.
- **The Ministry of Agriculture partnered with TRC** to register illiterate farmers using institutional data, enhancing rural inclusivity, while the Ministry of Family's 1003 centres supported refugee registration. The Chamber of Tradesmen utilized agreed criteria, such as workplace damage, for beneficiary scoring.
- **UN and international agencies played critical roles:** UNHCR and IOM partnered on data validation for refugees; however, contextual and regulatory factors delayed migrant inclusion. Negotiations with ECHO and the government partially reallocated ESN funds to include Turkish citizens (1% of €30M).
- **WFP's joint ESN infrastructure** enabled rapid scaling of cash transfers via the Collective Kindness program and allowed TRC to deliver cash to 110,033 households through pre-agreed financial service providers like Halkbank, reducing onboarding time, and synergizing TRC's targeting with WFP's financial systems.
- OCHA/UNDAC established coordination hubs (OSOCC in Gaziantep and sub-OSOCCs) that facilitated joint needs assessments. Initially, there was ambiguity until reporting transitioned from joint Türkiye–Northwest Syria flash updates to separate Türkiye and Syria situation reports.<sup>15</sup>

#### 4.5.4. *Innovations and Lessons*

This section covers the following evaluation question:

***What were any innovative information management practices, such as the use of digital tools or mobile technologies, that enhanced the operation's effectiveness and can be replicated in future operations?***

Digital innovations improved scalability but faced limitations in rural areas where paper-based processes persisted, risking data loss. Inclusion efforts strengthened feedback mechanisms, though lacked systematization. Key lessons highlighted the exclusion of newly vulnerable groups due to over-reliance on pre-crisis data, reinforcing the need for pre-negotiated data-sharing agreements and dynamic reassessments during crises.

- TRC's rumour tracking and multilingual call centre (including sign language) supported feedback. Inclusion pilots included Braille materials and simplified formats, though these were not systemic. Community committees in container cities enabled direct input into program design.
- A major lesson was the importance of pre-crisis data-sharing agreements (e.g., with AFAD), as outdated lists limited the inclusion of some newly affected groups. Future responses must incorporate dynamic reassessments to reflect evolving needs.
- The Collective Kindness initiative refined targeting from 35,000 to 9,000 households using field-level assessments and ministry data, prioritizing households with no income or with disabilities. Reuse of the ESN's Funding Framework Agreement (FFA)

<sup>15</sup> OCHA: Türkiye 2023 Earthquakes Situation Report No. 1, as of 16 February 2023

accelerated registration but exposed the need for flexible SOPs to bridge emergency and development data systems. What was innovative in this programme was the delivery mechanism itself, which used ID transfer to securely and efficiently channel assistance to recipients.

## 5. LESSONS LEARNED

The following lessons learned reflect the key insights shared by those directly involved in the operation, based on interviews and other consultation findings.

### 5.1. IDENTIFYING AND SELECTING THE POPULATION REACHED

1. **Multi-source, accurate data improves targeting** – Combining government data, community referrals, and field verification, supported by up-to-date systems, ensures inclusion of vulnerable groups and reduces duplication or exclusion errors.
2. **Integrated data systems strengthen coordination** – Transparent, timely data sharing across partners and departments enables more equitable assistance and efficient operations.
3. **Refugee and migrant inclusion must be deliberate** – Early, proactive strategies are needed to overcome political and operational barriers that risk exclusion.
4. **Early, integrated coordination strengthens responsiveness** – Avoiding silos, speeding deployment, and conducting timely reviews supports adaptive management.
5. **Clear, inclusive communication builds trust** – Timely, accessible, and multilingual information reduces uncertainty for affected communities.
6. **Accessible feedback and complaint systems are critical** – Removing awareness and literacy barriers ensures targeting errors are detected and corrected quickly.
7. **Preparedness and scalable systems enable rapid response** – Digital tools, logistics models, pre-positioned stocks, and established partnerships reduce delays and support large-scale delivery.
8. **Shared platforms and IM capacity maximize efficiency** – Common systems, strong information management, and inter-agency collaboration reduce duplication and improve targeting.

### 5.2. CVA MODALITY & MANAGEMENT

4. **Leveraging prior CVA experience** – TRC’s work with the Kızılaykart platform and ESSN, plus pre-established agreements with banks, retailers, and financial service providers, enabled rapid, large-scale cash distribution after the earthquake.
5. **Flexible modality selection** – Transitioning from vouchers to prepaid cards, and later to ID-linked transfers, based on market assessments and community feedback, improved accessibility, efficiency, and satisfaction.
6. **Clear and inclusive communication** – A comprehensive, multilingual CVA communication strategy is essential to avoid confusion and ensure beneficiaries understand how to access assistance.
7. **Strong local partnerships** – Collaboration with entities such as the Chambers of Tradesmen and the Ministry of Agriculture fosters local ownership, credibility, robust monitoring, and coordinated assistance while reinforcing TRC’s visibility.

### 5.3. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTABILITY TOWARDS STAKEHOLDERS

4. **Embedded IM capacity with digital tools** – A dedicated IM team and tools like Power BI dashboards, SMS-based monitoring, and feedback systems improved real-time coordination, decision-making, transparency, and adaptive response.
5. **Structured community engagement** – Formal committees, advisory groups, and regular meetings enabled two-way communication, empowering affected populations, especially underrepresented groups, to influence decisions and strengthen ownership.
6. **Inclusive, systematic communication** - multilingual field teams, consistent presence, and timely updates help ensure all community members are equally informed and engaged.
7. **Responsive and accessible feedback systems** – Tools such as the 168 Kızılay Call Center enhance accountability, but awareness, especially for sensitive complaints, must be improved.

### 5.4. REGISTRATION AND DATA MANAGEMENT

3. **Accurate, inclusive registration systems** – Outdated lists and limited adaptability risk excluding newly vulnerable groups, highlighting the need for responsive, multi-source registration processes.
4. **Simple registration fosters equity and participation** – Accessible processes, especially in livelihoods programming, reduce barriers for those with limited digital literacy, documentation, or mobility, building trust and participation.
5. **Integrated data management improves accountability** – Eliminating departmental silos, ensuring timely data sharing, and moving away from paper-based systems strengthens coordination, monitoring, and decision-making.

## 6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are prioritized recommendations from the Consultant Team, highlighting key issues identified during the evaluation. Many apply to IFRC, TRC, or both, and cut across multiple themes. For clarity, each recommendation notes in brackets the partner to which it is directed; they are not aimed at specific individuals or departments, as this is an internal decision for each partner. Readers are encouraged to review all recommendations and note linkages across themes.

### 6.1. IDENTIFYING AND SELECTING THE POPULATION REACHED

**Conclusion:** The Türkiye Earthquake Response demonstrated strong early action, supported by pre-existing systems, local partnerships, and skilled teams. Building on these strengths through enhanced readiness planning and continued investment in staff and volunteer skills, particularly in data management, CVA, protection, and community engagement, will help sustain rapid, high-quality, and adaptable responses in future emergencies.

#### Recommendation 1

**Strengthen Emergency Response Readiness and Core Capacities:** Building on the proven strengths of early action, TRC/IFRC should institutionalize and regularly update emergency response and readiness plans to ensure swift mobilization in future crises. This includes pre-positioning resources, clarifying surge protocols, and stress-testing systems for rapid deployment. Prioritize sustained investment in staff and volunteer capacity across essential functions—data management, CVA, protection, community engagement, and PMER/IM—to guarantee that skilled teams are consistently available to deliver rapid, adaptable, and high-quality responses. (TRC/IFRC)

**Conclusion:** The Türkiye Earthquake Response showed notable agility, with teams adapting quickly to changing needs and working closely with partners to deliver timely support. Further authorizing leaders to make decisions in the field and streamlining approval processes will build on this responsiveness, enabling faster, more flexible, and locally driven adaptations to meet the evolving needs of affected communities.

#### Recommendation 2

**Promote Adaptive and Decentralized Leadership:** Encourage leadership that is flexible and responsive to emerging challenges by authorizing leaders to make quick decisions in high-pressure situations. Reinforce this leadership culture with strong evidence-based decision-making, balancing data with contextual intuition. Decentralize some approval processes to enhance responsiveness and foster greater community ownership, enabling leadership to adapt strategies swiftly to meet the evolving needs of affected populations. (TRC)

**Conclusion:** The Türkiye Earthquake Response demonstrated effective collaboration that supported timely and relevant assistance to communities. By further strengthening internal communication and enhancing integration between sectors such as cash, protection, and livelihoods, TRC can build on these successes to deliver more coordinated, comprehensive support that meets the holistic needs of affected populations.

#### Recommendation 3

**Promote Cross-Sectoral Integration and Internal Coordination:** Create and institutionalize internal communication, coordination and collaboration mechanisms (structured meeting/planning) between sectors such as cash, protection, and livelihoods to create integrated and efficient programs that better meet the holistic needs of affected populations. An example would be collaboration between departments such as IM, CEA, Protection, and CVA, contributing to the successful delivery of CVA. (TRC)

**Conclusion:** The Türkiye Earthquake Response demonstrated that scalable interventions, supported by strong infrastructure and partnerships, can deliver significant impact in both emergency and recovery phases. However, as needs evolved, some gaps emerged in linking immediate relief to longer-term recovery, underscoring the importance of structured transition planning.

#### **Recommendation 4**

**Plan for Long-Term Sustainability:** Focus on enhancing the scalability of successful interventions, such as cash assistance and livelihoods support, by strengthening existing infrastructure and partnerships. Adopt replicable CVA models with standardized verification and monitoring mechanisms (e.g., Collective Kindness approach) to ensure quality and accountability as interventions expand. (TRC with support from IFRC)

**Conclusion:** During the Türkiye Earthquake Response, staff and volunteers demonstrated exceptional dedication, often while coping with their own disaster-related impacts. This commitment was critical to sustaining operations but also placed significant emotional and physical demands on teams, highlighting the importance of ensuring their well-being to maintain both morale and operational effectiveness.

#### **Recommendation 5**

**Enhance Staff Well-Being and Capacity:** Invest in wellness programs and rest protocols for staff and volunteers, especially those directly affected by the disaster. Ensure that well-being is prioritized to prevent burnout and maintain operational effectiveness over the long term. (TRC)

**Conclusion:** The Türkiye Earthquake Response showed that while preparedness and transition planning were in place, some communities remained uncertain about the continuity of support as emergency activities concluded. In several cases, this uncertainty created concern about meeting future needs, underscoring the importance of managing transitions in a way that maintains stability and confidence during the shift from relief to recovery.

#### **Recommendation 6**

**Enhance Transition Communication and Community Confidence:** While exit strategies and transition planning were in place, TRC with support from IFRC should place stronger emphasis on transparent communication of these plans to affected communities. This includes clearly informing people about the timeline of emergency support, the handover to recovery programming, and where they can access ongoing services. Doing so will reduce uncertainty, maintain community confidence, and ensure smoother transitions from relief to recovery. (TRC with support from IFRC)

**Conclusion:** The Türkiye Earthquake Response benefited from strong relationships with government, UN agencies, and other partners, enabling rapid mobilization and joint action. However, differences in data, processes, and decision-making at times slowed coordination and created risks of duplication or service gaps, highlighting the need for clearer and more consistent collaboration frameworks.

### **Recommendation 7**

**Improve External Coordination and Communication:** Strengthen coordination and communication with external partners by working together to develop clearer protocols for inter-agency collaboration and decision-making to avoid delays, duplication, and gaps in service delivery, especially in high-pressure situations. (TRC and IFRC)

## **6.2. CVA MODALITY & MANAGEMENT**

**Conclusion:** TRC staff faced significant challenges in effectively monitoring the use of e-vouchers. Limitations in tracking transactions, verifying usage, and preventing duplication hindered accountability and reduced the ability to accurately assess the effectiveness of these modalities during the early stages of implementation.

### **Recommendation 8**

**Monitoring System.** During the selection of a CVA mechanism, ensure that an adequate real-time monitoring system is in place. Adopt layered monitoring practices (process monitoring, PDMs, perception surveys) and verification checks as demonstrated in Türkiye's Collective Kindness model to strengthen accountability and adaptive programme management. (TRC with support from IFRC)

**Conclusion:** ID-based transfers proved to be scalable, cost-efficient, and widely preferred by the community. By leveraging national ID numbers, this mechanism eliminated the need for physical cards, reducing logistical challenges while ensuring fast, traceable, and secure cash distributions. Its strong operational efficiency highlights its potential for large-scale implementation in future programmes.

### **Recommendation 9**

**Prioritize the use of ID-based cash transfer mechanisms** in future programmes, as they offer scalability, cost-efficiency, and operational effectiveness. (TRC)

**Conclusion:** While the mechanisms used, particularly the ID-based transfers, were well accepted and positively received by the communities, beneficiaries had to make considerable efforts to travel in order to access the funds, as withdrawal points were not available near the container cities.

### **Recommendation 10**

Ensure that cash withdrawal points and service providers are conveniently located near where affected populations reside, such as within or close to container cities and informal settlements. When selecting delivery mechanisms, prioritize proximity and accessibility to reduce the burden on beneficiaries, especially those with limited mobility or resources. (TRC and IFRC)

**Conclusion:** The administrative workload associated with the livelihood component created significant strain on staff capacity and was not managed in the most efficient way. The volume

and complexity of administrative tasks diverted time and resources from other critical activities, highlighting the need for streamlined processes, clearer roles, and better resource allocation in future programming.

### **Recommendation 11**

**Administrative procedures.** Simplify administrative procedures, such as enabling digital invoice submissions for livelihood support, and improve operational efficiency to minimize delays between application and payment, ensuring timely assistance delivery. (TRC and IFRC)

**Conclusion:** The absence of early consultation with communities on their preferred transfer mechanisms meant that beneficiary perspectives were not fully reflected in the initial design and roll-out of the operation. As a result, the chosen modalities did not fully consider community preferences from the start.

### **Recommendation 12**

**Community Consultation.** Before initiating cash distributions, conduct community consultations as part of the needs assessment to identify preferred transfer modalities and communication channels. This ensures the chosen mechanism aligns with local preferences, accessibility, and market conditions, thereby improving acceptance, efficiency, and programme relevance. (TRC and IFRC)

## **6.3. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTABILITY TOWARDS STAKEHOLDERS**

**Conclusion:** While having multilingual teams was a significant positive factor in facilitating communication, challenges remained. For example, SMS messages were only sent in Turkish, and there was a lack of visual information, such as posters, banners, or pictograms, in multiple languages. This created barriers for parts of the population, particularly those who do not speak Turkish, limiting their ability to fully understand the information provided and engage effectively with the programme. It should also be noted that the Emergency Appeal did not prioritize the production of multilingual information materials, as the Turkish Red Crescent was already addressing these needs through its community centres and other programmes outside the scope of the Appeal. For instance, TRC community centres regularly organized information sessions and produced leaflets, posters, and awareness-raising materials in Arabic, Farsi, English, and other relevant languages.

### **Recommendation 13**

**Enhance Accessible and Multilingual Communication.** Develop and systematically disseminate communication materials in all relevant languages and formats adapted for people with low literacy and disabilities. Ensure SMS notifications and outreach messages are consistently provided in appropriate languages and accessible formats, including audio-visual content and pictograms. (TRC)

**Conclusion:** There was a noticeable lack of awareness among the population regarding the TRC staff Code of Conduct, as well as the mechanisms available for submitting sensitive complaints. In particular, many beneficiaries were unaware of how to report issues related to sexual abuse, harassment, and corruption, or how such complaints would be handled, highlighting a critical gap in community protection and accountability measures.

#### Recommendation 14

**Reinforce safeguarding awareness and reporting sensitive complaints.** Expand awareness of safeguarding policies and confidential complaint mechanisms by embedding safeguarding messages across all communication channels. Ensure multiple, safe, and discreet reporting options are available, particularly for sensitive complaints, and provide training to frontline staff on how to guide community members in using them. A TRC is currently conducting a safeguarding self-assessment, which should be referenced. (TRC)

**Conclusion.** The establishment of Community Participation Structures within the container cities was a highly positive initiative. These groups created a direct communication channel between the TRC and the residents, enabling the organization to gather firsthand information about the community's needs, concerns, and feedback. This engagement not only improved the relevance and responsiveness of the assistance provided but also fostered a sense of inclusion and empowerment among the residents. As highlighted by many beneficiaries, the presence of these groups significantly contributed to building strong trust and confidence in the TRC, strengthening the organization's relationship with the communities it served.

#### Recommendation 15

**Institutionalize Community Participation Structures.** Establish Community Groups in all programmes and response operations to strengthen participation in programme design, targeting, and implementation. Ensure that these groups represent diverse segments of the population, including women, persons with disabilities, and minority groups, and provide them with regular technical and logistical support. (TRC)

**Conclusion.** While the organization made significant efforts to communicate with the affected population, there was a clear absence of a centralized platform, such as the IFRC's Go platform, where the Turkish public could easily access comprehensive information about the scope and impact of TRC's assistance to earthquake-affected communities. This gap limited broader awareness and understanding of the organization's response efforts.

#### Recommendation 16

**Develop a Centralized Public Information Platform.** Establish a centralized, user-friendly digital platform in Türkiye, similar to IFRC's GO platform, that provides up-to-date information on the activities conducted by TRC. (TRC)

### 6.4. REGISTRATION AND DATA MANAGEMENT

**Conclusion.** The use of outdated data at the start of the operation posed a significant challenge, as individuals in need of assistance who were not included in the pre-existing lists were excluded from support.

#### Recommendation 17

**Establish Pre-Crisis Data-Sharing Protocols.** Formalize agreements with government (AFAD, ministries) and UN agencies to enable real-time access to updated databases. Over-reliance on outdated lists led to exclusion of newly vulnerable groups and inclusion errors (e.g., deceased individuals). (TRC)

**Conclusion:** TRC has numerous management mechanisms and tools in place, which at times can hinder smooth internal information flow and require significant effort to coordinate effectively.

#### **Recommendation 18**

**Harmonize Internal Data Systems:** Standardize tools and templates across the organization to avoid duplication. Link systems to a global multilingual repository to ensure coherence, accessibility, and replicability. Ensure these resources are user-friendly and adaptable so that staff, volunteers, and National Societies with evolving capacities can apply them easily in their contexts. (TRC/IFRC)

**Conclusion:** While TRC made significant efforts to reach targeted populations, the absence of regular vulnerability analyses occasionally limited the programme's ability to anticipate certain barriers and challenges in advance.

#### **Recommendation 19**

**Implement Dynamic Vulnerability Reassessments:** In order to avoid static data and barriers (e.g., digital illiteracy, Turkish-only SMS) that contribute to exclusion, develop SOPs for regular field verification to capture shifting needs, particularly among refugees, rural communities, and informal settlers. Promote evidence-based adaptation through continuous reassessment and analysis. (TRC)

### **6.5. ONE ADDITIONAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

**Conclusion:** By placing TRC firmly at the centre of the operation, with clear leadership and decision-making authority, the response highlighted how federation-wide support can strengthen a National Society-led model. IFRC's role in providing targeted technical assistance without assuming operational control further demonstrated how the **Agenda for Renewal** can be applied effectively in practice.

#### **Recommendation 20**

Document the Türkiye experience as evidence of how a National Society-led model, with TRC in a clear leadership role supported by federation-wide solidarity, can deliver effective results. Ensure that this approach, reflecting the **Agenda for Renewal**, is applied in whole or in part in future operations, adapted to the varying capacities of different National Societies. (IFRC)

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

The Türkiye Earthquake Response had a significant impact across multiple sectors. Key interventions such as livelihoods support, food assistance, protection services, and shelter provision played a crucial role in early recovery, meeting priority needs and delivering notable results. The government-mandated meals program, which ran for a full year and required enormous logistical and procurement systems, reached a wide population and was vital for early food security. Additionally, over 1,000 containers were deployed for shelter, with only a few communities remaining in tents due to residents' reluctance to leave their land. Livelihood interventions were particularly successful, helping businesses recover through the provision of cash and tailored follow-up support. Protection efforts were integral throughout the response, with targeted interventions ensuring the inclusion of vulnerable populations.

Despite some challenges in coordination, data management, and political constraints, the collaborative efforts between TRC, IFRC, and local authorities ensured timely and impactful interventions. Importantly, the response stands out as a strong example of the IFRC Agenda for Renewal in practice, with TRC clearly positioned at the centre of the operation, exercising leadership responsibility and authority. IFRC provided excellent technical and operational support, particularly in areas such as IM, CEA, and financial mobilization, without assuming decision-making power, reinforcing the model of a National Society-led response backed by federation-wide solidarity. This balance allowed for both local ownership and global support, maximizing effectiveness and ensuring the response was firmly rooted in national systems while benefiting from international expertise.

Beneficiary satisfaction with the assistance was high, with 53% of respondents reporting being very satisfied with the support, while an additional 38% expressed satisfaction. Only 3% were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied.




Figure 13: Beneficiary satisfaction

This positive feedback highlights the relevance, accessibility, and timeliness of the services delivered. Additionally, all key stakeholders involved in the response, including local authorities and international agencies, expressed strong satisfaction with the approach, quality, and impact

of the interventions. This broad consensus underscores the effectiveness of the response strategy and the strength of multisectoral collaboration throughout the operation.

Delivery methods were well-matched to the emergency's scale, market conditions, and operational capacity. An existing cash delivery system accelerated the response and improved efficiency, with mechanisms adapting to TRC's capabilities and beneficiary needs to achieve high redemption rates. Tools like the call center helped overcome access barriers, while coordinated use of e-vouchers and ID-linked bank transfers ensured continuity, dignity, inclusiveness, and effective monitoring as market conditions and feedback evolved.

Significant progress in institutionalizing IM and CEA positioned IFRC and TRC for more agile, transparent, and community-centred operations. A dedicated IM team enabled real-time coordination, evidence-based decisions, and adaptive programming using tools like geospatial analytics, dashboards, and improved call center systems. Structured mechanisms, such as container city committees and advisory groups, promoted meaningful participation, particularly among marginalized groups, while multilingual teams and inclusive communication built trust and accessibility. Gaps remain in linguistic coverage, feedback awareness, safeguarding knowledge, and transparency.

The registration and data management system balanced rapid scale-up with efficiency by integrating TRC systems, government databases, and real-time digital platforms, supported by partnerships with AFAD, ministries, UN agencies, and sector actors. Multi-source data, such as door-to-door assessments and cross-validation, improved targeting and reduced duplication, while digital tools streamlined workflows, and vulnerability criteria were applied through field checks and call center feedback. However, reliance on outdated lists excluded newly vulnerable groups, and language barriers, low digital literacy, and lack of documentation limited access for rural, refugee, and informal settler populations. Internal coordination challenges also caused processing delays.

Overall, the operation is widely recognized as a success, significantly reinforcing TRC's role as a leading actor in emergency response. While areas for improvement remain, the response was highly relevant, efficient, effective, and well-coordinated, delivering substantial impact for affected communities. Its achievements have been acknowledged not only by those served but also by the broader network of national and international stakeholders.

## ANNEX

### ANNEX I. LIST OF LITERATURE REVIEW

#### **MDRHT004 Documents:**

- Preliminary appeal
- Emergency Appeal
- Revised appeal
- Operation Update 1-07

#### **General Documents.**

- Operational Reviews - Türkiye earthquake response (MDRTR004). Kahramanmaraş Earthquake Operation. Emergency Appeal Evaluation. Final Evaluation Report. IFRC. April 2025
- Earthquake lessons learned Workshop (power point). IFRC, February 6, 2025.
- Report of the Independent Auditor. On the Financial Statements for the Emergency Appeal “Türkiye -Earthquake”(MDRTR004) for the period from February 06, 2023, to December 31, 2023. Forvis Mazars SA,
- Türkiye 2025 IFRC network country plan. IFRC, TRC. 2025
- Türk Kızılayafet Bölgesi İnşaat Projeleritaşınmaz Yönetimi Genel Müdürlüğü. TRC.
- Partners Call – Türkiye Earthquake Emergency Appeal. Webinar.
- Türkiye Unified Plan 2025-2027. TRC.

#### **Cash and Vouches Assistants (CVA) Documents**

- Post-Distribution Monitoring Survey. Collective Kindness Project. TRC, IFRC. November 2023
- Kindness in action. Collective Kindness Project Phase I. Monitoring and evaluation. Final report September 2023. WFP, IFRC, TRC.
- Uneven Market Speeds: Exploring the potential for cash programming after the earthquake. Market Assessment Report. WFP, IFRC, TRC. September 2023

#### **Basic Need Documents.**

- Post-Distribution Monitoring Survey. Basic Needs Cash Support Programme. TRC, IFRC. December 2024
- Minimum Expenditure Basket After the Earthquake Disaster in Türkiye. WFP, IFRC, TRC. August, 2023.
- Minimum Expenditure Basket After the Earthquake Disaster in Türkiye. WFP, IFRC, TRC. October, 2023.

#### **Cash For Protection Documents**

- Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM) Report - Cash for Protection. TRC, IFRC, 2024
- Cash For Protection Programme. Lessons learnt from the Earthquake Response. TRC, IFRC.

#### **Livelihoods Documents**

- Shaken to the Core II: Portrayal of Pre-disaster Livelihoods in the Affected Areas
- Uneven Market Speeds: Exploring the potential for cash programming after the earthquake
- IFRC-TRC Earthquake Operation - Livelihoods Recovery Programme: Case Study
- Restoring Livelihoods. Post-Distribution Monitoring Results from Early Recovery Programmes
- Case Study: 2023 Türkiye Earthquakes / IFRC-TRC Livelihoods Recovery Programme

#### **Shelter Documents**

- Lessons learned Workshop report 2023. Shelter sector, Türkiye Kahramanmaraş earthquakes response. IFRC, Shelter Sector Türkiye
- Post-Distribution Monitoring. Winterisation assistance assessed by Communities served. TRC, IFRC. 2024

#### **Other Relevant Documents.**

- IFRC Framework for Evaluations. IFRC. 2024
- Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS). CHS. 2024
- Movement Cash and Voucher Assistance. Strategic Framework. IFRC. 2024
- PGI Operational Framework 2022-2025. IFRC. 2022
- Community Engagement and Accountability Strategy 2023-2025. IFRC. 2023
- Manual on prevention and response to sexual exploitation and abuse. IFRC. 2020

**ANNEX II. LIST OF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS AND PARTICIPANTS IN THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION**

Nº	NAME	Organization/Office	TITLE
<b>IFRC Staff</b>			
1	Karen N'Gooi	Regional Office for Europe	PMER Delegate
2	Alma Alsayed	Regional Office for Europe	Coordinator, Operations, Europe - Disaster and Crisis Response
3	Dallas Roy	Regional Office for Europe	OPS Manager
4	Jonathan Brass	Regional Office for Europe	Cash Surge
5	Servet Avci	Regional Office for Europe	Cash Surge
6	Ruben Cano	Regional Office for Europe	Past HoD, Türkiye Country Office
7	Jessie Thompson	Türkiye Country Office	Head of Delegation
8	Raphael Hamoir	Türkiye Country Office	Programme Coordinator
9	Abdullah ALANI	Regional Office for Europe	Regional Head, PMER and Quality Assurance
<b>TRC Staff</b>			
1	Emrah Göktürk	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	CVA and External Access Specialist
2	Tuğba Akcan	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	PSS and Health Sector Manager
3	Carlos Clavijolaarte	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Project Manager (2023-2024 Deputy Coordinator)
4	Kamil Erdem Güler	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Director of Migration Department
5	Kaan Saner	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Director of International Policy and Cooperation
6	Onur Koçak	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Monitoring and Evaluation specialist
7	Aslan Turgut Bulut	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Director of Disaster Recovery and Climate Change
8	Mine Akdoğan	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Deputy Coordinator of Programs and Operations Management
9	Luay Alwuhaidi	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Manager SEE
10	Batuhan Apaydın	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Senior Manager of Operations
11	Burak Akar	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Cash Senior Officer
12	Aysun Ceyhan	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Protection Sector Manager
13	Fatih Ceylan	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Reconstruction Sector Manager (2024-June 2025)
14	Burak Aydınılmaz	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Shelter Sector Manager (2023-2024)
15	Bulent Ozturk	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Ops Manager
16	Murat Sezer	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Risk Reduction and Community Resilience Sector Manager (2023-2024)
17	Aysenur Cumali	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	PGI Senior Officer
18	M. Alperen Zengin	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Communications Senior Specialist (CEA Focal)
19	Onur Pekaydın	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Water and Sanitation Sector Manager
20	Yahya Orhan	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Livelihood Sector Manager (2023-2024)

21	Ümitcan Söylemez	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Deputy Coordinator of PMER and Partnerships
22	Kübra Divleli	Turkish Red Crescent NHQ	Partnerships Senior Manager
23	Ahmet Sağlam,	Turkish Red Crescent Kahramanmaraş	Community Service Centre Manager
24	Ayşe Bağdanur Saçıkara	Turkish Red Crescent Kahramanmaraş	Community Service Centre Protection Officer
25	Mustafa Edip Çelik	Turkish Red Crescent Kahramanmaraş	TRC Kahramanmaraş Branch Manager
26	Yusuf Kurt	Turkish Red Crescent Adıyaman	Community Service Centre Manager
27	Büşra Akman	Turkish Red Crescent Adıyaman	Community Service Centre Protection Officer
28	Esmâ Turan	Turkish Red Crescent Adıyaman	Former Livelihood Field Officer
29	Pınar İlkay Kamburoğlu	Turkish Red Crescent Hatay	Community Service Centre Manager
30	Berranur Özdemir	Turkish Red Crescent Hatay	Community Service Centre Protection Officer
<b>Focus Groups</b>			
1		Kahramanmaraş	Focus Group with Beneficiary (Cash for Protection-Female)
2		Kahramanmaraş	Focus Group with Beneficiary (Multipurpose Cash Program-Female)
3		Kahramanmaraş	Focus Group with Beneficiary (Cash for Protection-Immigrant-Female)
4		Adıyaman	Focus Group with Beneficiary (Cash for Protection - Male & Female)
5		Adıyaman	Focus Group with Beneficiary (Livelihoods Program-Female)
6		Adıyaman	Participation in the Advisory Committee Meeting (CEA) and On-Site Observation
7		Adıyaman	Adıyaman Branch Protection Team
8		Hatay	Hatay Branch Board
9		Hatay	Health and psychosocial support team at the Hatay branch
10		Hatay	Focus Group with beneficiary - Male/Female (Livelihood Program)
11		Hatay	Focus Group with Beneficiary (Multipurpose Cash Program - Male)
12		Hatay	Hatay Branch Protection Team
13		Hatay	Focus Group with Immigrant Beneficiaries (Cash for Protection – Male & Female)
<b>Other Stakeholders</b>			
1	Suat Önen	Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation - Kahramanmaraş	Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation Project Coordinator
2	Ahmet Kara	AFAD - Kahramanmaraş	Container City Manager

3	Ahmet Kuybu	Chamber of Tradesmen and Craftsmen - Kahramanmaraş	Manager
4	Mehmet Servet Yelken, Hakan Durmuş	AFAD - Adiyaman	Camp Management Coordination Manager
5	Emrah Omağ	Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation Project Coordinator - Adiyaman	Social Worker
6	Ayyuş Otuzbir/ Sevil Ergin	Hatay	Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation Manager
7	Avni Hatay	Hatay	Provincial Director of Agriculture
8	Tom Delure	United Nations Türkiye	Head of Office, Office of the UN Resident Coordinator
9	Emil Palsson	United Nations Türkiye	Nexis Officer

**ANNEX III. FIELD TRIP AGENDA**

Date & Time	Place & Meeting	Venue / Notes
<b>3 - 4 July 2025</b>	<b>ANKARA</b>	<b>Jorge Menendez &amp; Jan Gelfand Agenda</b>
<b>08:00 – 17:00</b>	Introduction and Meeting with TRC and IFRC Staff	
<b>7 July 2025</b>	<b>KAHRAMANMARAŞ</b>	<b>Jan Gelfand - Agenda</b>
<b>07:50 – 09:00</b>	Flight from Ankara to Kahramanmaraş	Kahramanmaraş
<b>09:30 – 10:00</b>	Arrival at the Community Service Center, Coffee, and Rest Break	Kahramanmaraş CSC
<b>10:00 – 10:45</b>	Introduction of the Kahramanmaraş Community Service Center (with CSC's Manager and CSC's Protection Officer)	Ahmet Sağlam, Ayşe Bağdanur Saçıkara
<b>11:00 – 12:00</b>	Interview with TRC Kahramanmaraş Branch Manager	Mustafa Edip Çelik
<b>12:00 – 13:00</b>	Lunch	
<b>13:15 – 14:15</b>	Interview with Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation Project Coordinator	Suat Önen
<b>14:30 – 15:30</b>	Interview with Manager of Chamber of Tradesmen and Craftsmen	Ahmet Kuybu
<b>15:45 – 16:45</b>	Interview with AFAD Container City Manager	Ahmet Kara
<b>17:00 ++</b>	Back to Hotel	Ramada Kahramanmaraş Hotel
<b>8 July 2025</b>	<b>KAHRAMANMARAŞ</b>	
<b>08:30 – 08:50</b>	Leaving the Hotel and Road to CSC	Kahramanmaraş CSC
<b>09:00 – 10:30</b>	Focus Group with Beneficiary (Cash for Protection-Female)	Kahramanmaraş CSC
<b>10:45 – 12:15</b>	Focus Group with Beneficiary (Multipurpose Cash Program-Female)	Kahramanmaraş CSC
<b>12:30 – 13:30</b>	Lunch	
<b>13:45 – 15:15</b>	Focus Group with Beneficiary (Cash for Protection-Immigrant-Female)	Kahramanmaraş CSC
<b>15:30 – 16:15</b>	Evaluation and Reporting of the Work Done Over Two Days	Kahramanmaraş CSC
<b>16:30 – 18:30</b>	Leaving the CSC and Road to Gaziantep	Novotel/Shimall Hotel
<b>7 July 2025</b>	<b>ADIYAMAN</b>	<b>Jorge Menendez - Agenda</b>
<b>08:05 – 09:15</b>	Flight from Ankara to Adiyaman	Adiyaman
<b>09:30 – 09:50</b>	Arrival at the Community Service Center, Coffee and Rest Break	Adiyaman CSC
<b>10:00 – 10:45</b>	Introduction of the Adiyaman Community Service Center (with CSC's Manager and CSC's Protection Officer)	Yusuf Kurt, Büşra Akman
<b>11:00 – 12:00</b>	Participation in the Advisory Committee Meeting (CEA) and On-Site Observation	Adiyaman CSC
<b>12:15 – 13:15</b>	Lunch	
<b>13:30 – 14:30</b>	Interview with Camp Management Coordination Managers - AFAD	Mehmet Servet Yelken, Hakan Durmuş

14:45 – 15:15	Interview with Social Worker at Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation	Emrah Omağ
15:30 – 17:00	Interview with Former Livelihood Field Officer	Esma Turan (TBC with Migration Dept)
17:00 ++	Back to Hotel	Adiyaman Dedeman Hotel
8 July 2025	<b>ADIYAMAN</b>	<b>Jorge Menendez - Agenda</b>
08:30 – 08:50	Leaving the Hotel and Road to CSC	Adiyaman CSC
09:00 – 10:30	Focus Group with beneficiary (Cash for Protection-Male & Female)	Adiyaman CSC
10:45 – 12:15	Focus Group with beneficiary (Livelihoods Program-Female)	Adiyaman CSC
12:30 – 13:30	Lunch	
13:45 – 15:30	Evaluation and Reporting of the Work Done Over Two Days	Adiyaman CSC
15:30 – 18:30	Leaving the CSC and Road to Gaziantep	Novotel/Shimall Hotel
9 July 2025	<b>HATAY</b>	<b>Jorge Menendez &amp; Jan Gelfand Agenda</b>
08:00 – 10:30	Leaving the Hotel (Gaziantep) and Road to Hatay	
10:45 – 11:10	Arrival at the Community Service Center, Coffee, and Rest Break	Hatay CSC
11:15 – 12:00	Introduction of the Hatay Community Service Center (with CSC's Manager and CSC's Protection Officer)	Pınar İlkay Kamburoğlu Berranur Özdemir
12:15 – 13:15	Lunch	
13:30 – 14:30	Interview with TRC Hatay Branch Manager	Hüseyin Kimyonoğlu
14:45 – 15:45	Interview with Hatay AFAD Representative	Hasan Kötüce
16:00 – 17:00	Interview with Former Livelihood Field Officer	Kader Tuna - TBC with Migration Dept
17:00 ++	Back to Hotel	Hatay Grand Boğaziçi Hotel
10 July 2025	<b>HATAY</b>	<b>Jorge Menendez &amp; Jan Gelfand Agenda</b>
08:30 – 09:00	Leaving the Hotel and Road to CSC	Hatay CSC
09:15 – 11:00	Focus Group with beneficiary - Male/Female (Livelihood Program)	Hatay CSC
09:15 – 11:00	Focus Group with Beneficiary - Male (Multipurpose Cash Program)	Hatay CSC
11:15 – 12:15	Interview with Hatay Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation Manager	Sevil Ergin or Ayyuş Otuzbir
12:30 – 13:30	Lunch	
13:45 – 14:45	Interview with the Provincial Director of Agriculture	Avni Hatay
15:00 – 16:30	Focus Group with Immigrant Beneficiary (Male and Female - Cash for Protection)	Hatay Community Center
16:45 – 17:30	Evaluation and Reporting of the Work Done Over Two Days	Hatay CSC
17:30 ++	Leaving the CSC and Road to Gaziantep	Novotel and Shimall Hotel

<b>11 July</b>	<b>GAZİANTEP</b>	<b>Jorge Menendez &amp; Jan Gelfand Agenda</b>
<b>09:40 – 10:55</b>	Flight from Gaziantep to Ankara	Ankara
<b>10:55 – 11:55</b>	Travel to IFRC Office	Ankara – IFRC Office
<b>14:30 – 16:30</b>	Debriefing	Ankara – TRC Office

## ANNEX IV. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES

### Online Survey Questionnaire PNS

#### Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this survey.

This survey forms part of an external evaluation of the Türkiye Emergency Appeal. The information gathered in this survey will only be seen by the independent consultants and will not be directly shared.

This survey is being completed by PNSs who have participated in Türkiye Emergency Appeal or supported the TRC bilaterally.

Responses will be collated, and only summary findings will be included in the report. The survey will close on ### to allow for ###. Please complete your response before this time.

By completing this survey, you agree that your information can be used for the evaluation. If you have any questions about the review or the survey, or you wish to provide additional information, please email the consultant, Jorge Menendez, at [jmenendez@oneginconsulting.com](mailto:jmenendez@oneginconsulting.com)

This survey has 22 questions. If you choose to answer only some questions, please click 'next' until you reach the last page. You can go back and change answers at any time during the survey.

1. What kind of support did you provide during the response operation?
  - Bilateral support to the HNS
  - Support to the Appeal
  - Other: Explained \_\_\_\_\_
2. How well did the Appeal Identify the needs of the affected population?
  - Excellent
  - Very Good
  - Good
  - Fair
  - Poor
  - I do not know
3. To what extent do you think the needs of those displaced by the earthquake were adequately identified and addressed?
  - Fully identified and fully addressed
  - Mostly identified and mostly addressed
  - Partially identified and partially addressed
  - Poorly identified and poorly addressed
  - I don't know / Not sure.
4. To what extent do you think the needs of host communities were adequately identified and addressed?
  - Fully identified and fully addressed
  - Mostly identified and mostly addressed
  - Partially identified and partially addressed
  - Poorly identified and poorly addressed
  - I don't know / Not sure.
5. To what extent do you think the needs of refugees were adequately identified and addressed?

- Fully identified and fully addressed
  - Mostly identified and mostly addressed
  - Partially identified and partially addressed
  - Poorly identified and poorly addressed
  - I don't know / Not sure.
6. How effective was the targeting system in identifying populations in need?
- Highly effective
  - Effective
  - Neutral
  - Ineffective
  - Very ineffective
  - I do not know
7. How well were the most vulnerable individuals prioritized for assistance?
- Very well
  - Well
  - Neutral
  - Poorly
  - Very poorly
  - I do not know
8. Do you consider that any of the following groups were not adequately considered in the response?
- Internally displaced persons (IDPs)
  - Host communities
  - Refugees
  - All groups were adequately considered
  - I don't know / Not sure.
9. Do you think inclusion and exclusion errors were minimized during the design and implementation of the targeting process?
- Yes, they were fully minimized
  - Yes, they were mostly minimized
  - Somewhat minimized
  - No, they were not minimized
  - I don't know / Not sure.
10. Were any corrective measures taken during implementation to address inclusion and exclusion errors?
- Yes, corrective measures were systematically implemented.
  - Yes, but only in specific cases or locations.
  - No, corrective measures were not taken.
  - Not applicable / No shortcomings were identified.
  - I don't know / Not sure.

11. How appropriate was the choice of assistance modality (cash, vouchers, ATM cards, digital payments) for the context?
- Very appropriate
  - Somewhat appropriate
  - Neutral
  - Somewhat inappropriate
  - Very inappropriate
12. How well did the Emergency Appeal adapt to changing needs and circumstances during its implementation?
- Excellent
  - Very Good
  - Good
  - Fair
  - Poor
  - I do not know
13. Were there any significant delays or gaps in the response?
- Yes, many delays or gaps
  - Yes, some delays or gaps
  - No significant delays or gaps
  - No delays or gaps at all
  - I don't know / Not sure.

If you answered "Yes", please explain briefly:

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14. How well did the Appeal use digital tools or mobile technologies to improve efficiency?
- Very well
  - Well
  - Neutral
  - Poorly
  - Very poorly
  - I do not know
15. How effective was the registration process in capturing accurate data?
- Highly effective
  - Effective
  - Neutral
  - Ineffective
  - Very ineffective
  - I don't know / Not sure.
16. How effective were partnerships with external entities (e.g., government agencies, UNHCR, IOM, WFP) in supporting the registration process?

- Highly effective – Strong collaboration and significant support provided
  - Effective – Good collaboration with some areas for improvement
  - Somewhat effective – Limited collaboration or support
  - Not effective – Minimal or no collaboration
  - Not applicable / I don't have enough information
17. How would you rate the overall impact of the Emergency Appeal on the affected population?
- Very high – The Appeal significantly improved the well-being of the affected population.
  - High – The Appeal had a positive and noticeable impact
  - Moderate – The Appeal had some positive effects, but with limitations
  - Low – The Appeal had minimal impact
  - Very low – The Appeal had little to no impact
  - Not sure / I don't have enough information
18. What two key strengths or areas for replication in future operations did you identify in the appeal in terms of relevance & appropriateness, effectiveness, and coverage? (Maximum 2)
- Strengths 1:  
\_\_\_\_\_
- Strengths 2  
\_\_\_\_\_
19. What two key weaknesses or areas for improvement did you identify in the appeal in terms of relevance & appropriateness, effectiveness, and coverage? (Maximum 2)
- Weaknesses 1 :  
\_\_\_\_\_
- Weaknesses 2  
\_\_\_\_\_
20. What two key lessons were learned from this appeal that could inform future efforts? (Maximum 2)
- Lesson Learned 1 :  
\_\_\_\_\_
- Lesson Learned 2  
\_\_\_\_\_
21. What two specific recommendations would you make to enhance relevance & appropriateness, effectiveness, and coverage? (Maximum 2)
- Recommendations 1:  
\_\_\_\_\_
- Recommendations 2:  
\_\_\_\_\_

## Online Survey Questionnaire TRC

### Introduction

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this survey.

This survey forms part of an external evaluation of the Türkiye Emergency Appeal. The information gathered in this survey will only be seen by the independent consultants and will not be directly shared.

This survey is being completed by TRC Staff who have supported the implementation in the Türkiye Emergency Appeal.

Responses will be collated, and only summary findings will be included in the report. The survey will close on ### to allow for ###. Please complete your response before this time.

By completing this survey, you agree that your information can be used for the evaluation. If you have any questions about the review or the survey, or you wish to provide additional information, please email the consultant, Jorge Menendez, at [jmenendez@oneginconsulting.com](mailto:jmenendez@oneginconsulting.com)

This survey has 34 questions. If you choose to answer only some questions, please click 'next' until you reach the last page. You can go back and change answers at any time during the survey.

1. What is the Turkish Red Crescent branch or headquarters where you performed your duties?
  - Headquarters
  - Adiyaman
  - Gaziantep
  - Hatay
  - Kahramanmaraş
  - Malatya
  - Osmaniye
  
2. What is your role in the Appeal?
  
  
  
3. How well did the Appeal identify the needs of the affected population?
  - Excellent
  - Very Good
  - Good
  - Fair
  - Poor
  - I do not know
  
4. Was the identification of needs consistent across all sectors (shelter, health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, PGI, CEA, and multipurpose cash)? If not, please indicate which sector(s) were not adequately identified.
  - Shelter
  - Health
  - Livelihoods
  - WASH
  - Multipurpose Cash

- PGI (Protection, Gender and Inclusion)
  - CEA (Community Engagement and Accountability)
5. How effective was the targeting system in identifying populations in need?
- Very effective
  - Effective
  - Neutral
  - Ineffective
  - Very ineffective
  - I do not know
6. Was the targeting system in identifying populations in need consistent across all sectors (shelter, health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, PGI, CEA, and multipurpose cash)? If not, please specify the sector(s) that were affected.
- Shelter
  - Health
  - Livelihoods
  - WASH
  - Multipurpose Cash
  - PGI (Protection, Gender and Inclusion)
  - CEA (Community Engagement and Accountability)
7. How well did the Emergency Appeal adapt to changing needs and circumstances during its implementation?
- Excellent
  - Very Good
  - Good
  - Fair
  - Poor
  - I do not know
8. Was the adaptation to changing needs and circumstances during its implementation consistent across all sectors (shelter, health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, PGI, CEA, and multipurpose cash)? If not, please indicate the sectors that were affected.
- Shelter
  - Health
  - Livelihoods
  - WASH
  - Multipurpose Cash
  - PGI (Protection, Gender and Inclusion)
  - CEA (Community Engagement and Accountability)
9. To what extent do you think the needs of those displaced by the earthquake were adequately identified and addressed?

- Fully identified and fully addressed
  - Mostly identified and mostly addressed
  - Partially identified and partially addressed
  - Poorly identified and poorly addressed
  - I don't know / Not sure.
10. If you found that the needs of the displaced population were not consistently identified and addressed across all sectors (shelter, health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, PGI, CEA, and multipurpose cash), please specify the sector(s) that were affected.
- Shelter
  - Health
  - Livelihoods
  - WASH
  - PGI (Protection, Gender and Inclusion)
  - CEA (Community Engagement and Accountability)
  - Multipurpose Cash
11. To what extent do you think the needs of host communities were adequately identified and addressed?
- Fully identified and fully addressed
  - Mostly identified and mostly addressed
  - Partially identified and partially addressed
  - Poorly identified and poorly addressed
  - I don't know / Not sure.
12. If you found that these needs of host communities were not consistently met across all sectors (shelter, health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, PGI, CEA, and multipurpose cash), please specify the sector(s) that were affected.
- Shelter
  - Health
  - Livelihoods
  - WASH
  - PGI (Protection, Gender and Inclusion)
  - CEA (Community Engagement and Accountability)
  - Multipurpose Cash
13. To what extent do you think the needs of refugees were adequately identified and addressed?
- Fully identified and fully addressed
  - Mostly identified and mostly addressed
  - Partially identified and partially addressed
  - Poorly identified and poorly addressed
  - I don't know / Not sure.

14. If you found that the needs of refugees were not consistently met across all sectors (shelter, health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, PGI, CEA, and multipurpose cash), please specify the sector(s) that were affected.
- Shelter
  - Health
  - Livelihoods
  - WASH
  - Multipurpose Cash
  - PGI (Protection, Gender and Inclusion)
  - CEA (Community Engagement and Accountability)
15. Do you consider that any of the following groups were not adequately considered in the response?
- Displaced persons
  - Host communities
  - Refugees
  - All groups were adequately considered
  - I don't know / Not sure.
16. How well were the most vulnerable individuals prioritized for assistance?
- Very well
  - Well
  - Neutral
  - Poorly
  - Very poorly
  - I do not know
17. If you found that the needs of the most vulnerable people were not consistently prioritized across all sectors (shelter, health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, PGI, CEA, and multipurpose cash), please specify the sector(s) that were affected.
- Shelter
  - Health
  - Livelihoods
  - WASH
  - Multipurpose Cash
  - PGI (Protection, Gender and Inclusion)
  - CEA (Community Engagement and Accountability)
18. Do you think issues around prioritizing the needs of the most vulnerable were addressed during the design and implementation of the targeting process?
- Yes, they were fully addressed
  - Yes, they were mostly addressed
  - Somewhat addressed
  - No, they were not addressed

- I don't know / Not sure.
19. If you found that prioritizing the most vulnerable groups were not addressed consistently across all sectors (shelter, health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, PGI, CEA, and multipurpose cash), please specify the sector(s) that were affected.
- Shelter
  - Health
  - Livelihoods
  - WASH
  - PGI (Protection, Gender and Inclusion)
  - CEA (Community Engagement and Accountability)
  - Multipurpose Cash
20. Were any corrective measures taken during implementation to address shortcomings in proper prioritization of the most vulnerable sectors?
- Yes, corrective measures were systematically implemented.
  - Yes, but only in specific cases or locations.
  - No, corrective measures were not taken.
  - Not applicable / No shortcomings were identified.
  - I don't know / Not sure.
21. If you found that corrective measures were not implemented consistently across all sectors (shelter, health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, PGI, CEA, and multipurpose cash), please specify the sector(s) that were affected.
- Shelter
  - Health
  - Livelihoods
  - WASH
  - PGI (Protection, Gender and Inclusion)
  - CEA (Community Engagement and Accountability)
  - Multipurpose Cash
22. How effective was the registration process in capturing accurate data?
- Highly effective
  - Effective
  - Neutral
  - Ineffective
  - Very ineffective
  - I don't know / Not sure.
23. If you found that the registration process did not capture accurate data across all sectors (shelter, health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, PGI, CEA, and multipurpose cash), please specify the sector(s) that were affected.
- Shelter

- Health
  - Livelihoods
  - WASH
  - PGI (Protection, Gender and Inclusion)
  - CEA (Community Engagement and Accountability)
  - Multipurpose Cash
24. How effective were partnerships with external entities (e.g., government agencies, UNHCR, IOM, WFP) in supporting the registration process?
- Highly effective – Strong collaboration and significant support provided
  - Effective – Good collaboration with some areas for improvement
  - Somewhat effective – Limited collaboration or support
  - Not effective – Minimal or no collaboration
  - Not applicable / I don't have enough information
25. How well did the Appeal use digital tools or mobile technologies to improve efficiency?
- Very well
  - Well
  - Neutral
  - Poorly
  - Very poorly
  - I do not know
26. Do you think the Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA) modality was appropriate in terms of the context, scale of the emergency, recipient preferences, and local market infrastructure?
- Yes, all aspects were appropriately considered
  - Some aspects were appropriately considered
  - No, the CVA modality was not appropriately based on these factors
  - Not sure
27. Were there any significant delays or gaps in the response?
- Yes, many delays or gaps
  - Yes, some delays or gaps
  - No significant delays or gaps
  - No delays or gaps at all
  - I don't know / Not sure.
28. Please rate the level of Accountability of the Appeal to the affected population.
- To answer this question, consider the following aspects: the affected population was informed about the selection criteria, adequate feedback and complaint mechanisms were established, the affected population were meaningfully included in decision-making processes, the information shared with the affected population was culturally appropriate and accessible, among others.*
- Excellent
  - Very Good

- Good
- Fair
- Poor
- I do not know
- I do not understand

29. Please rate the level of Accountability of the Appeal to the Government institutions.

- Excellent
- Very Good
- Good
- Fair
- Poor
- I do not know
- I do not understand

30. Please rate the level of Accountability of the Appeal to Donors.

- Excellent
- Very Good
- Good
- Fair
- Poor
- I do not know
- I do not understand

31. How would you rate the overall impact of the Emergency Appeal on the affected population?

- Very high – The Appeal significantly improved the well-being of the affected population
- High – The Appeal had a positive and noticeable impact
- Moderate – The Appeal had some positive effects, but with limitations
- Low – The Appeal had minimal impact
- Very low – The Appeal had little to no impact
- Not sure / I don't have enough information

32. If you found that the overall impact of the Emergency Appeal was not consistent across all sectors (shelter, health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, PGI, CEA, and multipurpose cash), please specify the sector(s) that had the least impact.

- Shelter
- Health
- Livelihoods
- WASH
- PGI (Protection, Gender and Inclusion)
- CEA (Community Engagement and Accountability)
- Multipurpose Cash

33. What two key strengths or areas for replication in future operations did you identify in the appeal in terms of relevance & appropriateness, effectiveness, and coverage? (Maximum 2)

Strengths 1:

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Strengths 2

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34. What two key weaknesses or areas for improvement did you identify in the appeal in terms of relevance & appropriateness, effectiveness, and coverage? (Maximum 2)

Weaknesses 1 :

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Weaknesses 2

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35. What two key lessons were learned from this appeal that could inform future efforts? (Maximum 2)

Lesson Learned 1 :

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Lesson Learned 2

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36. What two innovative approaches or innovations used in this evaluation would you recommend for replication in future operations (Maximum 2)

Innovation 1:

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Innovation 2

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37. What two specific recommendations would you make to enhance relevance & appropriateness, effectiveness, and coverage? (Maximum 2)

Recommendations 1:

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Recommendations 2:

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## **Online Survey Questionnaire People Reached**

### **Introduction**

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this survey.

This survey forms part of an external evaluation of the response to the earthquake by the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) through an international appeal launched by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The information gathered in this survey will only be seen by the independent consultants and will not be directly shared with anyone else.

This survey is being completed by peoples that have received support from the TRC.

Responses will be collated, and only summary findings will be included in the report. The survey will close on ### to allow for ###. Please complete your response before this time.

By completing this survey, you agree that your information can be used for the evaluation. If you have any questions about the review or the survey, or you wish to provide additional information, please email the consultant, Jorge Menendez, at [jmenendez@oneginconsulting.com](mailto:jmenendez@oneginconsulting.com)

This survey has 29 questions. If you choose to answer only some questions, please click 'next' until you reach the last page. You can go back and change answers at any time during the survey.

1. In which province did you receive support?
  - Headquarters
  - Adiyaman
  - Gaziantep
  - Hatay
  - Kahramanmaraş
  - Malatya
  - Osmaniye
2. What kind of support have you received? Select all that apply
  - Multipurpose Cash Assistance,
  - Protection Support,
  - Small Business Recovery Support,
  - Farm Recovery Support,
  - Other (WASH, Shelter, PSS, etc.)
3. How did you receive information about the type of support being provided by TRC? (Select all that apply)
  - In person (staff or volunteer visit)
  - By phone call, WhatsApp or SMS
  - Posters or signs in the community
  - From other people in the community
  - Radio
  - Social Media
  - I did not receive any information
4. Did anyone ask you what you needed or how you were doing before receiving the support from TRC?
  - Yes
  - No

- I don't remember
5. Did you face any challenges during the registration process, and was it clear and easy to understand?
    - No, I didn't face any challenges, and the process was clear and easy to understand
    - I faced some challenges, but TRC staff resolved them, and the process became clear
    - I faced some challenges, and nobody helped resolve them, it was confusing
    - The process was somewhat clear, but I had minor difficulties
    - I don't remember
  6. Did the TRC explain clearly what kind of support you would receive(s)?
    - Yes, very clearly – I understood everything.
    - Yes, mostly clear – I understood most of it.
    - A little – I understood some parts, but not everything.
    - No, it was not clear – I didn't really understand.
    - No one explained anything to me.
    - I don't remember.
  7. Did the TRC explain clearly what kind of amount you would receive?
    - Yes, very clearly – I understood everything.
    - Yes, mostly clear – I understood most of it.
    - A little – I understood some parts, but not everything.
    - No, it was not clear – I didn't really understand.
    - No one explained anything to me.
    - I don't remember
  8. Did the TRC explain clearly the selection process and the selection criteria?
    - Yes, very clearly – I understood everything.
    - Yes, mostly clear – I understood most of it.
    - A little – I understood some parts, but not everything.
    - No, it was not clear – I didn't really understand.
    - No one explained anything to me.
    - I don't remember
  9. Did the TRC explain clearly when you were going to receive the assistance?
    - Yes, very clearly – I understood everything.
    - Yes, mostly clear – I understood most of it.
    - A little – I understood some parts, but not everything.
    - No, it was not clear – I didn't really understand.
    - No one explained anything to me.
    - I don't remember
  10. Did you receive assistance in the time frame that the TRC told you?
    - Yes, it came at the time
    - It came later than they told me

- Never came
  - I don't remember
11. What channel was your main source for receiving information?
- TRC call center
  - SMS
  - TRC staff
  - Community service center
  - WhatsApp
  - Social Media
  - Other
12. What channel was your prefer source for give your feedback to Turkish Red Crecent (give your opinion, suggestions, claims..)?
- TRC call center
  - SMS
  - TRC staff
  - Community service center
  - WhatsApp
  - Social Media
  - Other
13. Was it easy to understand the information you received?
- Yes, very easy to understand
  - A little difficult, but I understood
  - Difficult to understand
  - I didn't receive any messages or calls
  - I don't remember.
14. If you received financial support, how did TRC deliver the money to you? Select all that apply
- Supermarket voucher
  - ESEN Card
  - ID bank transfer
  - Other
15. Were you able to use the support (cash, voucher, etc.) in local shops or markets to get what you needed?
- Very easy to use in local shops or markets
  - Fairly easy to use in local shops or markets
  - Somewhat difficult to use in local shops or markets
  - Very difficult to use in local shops or markets
  - I didn't try to use it
  - Not sure
16. Were you able to access and spend 100% of the amount of aid that was assigned to you?

- Yes
- Not, I spent the 75% of the support
- Not, I spent the 50 % of the support
- Not, I spent the 15% of the support

If not, please explain why

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17. In case of another emergency, how would you prefer to receive financial support from the TRC?

- Supermarket voucher
- ESEN Card
- ID bank transfer
- Other

18. Did you receive the support at the right time when you really needed it?

- Yes, it came at the right time
- It came late, but still helped
- It was too late to help
- I don't remember

19. How long did it take to receive the first support (like food, cash, seeds, or tools, health services) after the earthquake?

- Less than 1 week
- 1 to 2 weeks
- More than 2 weeks
- I don't remember

20. Did the assistance you received help meet your household's needs?

- All of them
- Most of them
- Some of them
- None of them

21. Did anyone from TRC check again during the program to see if your needs had changed?

- Yes, more than once
- Yes, one time
- No
- I don't know

22. Is the assistance you received after the earthquake still helping your recovery process or preparing you for future challenges?

- Yes, I still benefit from it
- A little, but not much
- No, it is no longer helping
- I don't know

23. Did the organization inform you when there were any changes in the support, Schedule or other relevant information (e.g., dates, type of assistance)?
- Yes, they gave updates clearly and on time
  - Yes, but updates were late or unclear
  - No, I did not receive any updates
  - I don't know
24. Did you know who to talk to or what to do if you had a question, feedback, complaints or problem about the help?
- Yes, I knew who to talk to and how.
  - Yes, but it was hard to contact them.
  - No, I didn't know who to talk to.
  - No one told me what to do.
  - I don't remember.
25. What would make this kind of support better in the future? (Select all that apply)
- Easier application
  - Faster delivery
  - Different modality
  - Better communication with people
  - Larger amount of support
  - I don't know
  - Other: \_\_\_\_\_
26. Should this way of checking and adjusting support be used again in future emergencies?
- Yes, it worked well and should be used again
  - Maybe, but some things could improve
  - No, it did not work well
27. How satisfied are you overall with the support you received from TRC?
- Very satisfied
  - Satisfied
  - Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
  - Dissatisfied
  - Very dissatisfied
  - I don't know / Not sure
28. Do you have any suggestions or recommendations on how TRC could improve its support in future responses?
-

## **ANNEX V. FOCUS GROUPS AND KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS QUESTIONS**

### **Community Focus Groups Questions**

#### **Introduction**

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this meeting.

This meeting is part of an external evaluation of the response to the earthquake by the Turkish Red Crescent through an international appeal launched by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. . We are holding it to assess the assistance provided by the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) to you. Your participation is completely voluntary and will not affect whether you or your community receives further support from TRC. All information you share will be kept strictly confidential and used only for our report; no names or personal details will be disclosed. You may leave the meeting at any time, and you are welcome to skip any questions you prefer not to answer.

#### **Participants participation**

The meeting will begin with an introduction of the consultant, followed by a presentation of the participants, who will be asked to state their name and the type of support they have received from the TRC.

1. How and when did you find out about the support being provided by TRC?
  2. Could you explain to me how the registration process was? Was the process easy to complete? If not, why??
  3. If you have any special needs or if you know someone who has it, do you feel that the process to receive and use the assistance was adapted for the conditions of people with special needs?
  4. How did you receive information from TRC? Did this work well? Do you have any suggestions for better ways to receive information?
  5. What information did TRC provide to you about TRC and the support you would receive (for example, about the amount, the timing, who qualifies)? Did the TRC inform you when there were changes in the type of support they could provide? Was the TRC clear about when the support would end?
  6. Was the information easy to understand?
  7. If you received cash, could you share with us how, in general, you used it?
  8. Were you able to spend all of the cash that was provided?
  9. What challenges did you have using the CASH?
  10. Did the assistance you received help meet your household's needs?
  11. Did anyone from TRC check again during the program to see if your needs had changed?
  12. Did you know who to talk to or what to do if you had a question, feedback, complaints, or problems about the help? Could you explain to us how this worked or what problems you may have had? Which was your preferred channel to provide feedback?
  13. What would make this kind of support better in the future? (Select all that apply)
  14. How satisfied are you overall with the support you received from TRC?
  15. Do you have any suggestions or recommendations on how TRC could improve its support in future responses?
-

## **Key Informant Interviews Questions (IFRC & TRC)**

### **Introduction**

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this meeting.

This meeting is part of an external evaluation of the response to the earthquake by the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) through an international appeal launched by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. This evaluation aims not only to assess the impact of the response but also to identify key lessons learned and provide recommendations to enhance future disaster responses in similar contexts.

Please be assured that all information shared during the interview will remain strictly confidential and will only be viewed by the consulting team for the purposes of this evaluation.

### **1. *Relevance and Appropriateness***

#### **1.1. Were there mechanisms in place for ongoing needs assessment and program adjustments during the implementation of the emergency appeal that can be replicated in future operations?**

- Were monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in place to update, review, and adapt interventions as new information emerged or needs evolved?
- How were ongoing risk analyses, assessments, market studies, and others used to adjust programme design and delivery?
- To what extent were the needs (LH, shelter, health...) of different population groups (e.g., host communities, refugees, women, youth, farmers, informal workers) assessed at different stages of the response?
- What mechanisms were in place to collect feedback from beneficiary communities, and how was it integrated into program decision-making?
- What mechanisms were in place to collect feedback from beneficiary communities, and how was it integrated into program decision-making?
- Which of these mechanisms do you consider can be replicated in future operations?

#### **1.2. To what extent was the choice of modality (e.g., cash, voucher, ATM cards, or digitized payment systems) appropriate to the context, scale of emergency, recipient preferences, and local market infrastructure?**

- How did the chosen modality reflect the preferences of recipients in terms of utility, dignity, and effectiveness?
- To what extent did the local market infrastructure and supply chains (e.g., for food, seeds, tools) support the appropriateness of using cash-based modalities?
- Were vouchers or in-kind support considered more appropriate in certain contexts or periods, and how were these decisions made?
- Were there any revisions or adjustments to the support modality throughout the program?

#### **1.3. What was the role of Information Management in ensuring accountability towards key stakeholders (affected population, donors, government institutions)?**

- In what ways did IM contribute to ensuring accountability to affected populations, particularly in ensuring that support addressed actual needs and challenges?
- How effectively was data collected, analyzed, and used to ensure the targeting and relevance of the support?
- How was information management used to report progress, results, and lessons learned to donors in a transparent and timely manner?
- How did information management help ensure that the affected population had access to clear, relevant, and timely information about assistance and could provide feedback?

- Were feedback and complaints related to the support systematically collected, analysed, and acted upon?
- What data management tools, platforms, or processes were used to facilitate coordination and ensure transparent information flow with all key stakeholders?
- Which IM activities implemented do you consider can be replicated in future operations?

## **2. Effectiveness**

### **2.1. How effective was the targeting system in identifying and selecting populations in need, and to what extent were the targeting mechanisms aligned with programme objectives and needs assessment findings?**

- What were the challenges in the registration process?
- To what extent did the targeting process minimize inclusion and exclusion errors, especially in dynamic or hard-to-reach contexts?
- Were all people with special needs registered in all phases of implementation or were there coverage gaps in any phase?
- How did you adapt the registration process to people with special needs?
- How participatory and transparent was the targeting process for communities and other local stakeholders?
- Which lessons learned do you consider can be replicated in future operations?

### **2.2. How well did the TRC adapt its response to emerging needs over time, ensuring continued timeliness of service delivery and its continuity in the recovery phase?**

- What systems or processes were used to monitor the context and quickly adjust the program based on changes?
- How timely was the delivery of the assistance in addressing urgent needs and preventing negative coping strategies?
- How effectively did the TRC adapt its interventions to evolving socio-economic conditions throughout the recovery phase?
- Were specific measures taken to ensure continuity of support beyond the initial emergency phase into sustainable recovery and resilience-building?
- Which adaptive mechanisms implemented do you consider can be replicated in future operations?

### **2.3. Were there any delays or gaps in the overall response, and what lessons can be learned to ensure quicker responses in future emergencies?**

- Were there delays or gaps in the delivery of the support, and what were the contributing factors (e.g., logistical, market-related, institutional)?
- What lessons can be drawn to improve the speed, coordination, and flexibility of future similar interventions during large-scale disasters?

### **2.4. What are some core operational components of the earthquake response that have a potential for high scalability, and how can these components be optimized to facilitate cost-effective scaling in future emergencies?**

- Which components of the response (e.g., multi-purpose cash, cash-for-livelihoods, cash for protection) showed high potential for scalability in terms of reach, efficiency, and outcomes?
- What operational and partnership models (e.g., with local governments, cooperatives, or private sector actors) facilitated effective scaling, and how can these be optimized in future operations?

**2.5. What were any innovative information management practices, such as the use of digital tools or mobile technologies, that enhanced the operation's effectiveness and can be replicated in future operations?**

- What innovative information management systems or digital platforms (e.g., digital beneficiary registration, mobile monitoring tools, market price tracking) were used to enhance the targeting, delivery, and monitoring of the assistance?
- How did these tools improve decision-making, efficiency, or transparency in the response?
- What challenges did you face when implementing these tools (staff capacity, connectivity, local acceptance, data protection, etc.)? Were they overcome?
- Which practices implemented do you consider can be replicated in future operations?

**2.6. What emerging best practices in Community Engagement and Accountability can be identified how can these practices be institutionalized for future operations?**

- How did CEA mechanisms (e.g., feedback systems, participatory planning, community outreach) contribute to improving the design and implementation of the support?
- What best practices in engaging communities (in informing, listening to, and responding to their needs) around programming emerged, and how can they be institutionalized for future disaster responses?

**3. Coverage**

**3.1. How well did the TRC assess and respond to the needs of displaced populations, host and refugee communities?**

- How did TRC ensure that assistance was equitable and did not create tensions between different groups (displaced people, refugees, host communities)?
- To what extent did the interventions reflect the specific needs of rural vs. urban populations?
- Were any of these population groups left out or had problems accessing the assistance process (registration, access to the redelivery mechanism, etc.)? How was this resolved?
- Which activities implemented do you consider can be replicated in future operations?

**3.2. How well did the prioritization process ensure that the most vulnerable individuals were prioritized for assistance, particularly in contexts with resource constraints?**

- To what extent did the prioritization criteria consider intersecting vulnerabilities, such as gender, age, disability, legal status, etc.?
- How did you adapt the prioritization process as the context changed or new needs arose?
- Were local communities or affected groups involved in defining these criteria?
- Did you receive complaints or comments from excluded individuals who should have been prioritized?
- Was the community clear about the selection processes and prioritization criteria?
- Which prioritization activities implemented do you consider can be replicated in future operations?

**3.3. How successfully were inclusion and exclusion errors minimized during the targeting design and implementation, and what measures were in place to address such errors in practice?**

- What was the extent of inclusion or exclusion errors in the response, and what mechanisms were in place to correct them (e.g., appeals, community validation)?
- How did TRC monitor and adjust targeting strategies during implementation to reduce such errors over time?
- Which mechanisms implemented do you consider can be replicated in future operations?

### **3.4. How effectively did the registration process capture and manage accurate and comprehensive data for targeted populations, including through partnerships with external entities such as government/ UNHCR/IOM/WFP amongst others?**

- What measures were taken to ensure the accuracy and consistency of the data collected? (tools, staff training in data collection, etc.)
- How was the data managed, protected, and updated once it was recorded, and what challenges or best practices were identified in that process?
- What role did partnerships with government agencies or UN entities (e.g., UNHCR, WFP, IOM) play in enhancing data accuracy and ensuring coordinated coverage of affected populations?
- To what extent did the use of digital tools or interoperable data systems improve the reach and accuracy of the programming?
- Which activities implemented do you consider can be replicated in future operations?

#### **Key Informant Interviews Questions - Stakeholders**

##### **Introduction**

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this meeting.

This meeting is part of an external evaluation of the response to the earthquake by the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) through an international appeal launched by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). This evaluation aims not only to assess the impact of the response but also to identify key lessons learned and provide recommendations to enhance future disaster responses in similar contexts.

Please be assured that all information shared during the interview will remain strictly confidential and will only be viewed by the consulting team for the purposes of this evaluation.

##### **Section 1: Needs Assessment and Identification**

1. **In your opinion, how well did TRC identify the needs of the population affected by the earthquake?**

*Can you provide any specific examples or situations?*

2. **Do you consider that the needs of host communities were adequately identified and addressed?**

*Why or why not?*

3. **And how about the refugee population? Do you think their needs were sufficiently identified and responded to?**

4. **Do you think any of these groups were not adequately considered in the response? Why do you think that was the case?**

*(Prompt: displaced persons, host communities, refugees)*

##### **Section 2: Targeting and Vulnerability**

6. **How effective do you think the targeting system used by TRC was in identifying people most in need?**

*What worked well and what could have been improved?*

7. **Were the most vulnerable individuals and households prioritised for assistance?**

*Can you think of any examples where this was done well or not done well?*

8. **Do you consider that TRC was able to adequately adapt to changes in needs and circumstances during implementation?**

*Were there any notable shifts or adaptations you observed?*

### **Section 3: Collaboration and Accountability**

10. **From your perspective, how effective were TRC's partnerships with other organisations (such as government agencies, UNHCR, WFP, IOM) in supporting the registration or response processes?**

*Any collaboration you would highlight as especially strong or weak?*

11. **How would you rate the level of accountability of TRC to your organisation or institution?**

*Were communication and coordination mechanisms effective?*

*Could you provide examples?*

12. **And how would you rate the level of accountability of TRC to the affected population?**

*Did people have the opportunity to express their concerns or feedback? Were they heard?*

### **Section 4: Impact and Recommendations**

13. **Overall, what impact do you think TRC's activities had on the affected population?**

*In what ways did they make a difference, or not?*

14. **Do you have any suggestions or recommendations on how TRC could improve its support in future emergencies or responses?**

*Feel free to reflect on any area you think is important, targeting, communication, partnerships, adaptation, etc.*

### **Closing:**

*Thank you very much for your time and for sharing your perspective. Your input is extremely valuable to this evaluation.*

## ANNEX VI. TERM OF REFERENCE

### Terms of reference<sup>1</sup>

#### International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies: Final Evaluation of Türkiye Earthquake Response (MDRHT004)

### 1. Summary

**1.1 Purpose:** This Final Evaluation will assess the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) and partners' response to the February 2023 earthquakes in Southeast Türkiye. Its purpose is to assess the achievements and quality of the programme's support to the affected population under the Federation-wide Emergency Appeal (EA). This evaluation complements the Operational Review, and the outcomes of the February lessons learned workshop. Findings will primarily be programmatic in nature and will distil key learnings and formulate actionable and evidence-based recommendations to inform future IFRC and Turkish Red Cross programmes.

**1.2 Target Audience:** This Evaluation will be used by the TRC, IFRC and its member National Societies, other Movement partners, the IFRC Europe Regional Office (ROE), and Headquarters in Geneva. The report will also be made available to RC/RC stakeholders and external partners involved in the response via [the IFRC Evaluation Databank](#), in a format agreed by all stakeholders involved.

**1.3 Commissioners:** This evaluation is being commissioned by Birgitte Bischoff Ebbesen, Regional Director, IFRC Regional Office for Europe.

**1.4 Reports to:** Evaluation Management Team (EMT)

**1.5 Duration:** Up to 80 working days

**1.6 Timeframe:** 1 June 2025 – 31 October 2025

**1.7 Location:** Primarily remote, with field visit to Türkiye

### 2. Background <sup>2</sup>

On 6 February 2023, a 7.7 magnitude earthquake struck at 04:17, followed by 83 aftershocks and a second earthquake of 7.6 magnitude at 13:24, impacting a wide range of areas in Türkiye and affecting about 15.7 million residents. On 20 February, another 6.4 magnitude earthquake hit Defne district, followed by a 5.8 magnitude quake in Samandağ district, causing further damage.

These earthquakes were among the largest and deadliest in Türkiye's history. In total, 17 provinces have been impacted by the earthquake with an estimated 9.1 million people directly affected according to AFAD<sup>3</sup>. The disaster severely damaged these provinces' infrastructure and livelihoods, with agricultural losses estimated at USD 6.4 billion. The affected areas were already impacted by the Syrian civil war since 2011, hosting about 1.8 million Syrian refugees, 47% of all Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Before the earthquakes, the region was already characterized by lower labour force participation and higher unemployment rates compared to the rest of Türkiye. Due to the humanitarian emergency, the overall socio-economic situation has deteriorated for all communities. In addition, climate and typical weather patterns in the earthquake-affected region have intensified the challenges for communities, and this trend is expected to persist.

During the earthquake response, Turkish Red Crescent led mass feeding services under the National Disaster Response Plan and contributed to health services, psychological support, relief item

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<sup>1</sup> This Terms of Reference was developed in accordance with the [IFRC Framework for Evaluations 2024](#)

<sup>2</sup> Sources: Operational Update #7 on the earthquake response operation and other relevant reports and documents related to the Emergency Appeal, available at: [IFRC GO - Emergency](#)

<sup>3</sup> Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency

distribution, and shelter assistance. Cash and voucher assistance (CVA) was also utilized to address urgent needs. In the first six months, TRC provided 416 million meals, clean water, hygiene items, and health services. Additionally, 1.34 million individuals received cash assistance to cover basic needs. These achievements were possible by TRC's extensive network of 13,000 staff, 300,000 volunteers, and its presence in 520 branches across the country.

In response to the disaster, the IFRC launched on 7th of February a Federation-wide Emergency Appeal (EA) of 120M CHF (which included an allocation of CHF 2 million from IFRC's Disaster Response Emergency Fund (DREF)), aiming to assist 300,000 people. As the scale of the disaster became clearer, the EA was revised twice, with the funding target increasing to CHF 750 million, intended to support mid-to-long-term recovery efforts for 1.25 million people.

## 2.1 Target population

Number of people being assisted: 1,751,234

## 2.2 Areas of Intervention

1.	Shelter, Housing and Settlements
2.	Livelihoods and Food Security
3.	Multi-purpose Cash
4.	Health & Care
5.	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
6.	Protection, Gender and Inclusion
7.	Community Engagement and Accountability

## 3. Evaluation Purpose and Scope

### 3.1 Purpose (overall objective)

The Final Evaluation focuses on the programmatic aspects of the Türkiye earthquake response, assessing the

- relevance,
- coverage, and
- effectiveness

of the intervention. It will also provide critical insights into the programme's strengths, best practices and lessons learned that can be integrated into future disaster response operations.

The findings from the evaluation will be used to inform several key aspects:

- **Evidence-based decision-making:** The Final Evaluation will provide evidence-based recommendations for ongoing or future operations, guiding strategic decisions for disaster response and preparedness.
- **Learning:** By identifying the transferable best practices and key lessons learned, the Final Evaluation will inform the development of more effective programming strategies for future responses.
- **Accountability:** The Final Evaluation will assess whether the earthquake response met its targets and objectives, and whether the operation has been conducted in compliance with the RCRC's Movement's standards and principles.

### 3.2 Scope

The Final Evaluation will assess the interventions carried out under the duration of the Emergency Appeal (7 February 2023 - 28 February 2025) in the 17 Turkish provinces affected by the earthquakes.

The Final Evaluation aims to generate learnings on cash-based interventions including multi-purpose cash (MPC) assistance, cash for protection and cash for livelihoods with the focus on scalability, replicability and innovation.

The target groups that should be included as a source of primary data in the Final Evaluation are those whose perspectives, experiences and feedback are essential to assessing the relevance, coverage, and effectiveness of the interventions. These groups can be categorized as follows:

- Recipients: people (individuals and families) who were affected by the earthquake and were recipients of interventions
- Red Cross and Red Crescent Staff and Volunteers: staff and volunteers of Turkish Red Crescent and international staff from other National Societies involved in the response
- IFRC Secretariat: Staff of IFRC's Country Delegation and IFRC's Regional Office for Europe
- Key implementing partners: Turkish Government Entities directly involved in the disaster response coordination, funding and policy implementation; local authorities and municipalities responsible for managing local-level disaster relief efforts

#### 4. Evaluation Criteria and Questions

Below are suggestions for key questions to be addressed in this Final Evaluation. These suggested questions provide initial guidance and can be further elaborated by the Evaluation Management Team and clarified by the consultancy team. The evaluation should follow the [Development Assistance Committee \(DAC\)](#) criteria, and the criteria presented in [the IFRC Framework for Evaluation](#).

##### 1) Relevance & Appropriateness<sup>4</sup>

- Were there mechanisms in place for ongoing needs assessment and program adjustments during the implementation of the emergency appeal that can be replicated in future operations?
- To what extent was the choice of modality (e.g., cash, voucher, ATM cards, or digitised payment systems) appropriate to the context, scale of emergency, recipient preferences, and local market infrastructure?
- What was the role of Information Management in ensuring accountability towards key stakeholders (affected population, donors, government institutions)?

##### 2) Effectiveness<sup>5</sup>

- How effective was the targeting system in identifying and selecting populations in need, and to what extent were the targeting mechanisms aligned with programme objectives and needs assessment findings?
- How well did the TRC adapt its response to emerging needs over time, ensuring continued timeliness of service delivery and its continuity in the recovery phase?
- Were there any delays or gaps in the overall response, and what lessons can be learned to ensure quicker responses in future emergencies?
- What are some core operational components of the earthquake response that have a potential for high scalability, and how can these components be optimized to facilitate cost-effective scaling in future emergencies?

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<sup>4</sup> Relevance and appropriateness are complementary criteria used to evaluate an intervention's objectives and wider goal. Relevance focuses on the extent to which an intervention is suited to the priorities of the target group, (i.e. local population and partners).

<sup>5</sup> Effectiveness measures the extent to which an intervention has or is likely to achieve its intended, immediate results. It is based upon an intervention's objectives and related indicators, typically stated in a logical framework. However, the assessment of effectiveness should not be limited to whether an intervention has achieved its objectives, but also to identify the major reasons and key lessons to inform further implementation or future interventions.

- What were any innovative information management practices, such as the use of digital tools or mobile technologies, that enhanced the operation's effectiveness and can be replicated in future operations?
- What emerging best practices in Community Engagement and Accountability can be identified how can these practices be institutionalized for future operations?

### 3) Coverage<sup>6</sup>

- How well did the TRC assess and respond to the needs of displaced populations, host and refugee communities?
- How well did the prioritisation process ensure that the most vulnerable individuals were prioritised for assistance, particularly in contexts with resource constraints?
- How successfully were inclusion and exclusion errors minimised during the targeting design and implementation, and what measures were in place to address such errors in practice?
- How effectively did the registration process capture and manage accurate and comprehensive data for targeted populations, including through partnerships with external entities such as government/ UNHCR/IOM/WFP amongst others?

## 5. Methodology

The methodology applied in this evaluation will adhere to the IFRC Framework for Evaluation with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized.

The EMT will manage and oversee the evaluation that will consist of 2 people including CVA expert and an evaluator who possess good understanding of the Türkiye context.

The Final Evaluation will complement the findings of the Operation Review and Lessons Learned workshop. The detailed evaluation methodology will be proposed by the consultant in close consultation with the Evaluation Management Team, but can draw upon the following primary methods:

- **Desk Review:** Analysis of the Operation Review and Lessons Learned Workshop report as well as other key program documents including the Operational Strategy, Operation Updates, Recovery Assessments, pledged-based reports, IFRC and TRC monitoring data and further relevant documentation produced as part of the operation.
- **Mixed-method Household Surveys:** Structured surveys to collect data from recipients to identify key outcomes of the operation.
- **Key Informant Interviews:** Interviews with IFRC and National Society staff, Government agencies, and other stakeholders.
- **Focus Group Discussions:** Group interviews with recipients and National Society staff to collect lessons learned from the operation and inform recommendations.
- **Field Visits/Observations:** If necessary, visits to selected sites to interact directly with the operation's recipients and the implementing National Society.

The consultant or consulting organization will outline the detailed methodology and data collection plan in the Inception Report that is to be approved by the EMT. The consultant will be responsible for all data collection and analysis activities while the IFRC will provide necessary support, including

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<sup>6</sup> Coverage refers to the extent population groups are included in or excluded from an intervention, and the differential impact on these groups. Evaluation of coverage involves determining who was supported by humanitarian action, and why. Coverage is linked closely to effectiveness (discussed above), but it has been included here as a separate criterion as it is especially relevant for the work of IFRC and its commitment to provide aid on the basis of need alone

mapping key informants and facilitating scheduling the interviews and focus group discussions as needed.

## 6. Deliverables

**Inception Report:** The Inception Report will outline the agreed methodology and data collection tools, sample size and a detailed work plan including data collection plan, along with allocation of clear roles and responsibilities within the team, firm deadlines for deliverables and the travel/logistical arrangements for the consultant. It will be presented to the Evaluation Management Team at the beginning of the consultancy.

**Debriefing and Validation of Preliminary Findings:** Virtual session to present the initial findings of the evaluation and receive input and feedback. This will inform drafting of the report. The workshop should include IFRC, TRC and other key stakeholders.

**Draft Report:** A Draft Report outlining key findings, conclusions, and recommendations to be sent to the EMT for feedback and comments.

**Final report:** The Final Report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 500 words) and a main body of the report (expected to be no more than 10,000 words) covering the background of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned, and clear recommendations. Recommendations should be specific, feasible and evidence based. The report should also contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the Terms of Reference (ToR), cited resources or bibliography, a list of respondents, the data collection tools used, and any other relevant materials. The report will also be made available to RC/RC stakeholders and external partners involved in the response via the IFRC Evaluation Databank, in a format agreed by all stakeholders involved.

## 7. Proposed Timeline

Time schedule	Activities	Deliverables
April 2025 (Weeks 1-4)	Desktop study: review intervention documentation, and related primary/secondary resources for the evaluation  Initial briefings  Development of detailed Inception Report, or data collection/analysis plan, draft methodology, data collection tools and work plan	Inception report, data collection/analysis plan, draft methodology, data collection tools and work plan
May- June 2025 (Weeks 5-12)	Preparation and pilot of data collection tools  Data collection in target communities according to data collection schedule	Piloted data collection instruments Data collection
July 2025 (Week 13)	Preparation and presentation of preliminary findings of to the EMT and key staff for initial inputs	Presentation
July 2025 (Weeks 14-15)	Preparation of Draft Evaluation Report	Draft version of evaluation report
July 2025 (Week 16)	Revision of draft report and submission of Final Evaluation Report	Final draft of evaluation report
August 2025 (Week 17)	Preparation of final virtual presentation	Final virtual presentation

## 8. Evaluation Quality and Ethical Standards

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people and communities involved and shall abide by the “do no harm” principle. The review should be technically accurate and reliable, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contribute to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and applicable practices outlined in the [IFRC Evaluation Framework](#). The IFRC Evaluation Standards are:

- **Utility:** Evaluations must be useful and used.
- **Feasibility:** Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost-effective manner.
- **Ethics & Legality:** Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner, with particular regard to the welfare of those involved in and affected by the evaluation.
- **Impartiality & Independence:** Evaluations should be impartial, providing a comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all stakeholders.
- **Transparency:** Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and transparency.
- **Accuracy:** Evaluations should be technically accurate, providing sufficient information about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or merit can be determined.
- **Participation:** Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.
- **Collaboration:** Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: 1) Humanity, 2) Impartiality, 3) Neutrality, 4) Independence, 5) Voluntary service, 6) Unity, and 7) Universality. Further information can be obtained about these Principles at <https://www.ifrc.org/who-we-are/international-red-cross-and-red-crescent-movement/fundamental-principles>.

## 9. Consultant's Qualifications and Experience

The lead evaluator should have:

- Minimum qualification of a PhD in international development, social sciences, humanitarian assistance or other related fields, or a Master's degree with equivalent combination of education and relevant work experience.
- Minimum of 7 to 10 years demonstrated experience in planning and implementing evaluations of humanitarian programs responding to major disasters required preferably with a specific focus on evaluating cash-based interventions.
- Advanced knowledge of cash-based interventions/ cash-based assistance programmes and an ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders.
- Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner.
- Excellent written and spoken English (reference of sample work required).
- Experience in managing teams remotely and comfortable working with online platforms.
- Knowledge and experience working with of Red Cross Red Crescent Movement strongly preferred.

- Experience working in Türkiye strongly preferred.

The consultant will provide an independent, objective, and critical perspective, and will be the primary author of the evaluation report. They will be hired through a transparent recruitment process, based on professional experience, competence, ethics and integrity for this evaluation.

The consultant should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the piece of work is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people involved and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable, is conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to better programming, organizational learning and accountability.

## **10. Fees and Payment Scheme**

Payment shall be made upon satisfactory completion of work in accordance with the ToR. The following shall be the payment scheme to the Consultant:

- 20% of the total amount after submission and approval of the Inception Report.
- 80% of the total amount after submission and approval of the Final Evaluation Report and the delivery of final presentations of the evaluation findings.

*Note: The consultant is solely responsible for the payment of taxes and other lawful fees that may be incurred from this contract.*

## **11. Application Procedures**

Interested candidates should submit their application material by **4 April 2025** to [hr.europe@ifrc.org](mailto:hr.europe@ifrc.org) with **'Türkiye Earthquake Response Final Evaluation'** written in the Subject Line. Application materials should include:

- Curriculum Vitae (CV) of all members of the team applying for consideration
- A one-page expression of interest
- A technical proposal, not exceeding five pages expressing an understanding and interpretation of the TOR, the proposed methodology, a time and activity schedule, and itemizing estimated costs for services
- Contact details for three professional referees
- At least one example of an evaluation report most similar to that described in the ToR.

For any questions regarding this evaluation, please contact Eva Mihalik, Monitoring and Evaluation focal point at [eva.mihalik@ifrc.org](mailto:eva.mihalik@ifrc.org).

## ANNEX VII. EVALUATION MATRIX

Evaluation criteria	Criteria definition <sup>22</sup>	Key general questions	Indicator	Source
Relevance and appropriateness	Relevance and appropriateness are complementary criteria used to evaluate an intervention's objectives and wider goal.	Were there mechanisms in place for ongoing needs assessment and program adjustments during the implementation of the emergency appeal that can be replicated in future operations?	Documented evidence of at least one systematic needs assessment update and corresponding program adjustment conducted during the emergency appeal  % of respondents who consider the need assessment identify the need of the population adequately	Desk review KII Interviews Focus Groups Discussions Online Survey Observation
	Relevance focuses on the extent to which an intervention is suited to the priorities of the target group, (i.e. local population and donor).	To what extent was the choice of modality (e.g., cash, voucher, ATM cards, or digitised payment systems) appropriate to the context, scale of emergency, recipient preferences, and local market infrastructure?	Evidence that the selected transfer modality was aligned with recipient preferences, market functionality assessments, and operational feasibility, with documented rationale demonstrating appropriateness to the emergency context and scale.  % of respondents who consider the mechanism appropriate	
	Appropriateness focuses on the extent to which an intervention is tailored to local needs and context, and compliments other interventions from other actors	What was the role of Information Management in ensuring accountability towards key stakeholders (affected population, donors, government institutions)?	Documented examples of information products, feedback mechanisms, and data management practices that contributed to transparency, informed decision-making, and timely reporting to affected populations, donors, and government institutions.	
Effectiveness	Effectiveness measures the extent to which an intervention has or is likely to achieve its intended, immediate results. It is based upon an intervention's objectives and related indicators, typically stated in a	How effective was the targeting system in identifying and selecting populations in need, and to what extent were the targeting mechanisms aligned with programme objectives and needs assessment findings?	Perceptions of staff and stakeholders on the effectiveness and timeliness of needs assessment processes in informing programme adjustments  Stakeholder perspectives on whether programme adjustments addressed emerging needs effectively and in a timely manner	

<sup>22</sup> Definition based on the IFRC Evaluation Framework

<p>logical framework. However, the assessment of effectiveness should not be limited to whether an intervention has achieved its objectives, but also to identify the major reasons and key lessons to inform further implementation or future interventions.</p>		<p>% of respondents reporting that ongoing needs assessments were conducted during implementation</p> <p>% of respondents who believe programme adjustments were made based on updated needs assessments</p> <p>% of respondents rating the adjustment process as timely and relevant</p>	
	<p>How well did the TRC adapt its response to emerging needs over time, ensuring continued timeliness of service delivery and its continuity in the recovery phase?</p>	<p>Evidence of changes in programme design or delivery in response to newly identified needs during the response and recovery phases</p> <p>Perceptions of affected communities on the relevance and timeliness of adjustments made to services over time</p> <p>Examples of activities implemented to adapt to emergencies needs.</p> <p>% of respondents who consider the appeal adapt well, very good or good to changing needs and circumstances during its implementation?</p>	
	<p>Were there any delays or gaps in the overall response, and what lessons can be learned to ensure quicker responses in future emergencies?</p>	<p>Evidence and examples of specific delays or service gaps identified during the response</p> <p>Perceptions of affected populations on the timeliness, coverage, and adequacy of the response</p> <p>Stakeholder perspectives on key factors contributing to delays or gaps (e.g., coordination, resource mobilization, supply chain, staffing)</p> <p>Examples of successful adjustments or innovations made during the operation to overcome delays and improve responsiveness</p> <p>% of respondents reporting delays in the response</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>KII Interviews</p> <p>Focus Groups Discussions</p> <p>Online Survey</p> <p>Observation</p>

			<p>% of respondents consider they received the support on the right time.</p>	
		<p>What are some core operational components of the earthquake response that have a potential for high scalability, and how can these components be optimized to facilitate cost-effective scaling in future emergencies?</p>	<p>Evidence of successful implementation of these components at different scales during the earthquake response</p> <p>Perceptions of staff and partners on the feasibility and effectiveness of scaling these components</p> <p>Examples of adaptations or innovations within these components that improved efficiency or resource utilization during the response</p>	
		<p>What were any innovative information management practices, such as the use of digital tools or mobile technologies, that enhanced the operation's effectiveness and can be replicated in future operations?</p>	<p>Evidence of innovative information management practices applied during the operation (e.g., digital tools, mobile data collection, real-time dashboards)</p> <p>Perceptions of staff, partners, and affected communities on the usefulness and ease of use of these tools or technologies</p> <p>Examples of how innovative information management practices directly contributed to faster decision-making or improved service delivery</p> <p>Stakeholder recommendations for optimizing or expanding the use of these tools and technologies in similar contexts</p>	
		<p>What emerging best practices in Community Engagement and Accountability can be identified how can these practices be institutionalized for future operations?</p>	<p>Identification of emerging best practices in CEA applied during the operation, as recognized by staff, partners, and communities</p> <p>Examples of how CEA practices (e.g., two-way communication channels, feedback mechanisms, participatory decision-making) influenced programme design or delivery</p> <p>Perceptions of affected communities on the accessibility, inclusiveness, and</p>	

			responsiveness of CEA approaches used in the operation	
Coverage	<p>Coverage refers to the extent population groups are included in or excluded from an intervention, and the differential impact on these groups. Evaluation of coverage involves determining who was supported by humanitarian action, and why. Coverage is linked closely to effectiveness (discussed above), but it has been included here as a separate criterion as it is especially relevant for the work of IFRC and its commitment to provide aid on the basis of need alone</p>	How well did the TRC assess and respond to the needs of displaced populations, host and refugee communities?	<p>Evidence of comprehensive needs assessments conducted for displaced populations, host communities, and refugee communities.</p> <p>Stakeholder consider that TRC's response to the needs of the displaced populations, host and refugee communities</p> <p>% respondents consider that the assistance help meet their household's needs</p>	<p>Desk review</p> <p>KII Interviews</p> <p>Focus Groups Discussions</p> <p>Online Survey</p> <p>Observation</p>
		How well did the prioritisation process ensure that the most vulnerable individuals were prioritised for assistance, particularly in contexts with resource constraints?	<p>Evidence of clear and transparent criteria used to identify and prioritise the most vulnerable individuals in resource-constrained contexts</p> <p>Perceptions of affected communities and stakeholders on the fairness and transparency of the prioritisation process</p> <p>Examples of how prioritisation decisions were adjusted in response to emerging needs or feedback from communities</p> <p>% of respondents who believe the most vulnerable were prioritised very well and well.</p>	
		How successfully were inclusion and exclusion errors minimised during the targeting design and implementation, and what measures were in place to address such errors in practice?	<p>Evidence of targeting mechanisms and verification processes designed to minimise inclusion and exclusion errors</p> <p>Perceptions of staff and partners on the fairness and accuracy of beneficiary selection</p> <p>Examples of identified inclusion or exclusion errors and actions taken to address them during implementation</p> <p>Evidence of ongoing monitoring and validation processes to detect and correct targeting errors</p>	

		<p>How effectively did the registration process capture and manage accurate and comprehensive data for targeted populations, including through partnerships with external entities such as government/ UNHCR/IOM/WFP amongst others?</p>	<p>Evidence that registration processes collected accurate, complete, and disaggregated data for all targeted population groups</p> <p>Perceptions of staff, partners, and affected populations on the efficiency, accessibility, and clarity of the registration process</p> <p>Examples of how data from registration was used to inform targeting, service delivery, and programme monitoring</p> <p>Evidence of effective data sharing, coordination, and interoperability with external entities (e.g., government, UNHCR, IOM, WFP) while maintaining data protection standards</p> <p>% of respondents who consider that the registration was highly effective and effective.</p>	
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## ANNEX VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION MATRIX

Nº	Conclusions	Recommendation	Source	Confidence Rate
1	<p>The Türkiye Earthquake Response demonstrated strong early action, supported by pre-existing systems, local partnerships, and skilled teams. Building on these strengths through enhanced readiness planning and continued investment in staff and volunteer skills—particularly in data management, CVA, protection, and community engagement—will help sustain rapid, high-quality, and adaptable responses in future emergencies.</p>	<p><b>Strengthen Emergency Response Readiness and Core Capacities:</b> Building on the proven strengths of early action, TRC/IFRC should institutionalize and regularly update emergency response and readiness plans to ensure swift mobilization in future crises. This includes pre-positioning resources, clarifying surge protocols, and stress-testing systems for rapid deployment. Prioritize sustained investment in staff and volunteer capacity across essential functions—data management, CVA, protection, community engagement, and PMER/IM—to guarantee that skilled teams are consistently available to deliver rapid, adaptable, and high-quality responses. (TRC/IFRC)</p>	<p>Document Review Interviews with TRC, IFRC and other Stakeholders</p>	<p>High</p>
2	<p>The Türkiye Earthquake Response showed notable agility, with teams adapting quickly to changing needs and working closely with partners to deliver timely support. Further authorizing leaders to make decisions in the field and streamlining approval processes will build on this responsiveness, enabling faster, more flexible, and locally driven adaptations to meet the evolving needs of affected communities.</p>	<p><b>Promote Adaptive and Decentralized Leadership:</b> Encourage leadership that is flexible and responsive to emerging challenges by authorizing leaders to make quick decisions in high-pressure situations. Decentralize some approval processes to enhance responsiveness and foster greater community ownership, enabling leadership to adapt strategies swiftly to meet the evolving needs of affected populations. (TRC, ongoing assessment by IFRC)</p>	<p>Document Review Interviews with TRC, IFRC and other Stakeholders People Reached Survey FGD People Reached</p>	<p>High</p>
3	<p>The Türkiye Earthquake Response demonstrated effective collaboration that supported timely and relevant assistance to communities. By further strengthening internal communication and enhancing integration between sectors such as cash, protection, and livelihoods, TRC can build on these successes to deliver more coordinated, comprehensive support that meets the holistic needs of affected populations.</p>	<p><b>Promote Cross-Sectoral Integration and Internal Coordination:</b> Create and institutionalize internal communication, coordination and collaboration mechanisms (structured meeting/planning) between sectors such as cash, protection, and livelihoods to create integrated and efficient programs that better meet the holistic needs of affected populations. An example would be collaboration between departments such as IM, CEA, Protection, and CVA contributing to the successful delivery of CVA. (TRC)</p>	<p>Document Review Interviews with TRC, IFRC and other Stakeholders FGD TRC Staff</p>	<p>High</p>

4	<p>The Türkiye Earthquake Response demonstrated that scalable interventions, supported by strong infrastructure and partnerships, can deliver significant impact in both emergency and recovery phases. However, as needs evolved, some gaps emerged in linking immediate relief to longer-term recovery, underscoring the importance of structured transition planning.</p>	<p><b>Plan for Long-Term Sustainability:</b> Focus on enhancing the scalability of successful interventions, such as cash assistance and livelihoods support, by strengthening existing infrastructure and partnerships. Plan for gradual transition from emergency relief to recovery, ensuring that the response can continue to be flexible and adaptive to future challenges. (TRC with support from IFRC)</p>	<p>Document Review Interviews with TRC, IFRC and other Stakeholders FGD People Reached People Reached Survey</p>	High
5	<p>During the Türkiye Earthquake Response, staff and volunteers demonstrated exceptional dedication, often while coping with their own disaster-related impacts. This commitment was critical to sustaining operations but also placed significant emotional and physical demands on teams, highlighting the importance of ensuring their well-being to maintain both morale and operational effectiveness.</p>	<p><b>Enhance Staff Well-Being and Capacity:</b> Invest in wellness programs and rest protocols for staff and volunteers, especially those directly affected by the disaster. Ensure that well-being is prioritized to prevent burnout and maintain operational effectiveness over the long term. (TRC)</p>	<p>Document Review Interviews with TRC and IFRC FGD TRC Staff</p>	High
6	<p>The Türkiye Earthquake Response showed that while preparedness and transition planning were in place, some communities remained uncertain about the continuity of support as emergency activities concluded. In several cases, this uncertainty created concern about meeting future needs, underscoring the importance of managing transitions in a way that maintains stability and confidence during the shift from relief to recovery.</p>	<p><b>Enhance Transition Communication and Community Confidence:</b> While exit strategies and transition planning were in place, TRC with support from IFRC should place stronger emphasis on transparent communication of these plans to affected communities. This includes clearly informing people about the timeline of emergency support, the handover to recovery programming, and where they can access ongoing services. Doing so will reduce uncertainty, maintain community confidence, and ensure smoother transitions from relief to recovery. (TRC with support from IFRC)</p>	<p>Document Review Interviews with TRC and IFRC FGD TRC Staff FGD People Reached People Reached Survey</p>	Moderate
7	<p>The Türkiye Earthquake Response benefited from strong relationships with government, UN agencies, and other partners, enabling rapid mobilization and joint action. However, differences in data, processes, and decision-making at times slowed coordination and created risks of duplication or service gaps highlighting the need for clearer and more consistent collaboration frameworks.</p>	<p><b>Improve External Coordination and Communication:</b> Strengthen coordination and communication with external partners by working together to develop clearer protocols for inter-agency collaboration and decision-making to avoid delays, duplication, and gaps in service delivery, especially in high-pressure situations. (TRC and IFRC)</p>	<p>Document Review Interviews with TRC, IFRC and other Stakeholders TRC Staff Survey FGD TRC Staff</p>	High

8	TRC staff faced significant challenges in effectively monitoring the use of e-vouchers. Limitations in tracking transactions, verifying usage, and preventing duplication hindered accountability and reduced the ability to accurately assess the effectiveness of these modalities during the early stages of implementation.	<b>Monitoring System.</b> During the selection of a CVA mechanism, ensure that an adequate real-time monitoring system is in place. This includes establishing tools to effectively track voucher redemption and fund usage. Integrating robust monitoring capabilities into the chosen modality is essential for accountability, transparency, and adaptive programme management. (TRC with support from IFRC)	Document Review Interviews with TRC and IFRC	High
9	ID-based transfers proved to be scalable, cost-efficient, and widely preferred by the community. By leveraging national ID numbers, this mechanism eliminated the need for physical cards, reducing logistical challenges while ensuring fast, traceable, and secure cash distributions. Its strong operational efficiency highlights its potential for large-scale implementation in future programmes.	<b>Prioritize the use of ID-based cash transfer mechanisms</b> in future programmes, as they offer scalability, cost-efficiency, and operational effectiveness. (TRC)	Document Review Interviews with TRC, IFRC and other Stakeholders FGD People Reached People Reached Survey	High
10	While the mechanisms used, particularly the ID-based transfers, were well accepted and positively received by the communities, beneficiaries had to make considerable efforts to travel in order to access the funds, as withdrawal points were not available near the container cities.	Ensure that cash withdrawal points and service providers are conveniently located near where affected populations reside, such as within or close to container cities and informal settlements. When selecting delivery mechanisms, prioritize proximity and accessibility to reduce the burden on beneficiaries, especially those with limited mobility or resources. (TRC and IFRC)	Document Review Interviews with TRC and IFRC FGD People Reached	Moderate
11	The administrative workload associated with the livelihood component created significant strain on staff capacity and was not managed in the most efficient way. The volume and complexity of administrative tasks diverted time and resources from other critical activities, highlighting the need for streamlined processes, clearer roles, and better resource allocation in future programming.	<b>Administrative procedures.</b> Simplify administrative procedures—such as enabling digital invoice submissions for livelihood support—and improve operational efficiency to minimize delays between application and payment, ensuring timely assistance delivery. (TRC and IFRC)	Document Review Interviews with TRC and IFRC Interviews and FGD with other stakeholders FGD People Reached	Moderate

12	<p>The absence of early consultation with communities on their preferred transfer mechanisms meant that beneficiary perspectives were not fully reflected in the initial design and roll-out of the operation. As a result, the chosen modalities did not fully consider community preferences from the start.</p>	<p><b>Community Consultation.</b> Before initiating cash distributions, conduct community consultations as part of the needs assessment to identify preferred transfer modalities and communication channels. This ensures the chosen mechanism aligns with local preferences, accessibility, and market conditions, thereby improving acceptance, efficiency, and programme relevance. (TRC and IFRC)</p>	<p>Document Review Interviews with TRC and IFRC Interviews and FGD with other stakeholders FGD People Reached People Reached Survey</p>	High
13	<p>While having multilingual teams was a significant positive factor in facilitating communication, challenges remained. For example, SMS messages were only sent in Turkish, and there was a lack of visual information, such as posters, banners, or pictograms, in multiple languages. This created barriers for parts of the population, particularly those who do not speak Turkish, limiting their ability to fully understand the information provided and engage effectively with the programme. It should also be noted that the Emergency Appeal did not prioritize the production of multilingual information materials, as the Turkish Red Crescent was already addressing these needs through its community centres and other programmes outside the scope of the Appeal. For instance, TRC community centres regularly organized information sessions and produced leaflets, posters, and awareness-raising materials in Arabic, Farsi, English, and other relevant languages.</p>	<p><b>Enhance Accessible and Multilingual Communication.</b> Develop and systematically disseminate communication materials in all relevant languages and formats adapted for people with low literacy and disabilities. Ensure SMS notifications and outreach messages are consistently provided in appropriate languages and accessible formats, including audio-visual content and pictograms. (TRC)</p>	<p>Document Review Interviews with TRC and IFRC FGD People Reached</p>	Moderate

14	<p>There was a noticeable lack of awareness among the population regarding the TRC staff Code of Conduct, as well as the mechanisms available for submitting sensitive complaints. In particular, many beneficiaries were unaware of how to report issues related to sexual abuse, harassment, and corruption, or how such complaints would be handled, highlighting a critical gap in community protection and accountability measures.</p>	<p><b>Reinforce safeguarding awareness and reporting sensitive complaints.</b> Expand awareness of safeguarding policies and confidential complaint mechanisms by embedding safeguarding messages across all communication channels. Ensure multiple, safe, and discreet reporting options are available, particularly for sensitive complaints, and provide training to frontline staff on how to guide community members in using them. A TRC is currently conducting a safeguarding self-assessment, which should be referenced. (TRC)</p>	<p>Document Review Interviews with TRC FGD People Reached Observation</p>	<p>High</p>
15	<p>The establishment of Community Participation Structures within the container cities was a highly positive initiative. These groups created a direct communication channel between the TRC and the residents, enabling the organization to gather firsthand information about the community's needs, concerns, and feedback. This engagement not only improved the relevance and responsiveness of the assistance provided but also fostered a sense of inclusion and empowerment among the residents. As highlighted by many beneficiaries, the presence of these groups significantly contributed to building strong trust and confidence in the TRC, strengthening the organization's relationship with the communities it served.</p>	<p><b>Institutionalize Community Participation Structures.</b> Establish Community Groups in all programmes and response operations to strengthen participation in programme design, targeting, and implementation. Ensure that these groups represent diverse segments of the population, including women, persons with disabilities, and minority groups, and provide them with regular technical and logistical support. (TRC)</p>	<p>Document Review Interviews with TRC FGD People Reached Observation</p>	<p>High</p>
16	<p>While the organization made significant efforts to communicate with the affected population, there was a clear absence of a centralized platform—such as the IFRC's Go platform—where the Turkish public could easily access comprehensive information about the scope and impact of TRC's assistance to earthquake-affected communities. This gap limited broader awareness and understanding of the organization's response efforts.</p>	<p><b>Develop a Centralized Public Information Platform.</b> Establish a centralized, user-friendly digital platform in Türkiye— similar to IFRC's GO platform—that provides up-to-date information on the activities conducted by TRC. (TRC)</p>	<p>Document Review Interviews with TRC with other stakeholders FGD People Reached Observation</p>	<p>Moderate</p>

17	The use of outdated data at the start of the operation posed a significant challenge, as individuals in need of assistance who were not included in the pre-existing lists were excluded from support.	<b>Establish Pre-Crisis Data-Sharing Protocols.</b> Formalize agreements with government (AFAD, ministries) and UN agencies to enable real-time access to updated databases. Over-reliance on outdated lists led to exclusion of newly vulnerable groups and inclusion errors (e.g., deceased individuals). (TRC)	Document Review Interviews with TRC with other stakeholders	Moderate
18	TRC has numerous management mechanisms and tools in place, which at times can hinder smooth internal information flow and require significant effort to coordinate effectively.	<b>Harmonize Internal Data Systems:</b> Integrate TRC departmental platforms to eliminate duplication, standardize tools (e.g., tablets), and enable real-time reporting. This will reduce fragmentation that causes delays, reporting gaps, or hinders cash deployment. (TRC)	Document Review Interviews with TRC and IFRC FGD TRC Staff Observation	Moderate
19	While TRC made significant efforts to reach targeted populations, the absence of regular vulnerability analyses occasionally limited the programme's ability to anticipate certain barriers and challenges in advance.	<b>Implement Dynamic Vulnerability Reassessments:</b> In order to avoid static data and barriers (e.g., digital illiteracy, Turkish-only SMS) that contribute to exclusion, develop SOPs for regular field verification to capture shifting needs, particularly among refugees, rural communities, and informal settlers.	Document Review Interviews with TRC and IFRC FGD TRC Staff FGD People Reached People Reached Survey	High
19	By placing TRC firmly at the centre of the operation, with clear leadership and decision-making authority, the response highlighted how federation-wide support can strengthen a National Society-led model. IFRC's role in providing targeted technical assistance without assuming operational control further demonstrated how the <b>Agenda for Renewal</b> can be applied effectively in practice.	<b>Document the Türkiye experience</b> as evidence of how a National Society-led model, with TRC in a clear leadership role supported by federation-wide solidarity, can deliver effective results. Ensure that this approach, reflecting the <b>Agenda for Renewal</b> , is applied in whole or in part in future operations, adapted to the varying capacities of different National Societies. (IFRC)	Document review Interviews with TRC and IFRC	Moderate